NYĀYA PHILOSOPHY

Literal Translation of
Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtra*
&
Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*
along with a free and abridged translation of the Elucidation by
Mahāmahopādhyāya Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa

[PART III : THIRD ADHYĀYA]

MRINALKANTI GANGOPADHYAYA

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EDITOR'S NOTE

According to the original plan, the work on the third part of the *Nyāya Philosophy* was started jointly by myself and Sri Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya. However, it was later realised that, under the altered conditions of various commitments of both, sitting together for a sustained period—as was previously done—was becoming increasingly difficult. This made the progress of the work very slow. At the same time, the demand from the readers for the third part went on growing. Failing to visualise any near future when I might be able to return to it, I requested Sri Mrinalkanti to complete the work by himself. I am extremely happy that I have been able to persuade him to do so. Since I could work with him only on a negligible portion of the present part, it is considered fit to be published under his authorship alone.

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Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya
Editor, *Indian Studies : Past & Present*

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CHAPTER III

The third chapter of the *Nyāya-sūtra* is divided into two *āhnika*-s.
The contents of the first *āhnika*, consisting of nine sections and 73 *sūtra*-s, are:

Sūtra-s 1-3 : on the self as distinguished from the sense-organs
4-6 : on the self as distinguished from the body
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The contents of the second *āhnika*, consisting of seven sections and 72 *sūtra*-s, are:

Sūtra-s 1-9 : on knowledge being non-eternal
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Adhyāya III *Āhnika I*

1. ON THE SELF AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE SENSE-ORGANS

Bhāṣya

The critical examination of the *pramāṇa*-s being over, now are being critically examined the 'objects of knowledge' (*prameya*-s). [The list of] these [*prameya*-s] begins with the self. Hence the self is being critically examined first.

Is the self a mere assemblage of body, sense-organs, mind, knowledge and feelings [of pleasure and pain]? Or, is it something different [from such an assemblage]?

N. 3. 1/a

What is the cause of such a doubt ? Because there are 'references' (*vyapadeśa*) in both forms. By reference is meant the statement of the relation between the agent (*kartā*) and its action (*kriyā*) as well as its instrument (*karaṇa*). It is in two forms. [First] the reference to the whole by the parts, for example, "The tree stands on its roots", "The building stands on the pillars". [Secondly] the reference to something by something else, for example, "One cuts with the axe", "One sees with the lamp".

[Regarding the self] there are references like : "One sees with the eyes", "One knows with the mind", "One judges with the help of knowledge" and "One feels pleasure and pain with the body". In these cases, [the nature of] the references is not clear. Is it a reference by the parts to the whole [i.e. to the self] in the sense of an assemblage of body etc ? Or, is it a reference by something to something else as distinct from it [i.e. the assemblage] ?

Elucidation

In the first two chapters, Gautama has discussed the 'instruments of valid knowledge' (*pramāṇa*-s) both in their general and specific forms. As the logical sequence to it, he takes up the examination of the 'objects of valid knowledge' (*prameya*-s) in this chapter. These objects can be examined only with the aid of the *pramāṇa*-s and hence the discussion of the *prameya*-s presupposes the discussion of the *pramāṇa*-s. Of the *prameya*-s, the self is mentioned and defined first. Hence the critical discussion of the *prameya*-s logically begins with that of the self. Any critical discussion presupposes a doubt concerning the object discussed. There can be no doubt concerning the existence of the self, because its inferential proof is already given in *Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.10. Still, there may be doubt concerning the exact nature of the self, for the question arises whether the self is to be viewed as the mere assemblage of body, sense-organs, etc, or as something over and above. [However, the nature of the self understood as a mere assemblage of body, sense-organs, etc, amounts to the very denial of the self—a view to the discussion of which Phaṇibhūṣaṇa presently returns.]

This doubt concerning the nature of the self is explained by Vātsyāyana as due to the two ways in which the reference (*vyapadeśa*) to the self may be understood. The self is usually referred to by expressions like : "One sees with the eyes", "One feels pleasure and pain with the body", etc. A reference like this may be understood in two ways. Thus : 1) reference to the whole by the parts, e g., when one says, "The tree stands on its roots," ; 2) reference to something by something else, e.g., when one says, "One cuts with the axe".

Understood in the first of these senses, the above reference to the self amounts to the view of the self as a mere assemblage of the body, sense-organs, etc, or as a

mere member of such an assemblage. Understood in the second sense, the reference above amounts to the view of the self as something distinct from this assemblage or any member of it, i.e. as something over and above the body, sense-organs, etc. Hence there arises the doubt concerning the exact nature of the self and Gautama proposes to dispel it by the critical examination of the self.

Vācaspati, however, points out that from the strictly Nyāya point of view, even the reference in the form "The tree stands on its roots" amounts to a reference to something by something else, because in the Nyāya view the *whole* is completely distinct from the *parts*. Evidently, therefore, Vātsyāyana gives this example from the point of view of those who do not consider the *whole* as distinct from the *parts*.

The view that the self is nothing more than the assemblage of the body, sense-organs, etc., or that the self as a distinct entity does not exist, is prevalent from an ancient time and is known as *nairātmya-vāda* or the doctrine of the denial of the self. Such a view is referred to in the *Kaṭha* (i. 20) and *Maitrāyaṇī* (vii. 8) Upaniṣads. It is also mentioned in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* and from the refutation of the view by the Naiyāyikas like Udayana and his commentator Mathurānātha it is evident that the view was subscribed to by a section of the ancient Buddhists. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa comments that, though Uddyotakara elaborately refutes this ancient Buddhist view that rejects the reality of the self, Uddyotakara himself does not admit that such a view was true to the real teachings of the Buddha.

According to Uddyotakara the following inference was advanced by the ancient thinkers who denied the reality of the self. The self does not exist, because it has no origin, as for instance, the hare's horn. The hare's horn has no origin and it is non-existent. The self also, having no origin, is non-existent.

In refutation of this inference, Uddyotakara says that the 'thesis sought to be established' (*pratijñā*) of this inference is that the self does not exist. However, this is an absurd proposition. It is meaningless to deny the existence of something which is absolutely non-existent. The existence of something in a particular time or place can be denied only when it is known to be existing in some other time or place. Thus, the denial of the self implies its existence in some context or other.

To this it may be objected that we have the knowledge in the form : The hare's horn does not exist. In such a case, we do deny the existence of something absolutely non-existent. In the same way, there can be the denial of the self which is absolutely non-existing.

Uddyotakara answers that the real implication of the statement, viz. "The hare's horn does not exist" is the denial of the relation between the hare and the horn, both of which are separately known to be existing. Thus, even a proposition like this does not imply the denial of the existence of something absolutely non-existing. Therefore, those for whom the self is absolutely non-existing, it is meaningless to have the thesis of an inference in the form : The self does not exist.

From this it also follows that the corroborative instance of the inference,

namely, the hare's horn, is illegitimate, because the non-existence of the hare's horn simply means the absence of any relation between the hare and the horn.

Further, the probans of the inference, namely "it has no origin", cannot prove the non-existence of the self. The absence of origin may have two implications. These are : 1) the absolute absence of origin (*sarvathā-janma-rāhitya*) and 2) the absence of origin in a specific form (*svarūpataḥ-janma-rāhitya*). That which is eternal may be characterised by the absence of origin in a specific form, though this does not prove its non-existence, because it is eternal. Only when something is characterised by the absolute absence of origin, can its non-existence be inferred. The self, however, has no origin only in the second sense (*svarūpataḥ-janma-rāhitya*), and not in the first sense (*sarvathā-janma-rāhitya*). Thus, the self as self has no origin, but it has origin in the sense of being connected with different bodies in different births. Therefore, taking "the absence of origin in a specific form" as the probans, the non-existence of the eternal self cannot be inferred.

Uddyotakara shows why the inference of the non-existence of the self is fallacious also because of various other considerations. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa adds that assuming the self to be absolutely unreal, there is no scope to infer its non-existence, inasmuch as something which is absolutely unreal can never be the subject (*pakṣa*) of an inference at all. Such an effort will result in the pseudo-probans called *āśrayāsiddhi* or having for its subject (*pakṣa*) an unproved substratum. It becomes as absurd as trying to infer : The lotus blooming in the sky has fragrance, because it is a flower.

The existence of the self is sought to be denied also with the help of the following inference : The living body is without a self, because it is characterised by existence (*sattā*), as for instance, the jar. Anything existent is without a self ; the living body also, being existent, must be without a self. In answer to this, Uddyotakara says that it is necessary to determine first the exact meaning of the expression "without a self" (*nirātmaka*). Does it mean "having no use (*anupakārin*) for any self" ? Or does it mean the absence of the self ? The expression "without a self" cannot be taken in the first sense, because there can be no instance to corroborate the inference, inasmuch as there can be no object which has no use for any self. In the second alternative,—i.e. assuming "without a self" to mean "the absence of the self",—the very purpose of the inference is defeated. If the "absence of the self" means its absence only in some specific locus, the inference will prove its existence in some other locus. If, however, the absence of the self means its absolute non-existence, its denial can have no significance.

Besides, the word self (*ātman*) must have a specific meaning. If, however, there is nothing called the self, the word loses all significance and becomes non-sensical.

Uddyotakara further argues that only by flouting the true spirit of the Buddha's teaching can the Buddhist argue that there is no self. In the Buddhist canonical works, the self means the assemblage of the five 'constituent elements' (*skandha*), namely of 1) bodily form (*rūpa*), 2) feeling (*vedanā*), 3) perception (*saṃjñā*), 4) consciousness

(*vijñāna*) and 5) tendencies generated by the impressions of the past experience (*saṃskāra*). The identification of the self with any of these is denied, but that does not mean the denial of the self as such. Uddyotakara claims that in the work called *Sarvābhisamaya-sūtra*, the Buddha himself denounced the deniers of the self as being under the spell of ignorance. Though Phaṇibhūṣaṇa fails to trace such a text, he nevertheless feels convinced that from various other evidences it is clear that the Buddha himself believed in a permanent self. The Buddha's silence in response to questions regarding the self does not necessarily imply the denial of the self, the real significance of this silence being that the nature of the self was not easy to comprehend and as such was not worth expounding to everybody If the Buddha actually denied the self, there could hardly be any sense in his preaching the doctrine of *nirvāṇa*, for it was the self that was supposed to attain this stage beyond sorrow. Further, the doctrine of rebirth, which formed a part of his teachings as recorded in the *Dhammapada*, made no sense without the assumption of a permanent self. From the *Milinda-pañha* and other ancient Pāli texts it appears that the early Buddhist philosophers interpreted the Buddha's view of the self as an assemblage of the five *skandha*-s, though in such a view the self is taken as something which is not-self from the Vedic standpoint. Vātsyāyana also refutes here the view according to which the self is only an assemblage of body, sense-organs, etc, and not the view which totally denies the self.

Thus, though some of the later Buddhists rejected the very concept of the self, this could not have been the view of the Buddha himself. Besides, as a philosophical view, it is quite absurd, because the self is directly apprehended by the ego-consciousness (*ahaṃ-pratyaya*). The consciousness of the ego can have for its object only the self and it is impossible for any one to deny such a consciousness. Everybody has the experience in the form : "I know this or that". The knower or the ego in such an experience is nothing but the self. If the existence of the self were not indubitable, one could have an experience in the form "I do not exist" or a doubt In the form "Do I exist ?" But no sane person can have an experience or a doubt like this. Further, a philosopher trying to deny the existence of the self must himself exist in order to be able to deny the self. It is fantastic to imagine that somebody wants to deny the existence of the self without himself existing. Besides, any effort to deny the self can be made only with the aid of the *pramāṇa* or the instrument of 'valid knowledge' (*pramā*). But whose 'valid knowledge' can it be, if there is no self ? Therefore, the use of *pramāṇa* presupposes the existence of the self which alone can have the experience of valid knowledge. The very question concerning the proof for the existence of the self presupposes the existence of the self, because one must oneself exist in order to be able to raise this question. Moreover, practical activity in no form can be possible in the absence of the self, because practical activity presupposes the knowledge in the form : "This is desirable for me, etc." In short, it is impossible to deny the facthood of knowledge and knowledge having no substratum in the form of the knower is

inconceivable. This substratum can be nothing but the self. Therefore, Vācaspati Miśra argues that one who totally denies the self cannot even try to prove its non-existence, for any inference intending to prove the non-existence of the self must have the self for its subject (*pakṣa*) and if the subject of an inference is fictitious there will inevitably be the defect of *āśrayāsiddhi*, i.e. the fallacy of having an unproved subject.

Thus, the existence of the self is indubitable. But there may be doubt concerning its actual nature. Is it to be conceived as the mere aggregate of the body etc, or as something distinct from such an aggregate ? Such a doubt results from the two ways of understanding the reference to the self mentioned before. When we say, "One sees with the eyes", is this to be taken as a reference to the whole by the parts or as a reference to something by something else ?

Bhāṣya

This is a reference to something by something else. Why ?

Sūtra 1

Because [the same knower] knows the same object through the visual as well as the tactual sense-organs. // iii.1.1 //

Elucidation

The self cannot be equated to the aggregate of the body etc, because the sense-organs, included in the aggregate of body etc, cannot certainly stand for the self. If the sense-organ is identified with the self, the different sense-organs involved in different perceptions will have to be considered as different selves. In that case, the different perceptions derived through the different sense-organs cannot have the same agent (*kartā*) as the experiencer of these perceptions. However, the identity of the agent of two different perceptions derived through the visual and tactual sense-organs is proved by the internal perception in the form : 'The same object which was previously perceived by me through the visual sense is now being perceived by me through the tactual sense'.

Bhāṣya

An object is perceived by the visual sense. The same object is perceived by the tactual sense. [We have experiences in the form] "I am now perceiving through

the tactual sense the same object which I previously perceived through the visual sense", and "I am now perceiving through the visual sense the same object which I previously perceived through the tactual sense." These two perceptions of the same object are apprehended [by a further internal perception in the form of re-cognition or *pratyabhijñā*] as having an identical agent and not as having for their agents the aggregate of body etc, nor as having for their identical agent any sense-organ. Therefore, the self as a distinct category is that which is the knower of the same object through the visual as well as the tactual senses and which re-cognises these two perceptions that are obtained through different sense-organs which have an identical agent and which have for themselves an identical object. But why [these two perceptions are not apprehended] as having for their identical agent the sense-organ? Because, each sense-organ is capable of apprehending its own appropriate object and hence can have re-cognition of only that which is not due to any other sense-organ. No sense-organ can apprehend an object which is not appropriate for it. But why [these two perceptions are not apprehended] as having for their agent the aggregate of body etc ? Because the knower, which is one and the same, can apprehend the two perceptions that are obtained through different sense-organs and which perceptions are, moreover, re-cognised by itself [i.e. the same knower]; but an aggregate cannot [thus apprehend]. Why? Because, no member in an aggregate can have the re-cognition of the apprehension of a different object [i e. of an object apprehended by a different member of the aggregate], just as in the case of a different sense-organ [which cannot have re-cognition of the perception of an object apprehended through another sense-organ].

Elucidation

Every act presupposes an agent (*kartā*). Therefore, the acts of seeing etc must presuppose one. In the Nyāya view, this agent is the self as distinct from the aggregate of the body, sense-organs, etc. Therefore, Gautama shows in this *sūtra* that the self cannot be identified with either the sense-organs or the aggregate of body etc. The same object is perceived by two different sense-organs and there is the re-cognition in the form : 'The same object which I previously perceived through the visual sense is now being perceived by me through the tactual sense.' This internal perception proves the identity of the agent of the two perceptions. Such an identical agent cannot be equated to either the separate sense-organs or the aggregate of body etc composed of various members.

Why is it not possible to identify the sense-organs with the self? Each sense-organ apprehends its appropriate object and can have no re-cognition of the object apprehended by another sense-organ. However, the fact is that there is an identical agent which is the re-cogniser of two separate perceptions obtained by two separate sense-organs, e.g. the visual and the tactual ones. There cannot be any such re-cognition if any of these two sense-organs is identified with the self. On the same evidence of re-cognition, the aggregate of the body etc, which consists of heterogenous members, can be taken as the self. The totality of the aggregate of the body etc, if viewed as being distinct from the members constituting the aggregate, will amount to the tacit admission of the self as a distinct category. The opponent, therefore, will have to consider the membeis of the aggregate as the self. But this is impossible, because something apprehended by one of these members cannot be re-cognised by another, just as in the case of two separate sense-organs.

Sūtra 2

[Objection] No [i.e. the self is not distinct from the aggregate of body etc], because there is the law of the restriction of each sense-organ to its appropriaté object. // iii.1.2 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] there is no conscious self distinct from the aggregate of the body etc. Why ? Because there is the law of the restriction of each sense-organ to its appropriate object. Each of the sense-organs [can perceive] only its appropriate object. In the absence of the visual sense, there is no apprehension of colour. Only in the presence thereof, there is the apprehension. When a function does not take place in the absence of something, but takes place in its presence, the function is ascertained to be due to that something. Therefore, the perception of colour is the function of the visual sense, i.e. the visual sense perceives the colour. So also are the case of the olfactory and other senses. These sense-organs themselves are to be considered as conscious agents, because they perceive their respective objects and further because the presence or absence of the senses is followed by the presence or absence of the apprehension of the object. This being so, why admit a conscious self over and above ?

[Vātsyāyana's answer to the objection] The ground [of the opponent] is untenable, because it is vitiated by doubt. The doubt is : Is this presence or absence of the sense-organs co-existing with the presence or absence of the

apprehension of objects, due to the sense-organs being themselves conscious? Or, is their function in causing apprehension due to these being used as implements (*upakaraṇa*) by a conscious agent? The law referred to can be explained, because the sense-organs [without being themselves conscious] can be the causes of apprehension when used as implements by a conscious agent.

Elucidation

Gautama raises an objection, according to which the sense-organs themselves are the conscious agents of apprehension and as such the admission of a distinct self is superfluous. The ground of the objection is as follows. When the visual sense is present, there is the apprehension of colour and when the visual sense is absent there is no apprehension of colour. Therefore, the apprehension of colour belongs to the visual sense, i.e. the visual sense itself is the conscious agent. Similar is the case with the other senses.

Though Gautama himself refutes the objection in the next *sūtra*, Vātsyāyana offers here an independent answer to it. The concomitance of the sense-organ with the apprehension of their respective objects cannot prove that the sense-organs themselves are the conscious agents, because of the following doubt: Are the sense-organs the causes of apprehension, because they are themselves conscious or because they are simply instruments used by a distinct canscious agnet? The concomitance between the sense-organs and the apprehension of their respective objects holds good even on the second alternative, though in that case the sense-organs themselves are not the conscious agents. Colour etc are apprehended in the presence of light, while in the absence of light there is no apprehension of colour etc. From this, however, one cannot argue that light itself is the conscious agent that apprehends colour etc. The fact on the contrary is that light is only an auxiliary cause of the apprehension of colour etc. Similar may be the role of the sense-organs.

Bhāṣya

As to the [opponent's] claim that [there is no self distinct from the aggregate of body etc] because there is the law of the restriction of each sense-organ to its appropriate object, [it is answered]—

N. 3. 2/a

Sūtra 3

[Answer] The self cannot be denied, because the existence of the self is proved by the very law of the restriction of each sense-organ to its appropriate object. // iii.1.3 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] In the event of there being a single sense-organ which is not restricted to any specific object, which is capable of knowing everything, which can apprehend all sorts of objects and which is itself conscious—who can at all infer a conscious agent distinct from it ? Since, however, the sense-organs are restricted to their respective objects, the conscious agent distinct from them, which is capable of knowing everything and which can apprehend all sorts of objects, is inferred from the very law of the restriction of each sense-organ to its appropriate object. Here is an 'indisputable evidence' [*abhijñāna*, literally the insignia] for that which is characteristically conscious. This conscious self, while perceiving colour, infers the taste or smell previously perceived. Also, while perceiving smell it infers the colour and taste [previously perceived]. The same can be said of the objects [of the sense-organs]. It perceives smell after perceiving colour and it perceives colour after perceiving smell. Such an absence of any fixed order leads to the conclusion that all these perceptions of different objects have a single conscious entity as their substratum and that these perceptions have the same agent. [The self] also determines that the knowledge of various objects in the forms of perception, inference, verbal testimony and doubt are due to its own agency and apprehends them as such. It further knows the *śāstra* which is all-comprehensive and knows moreover objects beyond the range of the auditory sense-organ. Besides, it listens to the sounds (i.e. letters) uttered in succession, organises these as words and sentences, understands the relation between words and their implications and thus comprehends various kinds of objects which are not perceptible by any single sense-organ. This absence of any restriction regarding the objects known by one who knows everything [i.e. the self] cannot be exhaustively enumerated. Only a few examples are shown here. Therefore, it is baseless for you to claim that the sense-organs themselves being conscious there is no need to admit a distinct conscious agent.

Elucidation

Vācaspati Miśra argues that the law of restriction of each sense-organ to its respective objects proves that the sense-organs themselves are unconscious, i.e. the

very opposite of the thesis which the opponent wants to prove by it. In other words, his argument commits the fallacy of 'the contradictory' (*viruddha*). But, comments Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, it needs to be noted here that in the present *bhāṣya*, Vātsyāyana takes the said law of restriction in a sense different from the one in which it was taken by him in the *bhāṣya* on the previous *sūtra*. In the commentery on the previous *sūtra*, the law of restriction is taken to mean that in the presence of the sense-organ there is the presence of the apprehension of the object while in the absence of the sense-organ there is the absence of the apprehension of the object. But in the commentary on the present *sūtra* it is taken to mean that a specific sense-organ can apprehend a specific type of object, e.g. the visual sense can apprehend only colour and not smell etc. Taking the law in this second sense, Vātsyāyana proves here that the absence of a single sense-organ capable of apprehending all sorts of objects proves that, as distinct from the sense-organ, there must be a conscious agent or the self, which alone can apprehend all sorts of objects. As the distinctive mark of such a conscious agent, Vātsyāyana mentions its freedom from the restriction to any specific form of object. Thus, for example, the visual sense can apprehend only colour etc. But the self as a conscious agent, while perceiving colour, can infer smell, taste, etc previously perceived. Besides, it comprehends that the knowledge of different objects in the forms of perception, inference, verbal testimony and doubt are due to the same conscious agent. Again, from the discussion of the *śāstra*-s, it comprehends objects that are beyond the range of any specific sense-organ or are simply imperceptible. And so on. From all these it is clear that no sense-organ can be the conscious agent which apprehends all sorts of objects, because a sense-organ is always restricted to its respective object.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE SELF AS DISTINCT FROM THE SENSE-ORGANS

(*indriya-vyatireka-ātma-prakaraṇa*)

II. ON THE SELF AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE BODY

Bhāṣya

The self is distinct from the body etc and is not a mere aggregate of body etc also because—

Sūtra 4

[On this assumption] there results [the absurdity of] the absence of sin caused by the burning of the body [i.e. killing living beings]. // iii.1.4 //

Bhāṣya

The word body (*śarīra*) in the *sūtra* is used in the sense of the aggregate of the body, sense-organs, knowledge (*buddhi*) and feelings (*vedanā*),—[the aggregate] which has assumed the form of a living being. The word sin (*pātaka*) means the vice resulting from causing injury to living beings on the part of a person who burns the body in the form of the living being. There results the absence of such a sin, because the actual agent cannot be related to its results while something other than the actual agent becomes related to it. In the stream [of ever-changing] body, sense-organs, knowledge and feeling, a certain aggregate is produced while another is destroyed. This stream comprising of the production and destruction of the successive aggregates of [body etc] does not disagree with difference, because the aggregates of body etc are different from one another. Each aggregate of body etc is well-known as different from the other.

This being so, the actual aggregate of body etc in the form of a living being which causes injury cannot be related to the results of causing injury, while the one which gets related to them is one that does not cause the injury. Thus, the selves being different there resuls the absurdity of 'being unrelated to the fruition of one's own action' (*kṛta-hāna*) and 'being related to the fruition of an action not performed by oneself' (*akṛta-abhyāgama*).

Further, on the assumption of the self being originated and the self being destroyed, there results the absurdity of the production of body without the instrumentality of *karma* [i.e. the merits and demerits resulting from actions]. In that case, there will be no use of the practice of celibacy (*brahmacarya*) for the attainment of liberation. Thus, if the self is a mere aggregate of body etc, there cannot be any sin resulting from causing injury to the living beings. But this is

inadmissible. Therefore, the self is eternal and distinct from the aggregate of body etc.

Elucidation

The plain meaning of the *sūtra* seems to be as follows. The self cannot be identified with the body, because in that case with the burning of the body after death will also cease the merits and demerits of the self and as such one will not be related to the fruition of one's own past actions. But Vātsyāyana interprets the *sūtra* somewhat differently. The aggregates of the body etc are always changing and, assuming the self to be identical with such an aggregate, the self cannot be related in the future to the sin resulting from causing injury to the living beings in the past, because in the meanwhile the aggregate has already changed.

In any case, the *sūtra* shows that one who admits virtue and vice cannot identify the body with the self. Gautama will later show why even without the admission of virtue and vice this identification is impossible.

Vātsyāyana wants here to refute the Buddhists in particular, according to whom the self is nothing but an aggregate of the body etc. From the Buddhist point of view, everything is momentary ; therefore, so also must be the said aggregate. Again, they consider causing injury to the living beings to be a grave sin. However, since the aggregate of body etc is ever-changing and there is nothing called the self excepting this, the actual agent that causes injury cannot suffer the sin thereof : the aggregate that causes the injury ceases to exist and is replaced by another aggregate at the time of the fruition of the action. In other words, one who commits the sin does not suffer from it while one who does not commit the sin suffers from it.

Further, on the assumption of the Buddhists, there is no explanation of liberation, for the attainment of which they nevertheless practise celibacy etc. The destruction of the body etc means the total destruction of the self and there remains none to attain liberation. The Buddhists cannot argue that liberation means the cessation of rebirth, because if the self is nothing but an aggregate of the body etc, with the destruction of the body etc the merits and demerits as subsisting in the body etc will also be destroyed and therefore will automatically result the cessation of rebirth. Thus the observance of celibacy etc will be irrelevant for the attainment of liberation.

The Buddhists argue that, though the body etc as belonging to the aggregate are momentary, the stream of their ever-changing aggregate continues until liberation. This argument is untenable, because if each member of the aggregate constituting the stream is actually momentary, there is no sense in talking of the stream as a whole persisting up to the time of the attainment of liberation.

The Buddhist doctrine of momentariness is elaborately discussed and criticised under *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 2. 17.

Sūtra 5

[Objection] There will be the absurdity of the absence of that [i.e. sin resulting from causing injury to living beings], even by the burning of a body with a distinct self, because of the eternalily of the self. // iii.1.5//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Even according to those who consider that the body which is burnt [or which is injured] is endowed with an eternal self, there cannot be any sin resulting from burning the body [or causing injury to it] on the part of one who burns [or causes injury]. Why ? Because of the eternality of the self. One can never cause injury to this eternal self. If, however, [you admit] that it can be injured, it can no longer be considered eternal. Thus, if on the one alternative [viz. that the self is a mere aggregate of body etc], there can be no sin in causing injury, on the other alternative [viz. that the self is eternal and distinct from body etc] the act of causing injury becomes an impossibility.

Elucidation

The objector argues that the ground mentioned against the view of the self being a mere aggregate of the body etc applies equally against those who admit a distinct and eternal self. If the self is distinct and eternal, it cannot be affected by any injury caused to the body. And if there is no injury to the self, there cannot be any sin resulting from it. Thus, one has to deny either an eternal self or the possibility of causing injury to living beings.

Sūtra 6

[Answer] No [i.e. there is no absurdity of the absence of sin resulting from causing injury], 'because injury is caused to the body and the sense-organs' [or 'because injury is caused to aggregate of body, sense-organs, etc'] (*kāryā-śraya-kartṛvadhāt*). // iii.1.6 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] We do not talk of killing or injuring the eternal self. Thus, causing injury means injuring in the form of tormenting (*upaghāta*) or injuring in the form of causing deformity (*vaikalya*) or injuring in the form of killing (*pramāpaṇa*) to the body, which is the substratum of the activities of the indestructible self, and to the sense-organs which are the instruments of apprehending their respective objects. The activity of the self means the apprehension of pleasure and pain. The body is the locus, i.e. the abode, i.e. the substratum of this apprehension. Causing injury means injuring the body which is the substratum of the activity of the self and injuring the sense-organs which are the instruments of apprehending their respective objects, and it does not mean injuring the eternal self. Therefore, it is illogical for you to claim, 'There will be the absurdity of the absence of that [i.e. sin resulting from causing injury to living beings] even by the burning of a body with a distinct self, because of the eternality of the self.'

Only for those who consider injury as destruction of the self there results the defects of 'being unrelated to the fruition of one's own action' (*kṛta-hāna*) and of 'being related to the fruition of an action not performed by oneself' (*akṛta-abhyāgama*).

All these amount to the view that injury means either the destruction of the self or injuring the body which is the substratum of the activity of the indestructible self as well as the sense-organs. There is no third alternative. The destruction of the self is impossible. So what possibility remains ? Only the second alternative is valid.

Or, the expression *kāryāśraya-kartṛvadhāt* [in this *sūtra* may be explained as follows]. The substratum of the activity of the eternal self is the aggregate of the body, sense-organs and knowledge. Pleasure and pain are apprehended through it. Thus, it [i.e. the aggregate] is the abode of it [i.e. of pleasure and pain]. And it is imagined as the agent because it alone and nothing else becomes the locus of the apprehension of pleasure and pain. The apprehension of pleasure and pain is possible only through it and never without it. Therefore, injuring means inflicting pain (*vadha*), tormenting (*upaghāta*), torturing (*pīḍā*) and killing (*pramāpaṇa*) it [i.e. the aggregate]. [It cannot mean the destruction of the self, because] the self being eternal cannot be destroyed. Therefore, you cannot claim, 'There will be the absurdity of the absence of that [i.e. of sin resulting from causing injury to living beings] even by the burning of a body with a distinct self, because of the eternality of the self.'

Elucidation

In answer to the objection raised in the previous *sūtra*, Gautama says that causing injury to the living beings does not mean injuring the eternal self residing in the bodies. It simply means injuring the body, sense-organs, etc, through which the eternal self apprehends pleasure and pain. Injury in this sense results in sin.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE SELF AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE BODY

(*śarīra-vyatireka-ātma-prakaraṇa*)

III. ON THE UNITY OF THE VISUAL SENSE-ORGAN

Bhāṣya

The self is distinct from the body etc also because of the ground, namely—

Sūtra 7

Because of the re-cognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) of an object by the other [i.e. the right] eye [which was] 'perceived by the left eye' (*savya-dṛṣṭa*) // iii.1.7 //

Bhāṣya

Re-cognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) means that two pieces of knowledge (*vijñāna*), one acquired earlier and the other later, are known as being related to the same object. As for example, I now perceive the same object which I perceived before,—this object is identical with that [i.e. the object previously perceived]. [The *sūtra* means :] Because of the re-cognition of an object by the other [i.e. the right] eye [which was] perceived by the left eye in the form : I am now perceiving that which I perceived before. On the assumption of the sense-organ being itself conscious, there cannot be any explanation of such re-cognition, because one cannot have re-cognition of what is perceived by another. However, such re-cognition being a fact, the conscious self is distinct from the sense-organ.

Elucidation

The conscious self cannot be equated to the sense-organs, because in that case the left and the right eye, for example, will have to be considered as separate conscious agents. On such an assumption, the right eye cannot re-cognise an object perceived by the left eye, because the reminiscent impression of the previous perception could exist only in the conscious agent thereof, i.e. in the present case, in the left eye alone.

Sūtra 8

[Objection] No [i.e. the alleged impossibility of re-cognition is not valid], because there is the erroneous notion of duality in the single visual sense-organ separated by the nasal bone. // iii.1.8 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The visual organ (*cakṣuḥ*) is actually one ; it is separated into two by the nasal bone in the middle. When two of its extremities are separately known, there arises the erroneous notion of duality, just as in the case of something long divided in the middle.

Elucidation

According to the objector, the visual sense is really one, though it is wrongly imagined as two, caused by the partition of the nasal bone, just as a big lake may appear to be two being divided by a bridge constructed on its middle. The visual sense being really one, there is no difficulty in explaining the re-cognition by the right eye of an object perceived by the left.

Sūtra 9

[Answer] The visual sense is not really one, because one of [the two eyes] is not destroyed in spite of the destruction of the other. // iii.1.9 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] When one of the eyes is destroyed or plucked off, there remains the other eye, the existence of which is proved by its apprehension of the object. Therefore, it is illogical to claim that the single [visual sense-organ] is divided into two.

Elucidation

A person deprived of one eye does not become completely blind. This proves that the visual senses are actually two and not one imagined as two.

Sūtra 10

[Objection] This ground [i.e. the one mentioned in the previous *sūtra*] is illegitimate, because the whole (*avayavin*) is perceived even when [some of its] parts are destroyed. // iii.1.10 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The ground, namely 'because one of [the two eyes] is not destroyed in spite of the destruction of the other', is illegitimate. Why ? The tree is perceived as a tree even when some of its branches are cut off.

Elucidation

A tree remains a tree in spite of some of its branches being cut off. Thus, the destruction of some of the parts does not destroy the whole. The visual sense is a *whole*, having for its parts the two eye-balls. In spite of the destruction of one of the eye-balls, the visual sense as a whole is not destroyed.

Sūtra 11

[Answer] [The duality of the visual sense] cannot be denied, because of the contradiction with the instance cited. // iii.1.11 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The effect [in the form of the *whole*] (*kārya-dravya*) cannot survive in spite of the disjunction (*vibhāga*) of 'the constituent parts' (*kāraṇa-dravya*), because this results in the absurdity [of the effect or of the whole] being eternal. Among the innumerable wholes, only those are destroyed the constituent parts of which are disjoined, while those the constituent parts of which are not disjoined remain. [Thus, the tree as a whole—i.e. the same tree—does not survive when its constituent parts, viz. the branches, are cut off.] Or, 'being contradicted by instance cited' (*dṛṣṭānta-virodha*) [of the *sūtra*] means being contradicted

by what is actually perceived. Thus, in the skull of a dead man, the two holes, which are the sites of the visual sense, are perceived as being different. This would not have been possible if only a single visual sense were divided by the nasal bone. Or, the visual organ is inferred as two, which are separately covered and separately destroyed, because [on the contrary, i.e. if it is assumed as one] there can be no restriction of the destruction [in the form : only the right eye is destroyed or only the left eye is destroyed]. Moreover, when one eye is pressed, the visual images appear as different as a result of the separation of the contact between the object and the visual rays (*cakṣuḥ-raśmi*). But this cannot be possible on the assumption of the unity of the visual sense. On the release of the pressure, again, the visual image becomes one. Therefore, it is illogical to claim that the single visual sense-organ is divided into two.

Elucidation

Gautama says that the denial of the duality of the visual sense is 'contradicted by the instance cited' (*dṛṣṭānta-virodha*). Vātsyāyana explains this contradiction in three forms.

First, if the visual sense is taken as one, it is to be considered a whole (*avayavin*) having the two eyes as its constituent parts. But the destruction of the constituent parts must result in the destruction of the whole. Otherwise the whole becomes eternal. Thus, when the branches of a tree are cut off, it ceases to exist as the same tree and is replaced by a new tree having the remaining branches for its constituent parts. Similarly, assuming the unity of the visual sense, the destruction of only one eye should amount to the destruction of the visual sense as a whole. Thus, the instance of the tree cited by the opponent does not support his thesis.

But the opponent may argue that even assuming this, just as a new whole in the form of a new tree constituted by the remaining branches is said to come into being after the destruction of its older branches, so does a new visual sense comes into being with the remaining eye as its constituent part when one of the eyes is destroyed.

In answer to this, Vātsyāyana offers the second interpretation of 'being contradicted by the instance cited'. According to this interpretation, the thesis of the opponent is contradicted by what is actually observed. It is observed that the human skull has two holes indicative of the locations of two separate visual sense-organs. The claim of the opponent concerning a single visual sense-organ goes against this fact of observation.

The objector may argue that the two holes in the human skull do not prove the existence of two separate visual sense-organs. On the contrary, these simply show that the same visual sense is partitioned by the nasal bone. In answer to this,

Vātsyāyana offers his third interpretation. It is an established fact that when the left eye is covered or destroyed, the right eye remains in tact. This proves that there are two separate visual sense-organs. Vātsyāyana lastly cites the evidence of the difference in visual images as the result of pressing an eye-ball. In the Nyāya view, the actual cause of this difference in images is the scattering of the visual rays. If, however, the visual sense were one, with the pressing of one eye-ball its visual rays would have been diverted into the other eye-ball and as such the visual image would not have been disturbed. Therefore, the unity of the visual sense is inadmissible.

Uddyotakara differs from Vātsyāyana on this point. While Vātsyāyana supports the view of the duality of the visual sense-organ, Uddyotakara argues in favour of its unity. The mind (*manas*) being atomic in magnitude cannot simultaneously come in contact with two separate visual sense-organs and hence, on the assumption of the duality of the visual sense-organ, there cannot be any difference between monocular and binocular visual perceptions. Further, Gautama's distinct admission of only five external sense-organs shows that according to him the visual sense-organ is only one. Viśvanātha follows Uddyotakara and claims that Vācaspati Miśra also supports the view of the unity of the visual sense-organ. Accordingly, Viśvanātha claims that *Nyāya-sūtra* iii.1.7 represents the view of the opponent (*pūrvapakṣa*).

But Phaṇibhūṣaṇa comments that though Vācaspati names this section as "the section incidentally discussing the unity of the visual sense-organ" (*prāsaṅgika-cakṣuḥ-advaita-prakaraṇa*), there is no real ground to think that he himself subscribes to the view of the unity of the visual sense-organ. Further, the context in which this discussion is raised is that of proving that the self is distinct from the sense-organs etc, and the way in which Gautama proves the distinctness of the self cannot be reconciled with the view of the duality of the visual sense-organ.

As against Uddyotakara's argument, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out that the mind, though atomic in magnitude, is capable of extreme rapid fluctuation and so it can come in contact with both the visual senses in such a quick succession as to approximate simultaneity. On the other hand, the assumption of the unity of the visual sense-organ amounts to the admission of the visual perception being essentially monocular and as such it leaves no scope for distinguishing between monocular and binocular perceptions. Lastly, though admitting the duality of the visual sense-organ, Gautama an easily speak of only five external sense-organs, inasmuch as the two visual sense-organs, being identical in nature and function, can be counted as one. This point is further discussed under *Nyāya-sūtra* iii.1.60.

Bhāṣya

That the conscious self is distinct from the aggregate of the body etc is also inferentially proved—

Sūtra 12

[Answer continued] Because of the stimulation (*vikāra*) of a different sense-organ. // iii.1.12 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer continued] In a sour fruit is previously perceived a specific colour or fragrance as coexisting with a specific taste. Later on, either this colour or this fragrance is perceived by its appropriate sense-organ. This recalls the memory of the previonsly perceived taste. As a result, the other, namely the gustatory sense-organ, is affected by the desire of having the taste in the form of the deposit of saliva near the tooth-ends. This cannot be explained on the assumption of the sense-organ itself being conscious, because something perceived by one cannot be remembered by another.

Elucidation

After proving that the self is distinct from the body etc on the evidence of the internal perception in the form of re-cognition (*pratyabhijñā*), Gautama shows the inferential ground proving the same.

A sour fruit is previously perceived to have a particular colour, fragrance and taste by three distinct and appropriate sense-organs. Later on, only one of these sense-organs perceives its colour or fragrance alone. As a result, the gustatory sense-organ is stimulated and the mouth waters. This stimulation presupposes the memory of the previously perceived taste. But neither the visual nor the olfactory sense-organ can recall the previously perceived taste, because the taste was previously perceived by the gustatory sense and something perceived by one cannot be recalled by another. Hence, there must be a self distinct from the sense-organs themselves.

Sūtra 13

[Objection] No [memory does not prove the self as distinct from the sense-organs], because the object remembered is itself the cause of the recollection thereof. // iii.1.13 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The quality in the form of memory is produced by its specific cause. Its object is that which is remembered. The stimulation of another sense-organ is due to it [i.e. the object of recollection] and not due to any distinct self.

Elucidation

According to the objector, the real cause of recollection is the reminiscent impression along with the object recollected. The memory involved in the stimulation of the gustatory sense-organ is due to the sour taste and its reminiscent impression. The self is neither the cause nor the object of this memory and as such the self is not inferentially proved.

Sūtra 14

[Answer] The self cannot be denied, because the fact of memory can be explained only on the admission of its being a quality of the self. // iii.1.14 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The self cannot be denied, since it [i.e. memory] can exist only as a quality of the self. The fact of memory can be explained only if it is viewed as a quality of the self, because something perceived by one cannot be recollected by another. On the admission of the sense-organs themselves being conscious, there cannot be the recollection of the different perceptions of objects, the perceptions having different agents. Again, the admission of recollection [in the case under consideration results in] the violation of the law restricting a sense-organ to its respective object. However, the same conscious agent perceiving the different objects through different instrumental causes [i.e. the sense-organs] can recollect an object previously perceived, because the same agent perceiving different objects can recollect the different perceptions. Thus, recollection is possible only on the admission of its being a quality of the self. Otherwise it is inexplicable. The practical activity of all living beings depends on recollection. The mention of the stimulation of a different sense-organ as the probans for the inference of the self is only one instance [of memory proving the self].

Elucidation

Memory is only a quality and as such it must have a substratum. The object recollected cannot be this substratum, because there are cases of recollecting objects that no longer exist. None of the sense-organs can be this substratum, because no sense-organ can perceive all sorts of objects. The visual sense, e.g., can recollect

only colour and not taste or smell. Nor can the body be considered the substratum of this quality i.e. of memory. The physical qualities of one being perceptible by another, the assumption of memory being a physical quality leads to the absurdity of one's memory being recollected by another. Thus, e.g., one person has the memory of something and, if it is his physical quality, it should be perceptible to another person who, therefore, will have the memory belonging to the former. Further, the body changes from infancy to youth and from youth to old age. Thus, the same person has different bodies during his infancy, youth and old age. Therefore, something perceived during one's infancy cannot be recollected during one's youth and old age, because a thing perceived by one cannot be recollected by another.

Hence a distinct conscious agent capable of perceiving all sorts of objects has got to be admitted for explaining the fact of memory of all these objects. Since neither the sense-organs nor the body can be such an agent, this conscious agent is nothing but the self.

Bhāṣya

[The objection raised in *Nyāya-sūtra* iii.1.13 is] based on the ignorance of the actual object revealed by memory. Without properly understanding the nature of the objects revealed by memory, it is said by the objector, "No [i.e. memory does not prove the self as distinct from the sense-organs], because the object remembered is itself the cause of the recollection thereof." There is recollection of an object which is not directly apprehended at the time in the form, "I perceived this object previously." There are four expressions—all identical in implication—conveying the actual contents of memory. These are :

1) This memory reveals not the mere object, but the object previously perceived along with its knower and the knowledge.

2) I previously perceived this object.

3) This object was previously perceived by me.

4) I had knowledge of this object.

In all these expressions are revealed the knower, the knowledge and the object known.

[Vātsyāyana is now going to argue that re-cognition involves three cognitions, and these prove a distinct knower.] The three cognitions constituting the actual contents of the re-cognition of the object previously perceived are re-cognised as relating to the same object and as due to the same agent,—and not due to different agents nor without having any agent. What, then, does this imply ? [These three cognitions] have the same agent. "I am now perceiving the object which I also perceived previously." The knowledge in the form "I preceived previously", has for its object the cognition as well as the cognition of cognition, because in the case of the cognition itself remaining uncognised there cannot be any knowledge in the form, "I previously

perceived." Therefore, two cognitions are involved in this [knowledge in the form, "I previously perceived."]. A third cognition is the knowledge in the form, "I am now perceiving the same object."

Thus, the same recollection, involving three cognitions, is neither without any agent nor with different agents. What, then, is it ? It has an identical agent. The opponent, being simply unaware of the self which is existing and which is known as forming the content of memory, denies the self in the form, "There is no self, because the object remembered is the cause of the recollection thereof."

This [i.e. the knowledge constituted by the three cognitions] cannot be considered as mere recollection nor as merely revealing the object remembered. On the contrary, it is the re-cognition of recollection, like the re-cognition of any other form of knowledge, because all these are known by the same knower. However, the same knower that knows all sorts of objects re-cognises his own cognitions in the form : "I shall know this object", "I am knowing this object", "I knew this object previously" and "Being desirous of knowing this object and failing to comprehend its nature for a long time, I have at last comprehended it." Similarly is re-cognised the recollection pertaining to the three times and about which there is the desire to remember.

If the self is viewed as a mere stream of impressions there cannot be any impression capable of apprehending the knowledge or the recollection pertaining to the three times, because each impression is destroyed immediately after its origination. Without such an apprehension, there cannot be the re-cognition of the knowledge and the recollection in the form, "I recollect", "My recollection", etc, just as in the case of the different bodies. Thus it is inferred that there is a self, capable of perceiving all sorts of objects, which, residing in each body, re-cognises all its own cognitions and also all the recollections, and which, being absent in a different body, there cannot be any re-cognition [on the part of the self residing in another body].

Elucidation

The objector claims that the fact of memory is adequately explained by the object of memory itself and as such the admission of the self is redundant. In answer to this, Gautama argues that memory, being a quality of the self, is inexplicable without the admission of the self. Vātsyāyana elaborates this argument as follows.

Memory does not reveal the mere object previously perceived. It actually reveals three factors, namely, the object, the knower and the knowledge. This is evident from the four ways of referring to memory which are in fact identical in meaning. These are :

1) This memory reveals not the mere object, but the object previously perceived along with its knower and the knowledge,

2) I previously perceived this object,
3) This object was previously perceived by me, and
4) I have knowledge of this object.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa explains the subtle significance of Vātsyāyana's argument. The perception of an object is followed by its after-knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*). [See *Nyāya Philosophy*, Part I, p. 55]. This after-knowledge is the apprehension of the knowledge [i.e. the previous perception], its knower and the object. The reminiscent impression of this after-knowledge also must be that of these three factors. As such, the memory of the original perception must be the memory of all these three. This shows that the fact of memory proves the existence of the self.

Vātsyāyana further argues that recollection apart, the fact of re-cognition proves the self. Re-cognition takes the form, "I am now perceiving the same object which I previously perceived." When analysed three cognitions are found to be involved in this experience. The expression, "which I previously perceived" points to two cognitions, namely, 1) the cognition of the object and 2) the cognition of this cognition. A third cognition is indicated by the expression, "I am now perceiving." These three cognitions—viz. the two referring to the past and the one referring to the present—have the same agent. The self which previously perceived the object, which had the after-knowledge of that perception and which is now perceiving the object over again, must be the same.

Thus the self is a distinct content of both recollection and re-cognition. The opponent cannot deny it on the ground that memory reveals the mere object.

Further, we may try to recollect an object and, after failing to do so for some time, succeed in remembering it. This shows that all through the same self desires to recollect, endeavours to remember the object and finally succeeds in remembering it. Thus is proved that the same self persists throughout.

Vātsyāyana concludes that the Buddhists cannot deny a permanent self and identify it with a mere stream of impressions (*saṃskāra-santati*). Each impression in the stream being momentary, there can be no explanation of recollection and re-cognition on the Buddhist assumption. Vātsyāyana [on *Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.10] previously advanced the same argument against the Buddhist view of the self being a mere stream of consciousness (*vijñāna- santati*). According to some, the stream of impressions here means the same stream of consciousness previously referred to. But Phaṇibhūṣaṇa does not accept this. From the pointed expression "the stream of impressions" used here it appears that some of the Buddhists wanted to view the self in this sense.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE UNITY OF THE VISUAL SENSE-ORGAN

(*cakṣuḥ-advaita-prakaraṇa*)

IV. ON THE SELF AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE MIND

Sūtra 15

[Objection] No [i.e. the self is not a distinct entity], because all the grounds [allegedly] indicating the self are also applicable to the mind (*manas*). // iii.1.15 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The self is not distinct from the aggregate of body etc. Why? Because all the grounds [allegedly] indicating the self are also applicable to the mind (*manas*). The grounds, viz. "because [the same knower] knows the same object through the visual as well as the tactual sense-organs" [i.e. *Nyāya-sūtra* iii.1.1] etc, allegedly indicating the self, are also applicable to the case of the mind, because the mind can perceive all sorts of objects. Therefore, the self is not distinct from the aggregate of the body, sense-organs, mind and cognition (*buddhi*).

Elucidation

In the previous three sections, Gautama refutes the views identifying the self with the body or the sense-organs. In the present section, he proceeds to refute the view identifying the self with the mind. The opponent argues in this *sūtra* that the grounds previously shown as going against the identification of the self with either the body or the sense-organs do not go against the identification of the self with the mind. On the contrary, the same grounds prove the identification of the self with the mind.

The grounds so far adduced for the admission of a distinct self are mainly two, viz. 1) only a distinct self can apprehend all sorts of objects and 2) only on the admission of a distinct self is there an explanation of the fact of re-cognition. The objector contends that in the Nyāya view the mind is a cause of all apprehensions and hence the mind itself can be the agent perceiving the same object through different sense-organs. Secondly, the Naiyāyikas themselves admit the mind as eternal and hence the mind itself can be the agent re-cognising an object previously perceived. Therefore, there is no need to admit a self as distinct from the mind.

The main point of the *pūrvapakṣa*, as explained by Vātsyāyana, is that though neither the body by itself nor the sense-organs by themselves can be identified with the self, there is no need to admit any self over and above *the aggregate* of the body, sense-organs and the mind, because the mind, as belonging to this aggregate, is involved in all cases of apprehension and is also eternal.

Sūtra 16

[Answer] This [claim of the opponent] amounts 'only to a difference in terminology' (*saṃjñā-bheda-mātra*), because an instrument of knowledge for the knower has necessarily to be admitted. // iii.1.16 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] Only as being related to a knower, can exist the instruments of knowledge in the form, "One sees with the visual sense", or "One smells with the olfactory sense", or "One touches with the cutaneous sense". There must exist 'an internal sense-organ' (*antaḥ-karaṇa*), which is 'an instrument of the internal perceptions' (*mati-sādhana*) and which is capable of apprehending various kinds of objects for the agent who, through its instrumentality, thus internally apprehends all sorts of objects. This being so, the knower will be referred to as the mind and not as the self, and the mind will be referred to as 'the instrument of the internal perceptions' (*mati-sādhana*) and not as the mind. [That is, there is a simple substitution of the word *manas* for *ātman* and of *mati-sādhana* for *manas*.] Therefore, this makes only a difference in terminology without raising any dispute as to the content. This [i.e. the internal sense-organ] being rejected, there results the absurdity of the rejection of all sense-organs. If for a knower who internally apprehends all sorts of objects is denied an instrument of internal perception capable of perceiving all sorts of objects with the statement that *it does not exist*, similarly it may be maintained, "There exists no instrument for the apprehension of objects like colour etc." Thus there will be the absurdity of the rejection of all sense-organs.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana argues that if the objector proposes only to substitute the word *manas* for *ātman*, the dispute becomes one of mere terminology. But it is impossible to equate the internal sense with the knower or the self. Just as it is necessary to assume the instrumentality of the external sense-organs for the perception of the external objects, so also it is necessary to assume the instrumentality of a distinct internal sense for the perception of pleasure, pain, etc. From this it is clear that the knower is different from the internal sense. If, however, the opponent wants to discard the instrumentality of the internal sense, there will result the absurdity of the superfluity of the sense-organs as such, i.e. also of the external senses. Thus, in short, the mind is only the instrument for the knower in the perception of pleasure, pain, etc. Hence it cannot be inentical with the knower, i.e. the self.

Sūtra 17

[Answer continued] [There is need to assume the instruments for external perceptions of colour etc, but there is no need to assume an instrument for internal perception of pleasure, etc]—such a rule is unproved (*niranumāna*). // iii.1.17 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer continued] The opponent claims that there is a rule, namely that the knower has instruments for the perception of colour etc, but it needs no instrument capable of perceiving all sorts of objects in the case of internal perception. Such a rule is unproved, i.e. there is no ground from which we can infer any rule like this. As objects of knowledge, pleasure etc are different from colour etc. Hence, there must be a different instrument for their [i.e. of pleasure, pain, etc] perceptions. Thus, for instance, a separate instrument in the form of the olfactory sense is admitted, because smell cannot be apprehended by the visual sense. Again, a separate instrument in the form of the gustatory sense is admitted, because taste cannot be apprehended by either the visual or the olfactory sense. Similar are the cases of the other sense-organs. Therefore, there must be a distinct instrument [for the perception of pleasure etc], because pleasure etc are not apprehended by the visual and other external sense-organs. This is also inferred from the absence of the occurrence of simultaneous cognitions [See *Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.16]. The instrument for the perception of pleasure etc, is something which is inferred from the absence of the occurrence of simultaneous cognitions. Cognitions cannot occur simultaneously because of its [i.e. of the internal sense] being conjoined only with a particular sense-organ, and therefore not being [at that time] conjoined with any other sense-organ. Therefore, it is illogical to claim, "No [i.e. the self is not a distinct entity], because all the grounds [allegedly] indicating the self are also applicable to the mind."

Elucidation

The objector may argue that it is redundant to assume *manas* as an instrument for the perception of pleasure, pain, etc. The *manas* itself is the agent that apprehends pleasure, pain, etc. Hence, it is not a case of a mere substitution of the term *manas* for *ātman*.

Gautama answers that just as there are instruments for the perception of external objects like colour etc, so there must be an instrument for the internal perception of pleasure, pain, etc. This is proved in the form of the inference : "The perception of pleasure, pain, etc, must be due to an instrument, because these are caused, just as the perception of colour etc." No sense-organ used as the instrument for external perception can be used as the instrument for the internal perception pf pleasure, pain, etc, and hence as an instrument for perception, it must be distinct from the external sense-organs. Further, in *Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.16, Gautama has already argued that the absence of simultaneous cognitions proves the existence of the mind as an internal sense and as being atomic in magnitude. Thus, the self or the knower cannot be identical with the mind, which is the instrument for internal perception.

Moreover, if the mind is identified with the self, knowledge will have to be considered as the quality of the mind. But the quality of something atomic in magnitude can never be perceived. Therefore, assuming knowledge to be the quality of the mind, there can be no explanation of the cognition of cognition. The atomic magnitude of the mind will be further discussed in *Nyāya-sūtra* iii.2.56ff.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa comments that though in the different sections are separately refuted the views identifying the self with the sense-organs, or with the body, or with the mind, all these also imply that the self can neither be equated to their aggregate. He further argues that though the tendency of denying a permanent self is to be traced to the age of the Upaniṣads, later philosophers—particularly the Buddhists—wanted to defend such a tendency in the form of different views. Vātsyāyana refuted all such views prevalent in his time.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE SELF AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE MIND

(*manaḥ-vyatireka-ātma-prakaraṇa*)

V. ON THE ETERNALITY OF THE SELF

Bhāṣya

Is this self, which is distinct from the aggrégate of the body etc, to be viewed as eternal or non-eternal ? What is the caüse of this doubt ? There is doubt, because [existing objects] are observed in both forms. Existing objects are found in two forms, namely, eternal and non-eternal. The existence of the self is proved [by the grounds already adduced], still such a doubt is not dispelled.

However, the grounds proving the existence of the self have already established that the self persists in spite of the changing states of the body. It also persists in spite of leaving the body. Why ?

Sūtra 18

Because, immediately being born, an infant has the experience of joy, fear and sorrow [and this] as a result of the 'lingering of the memory' (*smṛti-anubandha*) of the past experiences.
// iii. 1. 18 //

Bhāṣya

An infant, immediately after being born [and therefore] in spite of having no experience of the causes of joy, fear and sorrow in this birth, nevertheless experiences joy, fear and sorrow, which are inferred from certain marks [viz. behaviour]. But these joy etc are produced by the recollection of past experiences and not otherwise. Recollection of past experiences is not possible without past experiences and past experiences are possible only if there are previous births. Therefore, it is proved that the self persists even after the destruction of the body.

Elucidation

According to Vâtsyâyana, in the first four sections of the third chapter, Gautama proves that there is a self as distinct from the aggregate of the body etc. But the grounds for this do not prove the eternality of the self, which, therefore, remains

doubtful. The evidence of re-cognition etc is explicable even on the admission that a distinct self persists only as long as the aggregate of the body etc lasts. But this by itself does not prove the existence of the self even after the destruction of the body. Thus the doubt remains whether the self, though existing, is eternal or not, particularly because the existing objects are observed to be of both types, namely, eternal and non-eternal. To dispel this doubt, Gautama now proceeds to show that the self must be eternal, there being proofs for its existence even after the destruction of the body.

Thus, Vātsyāyana says that the grounds so far adduced prove that a distinct self survives all the changes of the body, i.e. from infancy to old age. The grounds for its survival even after the destruction of the body are now shown by Gautama.

Immediately after being born, an infant is observed to have the experiences of joy, fear and sorrow. The experience of joy is the pleasure due to the attainment of the desirable object, while the experience of sorrow is the pain due to the non-attainment of such objects or due to the attainment of an undesirable object. An object can be considered as desirable or undesirable only on the basis of the previous experiences of it. But the new-born baby is yet to experience objects in this birth. Therefore, its experience of joy or sorrow can be explained only on the admission of its recollection of the objects being desirable or undesirable, as experienced in the previous birth. Similar is the implication of its experience of fear, with reference to which Vācaspati observes that a baby about to fall clings desperately to the mother's garments. Since, in the present birth it has yet to experience the unpleasent consequences of falling down, its fear of falling down implies the recollection of such an experience in the previous birth.

Vātsyāyana argues that the fact of the infant's experience of joy etc is inferentially proved by certain marks, which, as Phaṇibhūṣaṇa explains, are its behaviour in the form of smiling, shuddering and crying.

Sūtra 19

[Objection] Just as in the case of the lotus etc there are changes in the form of the unfolding (*prabodha*) and folding (*sammīlana*) of the petals, so also in its case [i.e. in the case of the self] there is change [in the form of the experiences of joy etc]. // iii.1.19 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Just as in the cases of the lotus etc, which are non-eternal, there are changes in the form of the unfolding and folding of the petals, so also in the

case of the non-eternal self, there are changes in the form of the experiences of joy, fear and sorrow.

[Vātsyāyana's answer to the objection] This is illogical, because of the absence of any valid ground. In this argument,—'just as in the cases of the lotus etc there are changes in the form of the unfolding and folding of the petals, so also in the case of the non-eternal self there are changes in the form of the experiences of joy etc',—there is neither any 'probans which proves the probandum through the resemblance with the instance cited' (*sādharmya-hetu*) nor any 'probans [which proves the probandum through] dissimilarity [with the instance cited]' (*vaidharmya-hetu*). In default of any valid ground, the statement of the opponent is meaningless, i.e. without any significance.

Further, the instance cited [i.e. of the lotus] does not preclude the cause of the experience of joy etc. The experiences of joy etc, which are observed in the cases of the individual selves and which result from the recollection of past experiences following the enjoyment of the various objects are not disproved by the instances of the unfolding and folding of the petals of the lotus. etc. Just as it is not disproved in the case of a young man, so is it not disproved in the case of the just-born infant. The unfolding and folding of the lotus mean the disjunction and conjunction of the petals due to some [mechanical] action and from this action can only be inferred a cause thereof. This being so, what is sought to be disproved by the instance cited ?

Elucidation

The objector argues that just as in the case of the non-eternal lotus, certain changes take place, so also in the case of the non-eternal self, there take place changes in the form of the experiences of joy etc. Thus, the evidence of these experiences does not prove the self to be eternal.

Though Gautama refutes this objection in the next *sūtra*, Vātsyāyana offers here an independent refutation of it. The objector simply cites an instance without advancing any valid ground to prove his point. But an instance by itself cannot prove anything.

The objector may claim that the instance cited is intended to show an irregularity (*vyabhicāra*) in the ground mentioned in the previous *sūtra*. Thus, just as the unfolding and folding of the lotus-petals do not presuppose any recollection of past experiences, so also is the behaviour of the infant. To this it is answered that the perceptible causes of joy and sorrow cannot be denied simply on the strength of the instance of the lotus. In the cases of the grown-up people, the experiences of joy and sorrow are

definitely known as due to the recollection of past experiences. Therefore, it is necessary to admit that the experiences of joy and sorrow are everywhere due to such recollections. The joy and sorrow of the infant are to be explained accordingly. And there is no ground to assume that this behaviour may be due to some other cause. The mere instance of the lotus cannot disprove this well-established fact.

Bhāṣya

Now, it may be claimed that the changes in the lotus in the form of the unfolding and folding of the petals are without any cause. So also is the experience of joy and sorrow in the case of the self. But this is—

Sūtra 20

[Answer] Inadmissible, because the changes in the objects constituted by the five elements are due to heat, cold and moisture. // iii.1.20 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] Since, in the presence of heat etc, there are also [changes like the unfolding and folding] and in the absence of heat etc [these changes] do not take place, the changes in the form of the unfolding and folding in the lotus etc, which are produced by the conjunction of the five elements, must be due to such heat etc and are not to be considered as being without any cause. Therefore, changes in the form of joy etc must also be due to some definite cause and are not without a cause. And this cause cannot be anything other than the lingering of of the memory of past experiences. Nor is it possible to infer any cause of the origin or destruction of the self from the instance [cited by the opponent].

Joy etc cannot be without any cause. The joy etc of the infant cannot be assumed as due to any different cause [i.e. other than the recollection of the past experience], like heat etc [as assumed in the case of the lotus etc]. Therefore, the claim of the objector is illogical.

Elucidation

As against the objector, it is first argued that the changes in the lotus cannot be viewed as being without any cause. It is observed that only in the presence of heat

etc such changes take place. Thus heat etc are definitely ascertained to be the cause of such changes. On the strength of the instance of the lotus, therefore, it cannot be claimed that the joy etc of the infant are without any cause.

But what specifically is the cause of the joy and sorrow of the infant ? It can only be the lingering of the memory of past experiences, because this is always observed to be the cause of joy and sorrow of the grown-up people. It is illogical to admit any other cause to explain the joy and sorrow of the infant.

The objector may claim that the real purpose of his mentioning the instance of the lotus in the previous *sūtra* is only to prove that the self is non-eternal. Anything subject to transformation is non-eternal, as for instance, the lotus, which is subject to the transformation of the folding and unfolding of the petals. The self is subject to transformation as experiencing joy and sorrow. Therefore, the self also is non-eternal.

Uddyotakara reads this objection in *Sūtra 18* and answers that this instance of the lotus cannot prove the non-eternality of the self, the eternality of the self being already inferentially established from its all-pervasive magnitude. Anything all-pervasive in magnitude is eternal, as for instance, *ākāśa.* The self is all-pervasive and hence is eternal.[1] Besides, though joy and sorrow are the qualities of the self, these do not produce any transformation affecting the real nature of the self. Thus, the non-eternalily of the self cannot be inferred from such changes in the attributes of the self. As Vācaspati further explains, a substance is not necessarily transformed by the qualities which it may acquire or lose, just as *ākāśa* remains unaffected by the production or destruction of different sounds in it. Joy and sorrow also do not transform the self.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out that Gautama's statement that an object produced by the conjunction of the five elements is subject to transformation due to heat etc has the added significance that the self being not thus produced does not suffer any transformation.

Bhāṣya

The self is eternal on the further ground, namely—

Sūtra 21

Because [the just-born infant] has the desire for sucking the mother's breast as a result of the habit of having food in the 'previous birth' (*pretya*). // iii.1.21 //

1. In the Nyāya view, only those objects that are neither atomic *(aṇu)* nor all-pervasive *(vibhu)* in magnitude are non-eternal.

Bhāṣya

It is a fact that there is the desire for sucking the mother's breast on the part of the just-born infant, which [desire] is inferred from its behaviour. Such a desire is inexplicable without [the assumption of] the habit of having food. What is the ground of such an assumption ? Animals suffering from hunger are observed to have the desire for food because of the lingering recollection resulting from the habit of having food [in the past]. In the case of the just-born infant also such a desire is inexplicable without [the assumption of] the habit [of having food] while possessing the previous body [i.e. in the previous birth]. Therefore is inferred its past body in which was formed the habit of having food. Thus the self, leaving its previous body and acquiring a new one, remembers, while suffering form hunger, the food habitually taken in the past and it has the desire for sucking the mother's breast. Therefore, the change of a body does not imply the change of the self and the same self persists in spite of assuming a different body.

Elucidation

After proving in a general way the permanence of the self, Gautama offers here a specific proof of it. The just-born infant has the desire to suck the mother's breast. This desire is inferred from its behaviour and is inexplicable without the assumption of the recollection of its previous habit of having food, inasmuch as the desire for having food in the case of all living beings is due to their past habit of having food when hungry. But in the case of a just-born infant, such a habit cannot be formed in this birth. Therefore, it implies the habit formed in the previous birth. Thus is proved the existence of the same self in spite of the change of bodies.

The desire for food in the just-born infant does not refer here to that of human beings only. It refers to the cases of all living beings. Thus for example a calf born in a solitary place, without being taught by anybody else, is observed to put upward thrust on the cow's udder for drawing out milk from it. But how does it know that milk would satisfy its hunger and that such a thrust would draw out milk ? Therefore, it is to be assumed that it has the recollection of such experiences taking place in its previous birth. It cannot be imagined that, with a view to save its life, God guides it to such an activity, because God leads an individual to an action only as determined by the nature of its past action (*karman*). If God is viewed to lead indiscriminately all the just-born infants to suck their mother's breasts, we should be led to the absurd conclusion that when an infant dies of sucking a poisonous breast, God simply guides it to its destruction without taking into account the result of its past actions. The admission of God acting in accordance with the results of an individual's

past actions, however, implies the admission of the previous births of the individual and hence also the eternality of the self.

Sūtra 22

[Objection] The movement [of the just-born infant towards its mother's breast] is like that of the iron towards the magnet. // iii.1.22 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Just as the iron moves towards the magnet without any previous habit, so does the infant desire to suck the breast without any previous habit of having food.

Elucidation

The objector argues that the tendency of moving towards something is not necessarily caused by the recollection of the past habit, inasmuch as the iron moves towards the magnet simply because of its inherent nature. The case of the just-born infant also is to be similarly viewed.

Bhāṣya

Is this movement of the iron towards the magnet without any cause or is it due to some specific cause ? The possibility of being without any cause—

Sūtra 23

[Answer] Is not [acceptable], because nothing else [i.e. nothing other than the iron] moves towards it. // iii.1.23 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] If it [i.e. the movement of the iron] is viewed as being without any cause, even the pieces of brick etc would move towards the magnet and there cannot be any cause to explain the law [that iron alone is drawn towards the magnet]. If, on the contrary, you admit that it has a cause, how is that cause to be determined ? The cause of an action is inferred from the action itself and the specific nature of the cause of an action is inferred from the specific nature of the action itself. This explains the absence of the movement elsewhere.

In the case of a just-born infant also is observed the action in the form of a specific movement. Excepting the lingering recollection resulting from the habit of having food in the past, the instance [cited by the opponent] does not indicate any cause to be inferred from the desire for sucking the breast. Nor can this instance negate the cause of the desire as actually observed. Therefore, the movement of the iron towards the magnent is only a pseudo-instance.

Besides, the iron also does not move towards anything else [than the magnet] and the iron is never drawn towards a piece of brick. How is this law to be explained ? If you admit that it is due to the specific nature of the cause, this [specific nature of the cause] is to be inferred from the specific nature of the action. Therefore, in the case of an infant also, the desire for the specific object is due to a specific cause. Whether this cause is the recollection of past habits or something else must be determined only on the basis of actual observation and what is actually observed is that all living beings have the desire for food due to the recollection of past habits.

Elucidation

The opponent cites the instance of the iron moving towards the magnet. But the iron moves *only* towards the magnet and *only* the iron moves towards the magnet. Therefore, there must be some specific cause for this. Similarly, there must be some specific cause of the infant's movement towards the mother's breast. However, this specific cause is to be determined only on the basis of what is actually observed and, in the case of all living beings, it is actually observed that the lingering recollection of the past habit of having food is the specific cause of the desire for food. Thus the instance cited by the opponent cannot disprove what is established on the basis of actual observation in the case of the infant's movement.

Bhāṣya

The self is eternal, also because of another ground. What is this ground ?

Sūtra 24

Because no living being is observed to be born without desire. // iii. 1. 24 //

Bhāṣya

It follows from the implication [of the *sūtra*] that living beings are born as characterised by desire. In other words, when a living being is born, it is born as endowed with desire. Desire, again, is born of the recollection of the objects previously perceived. The previous perception of objects is not explicable without [the admission of] a body in the previous birth. Thus the self recollects the objects perceived while having connection with a previous body and gets attached to those objects. It follows from this that the self, as connected with the two bodies, undergoes rebirth (*pratisandhi*).[1] In this way, the previous body presupposes a further previous body, which again presupposes a still further previous body—and so on. As a result, the connection with body of the conscious self is without any beginning. Therefore, attachment (*rāga-anubandha*) also is without a beginning. Thus is established the eternality of the self.

Elucidation

Gautama proves the eternality of the self on the further ground that the living beings are observed to be born as endowed with desire. Thus, e.g., the just-born infant is found to have the desire for sucking etc. Desire for an object is possible only when the object previously perceived as pleasant is remembered as such, which previous perception presupposes the connection of the self with a previous body. Since the

1. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa comments that this sentence of the *bhāṣya* is obscure. However, on the evidence of the *Viśvakoṣa* and Vātsyāyana's comment on *Nyāya-sūtra* iv.1.63, he takes the word *pratisandhi* here in the sense of rebirth. This sense is moreover appropriate in this particular context.

just-born one cannot have any previous perception of the object in this birth, its first or initial desire presupposes its previous existence in a previous birth as possessing a previous body. The same argument proves the existence of the self with a still previous body, and so on without any beginning. Thus the series of births of the self is without any beginning and hence is eternal, because a 'positive entity' (*bhāva-padārtha*) without any beginning is inferentially proved to be eternal.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out that in *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1. 21, Gautama proves the rebirth and eternality of the self on the ground of the first desire for sucking on the part of the just-born infant, while in the present *sūtra* he proves the same on the ground of the initial desire for objects on the part of all living beings.

Following the *Yoga-sūtra* ii. 9 and ii. 10, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa adds that rebirth and the eternality of the self are also proved from the fear of death found in all living beings, inasmuch as this fear presupposes the experience of the suffering of death in the previous birth. Similarly, the innate dispositions characterising the different just-born animals—for example, the climbing up of a tree by a just-born monkey scared by a loud sound—also prove their previous births.

'Being characterised by desire' of the *sūtra* should be understood as inclusive of the special aptitudes for different branches of the different arts and sciences found in the different individuals. Thus, e.g., the special aptitude for music of an individual can be explained only on the assumption of his past practice of music, i.e. the practice of music in the previous birth.

It may be objected by some that the assumption of the previous birth is untenable, because in that case there should have been the recollection of all sorts of things perceived in the previous birth. To this it is answered that there is no rule that each and every object previously perceived is necessarily recollected afterwards. Of the innumerable objects perceived by us in this birth, we remember only a few. The rule, on the contrary, is that only that object is remembered the adequate cause of the remembrance of which is present at the moment. Therefore, the admission of the previous birth does not necessarily imply that everything perceived in the previous birth has got to be clearly remembered during this birth. The specific cause of the remembrance of an object is the reminiscent impression revived through the specific form of the *adṛṣṭa* of the individual. In the case of the just-born infant, e.g., its *adṛṣṭa* in the form of "being conducive to its saving of the life" revives the reminiscent impression of sucking, which impression is due to its experience of sucking in the previous birth. That is why, the just-born infant remembers only this and not everything experienced in the past.

If the existence of previous birth is denied on the ground that it is never directly perceived by anybody, the same ground will lead us to deny the existence of our ancestors whom we have never seen. Further, on the evidence of the *Yoga-sūtra* iii. 18, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa argues that it is possible to remember everything about the past existence through the yogic disciplines. The Buddhists, too, admit this, as is evidenced by their Jātakas.

In the *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* (i. 8), Udayana wants to prove the reality of the other world from the fact that a large number of persons are attracted to the performance of the Vedic rites like *agnihotra* etc, supposed to lead to pleasure in the other world. This attraction is inexplicable on the assumption that the rites are futile or that these lead to mere suffering or that these are performed for acquiring fame. The Cārvāka claim that these rites are the inventions of the cunning people for deceiving others is also untenable, inasmuch as nobody would undergo the strain involved in the performance of the rites only for the purpose of deceiving others. It follows from the proof of the other world that the self survives after death in order to be able to enjoy the fruits of the actions performed in this birth. But it is not possible for the self to enjoy such fruits without being connected with a body. It follows, therefore, that after the destruction of this body, the self gets connected with another body and this process continues until the attainment of the final liberation.

It is moreover found that different persons are differently placed in life—some under favourable conditions and others under unfortunate ones—without there being any palpable reason for this difference. Therefore, this difference is explicable only on the admission of *adṛṣṭa*, which, in its turn, is due to the good and bad actions performed by the different individuals in their previous births.

Bhāṣya

But how is it known that the desire of the living being is born of the recollection of the objects previously perceived and not that—

Sūtra 25

[Objection] Its [i.e. of the self along with its desire] origination is like the origination of the [ordinary] things endowed with qualities [like form, colour, etc]. // iii.1.25 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Just as the qualities of an [ordinary] thing which is characterised by origination [i.e. of an ordinary thing which is non-eternal] are produced from certain causes, so also the desire of the self [equally] characterised by

origination is produced by a certain cause. [That is, the objector proposes to view the self as being equally non-eternal as an ordinary thing and the desire of the self is produced in the same way as the quality of an ordinary thing].

For the purpose of explaining with the help of a new instance [e.g., a jar], this is only a repetition of what is already said [in *Nyāya-sūtra* iii.1.22].

Elucidation

In the case of an ordinary object like the jar, it is admitted that the object, after being produced, acquires its qualities because of certain other specific causes. The objector argues: Why should we not conceive the origination of desire in the self in the same manner ? Therefore, on the evidence of the origination of desire in the self, the self is not necessarily to be viewed as eternal.

Vātsyāyana remarks that this is a repetition of an argument already mentioned and Vācaspati adds that this repetition has its justification, because the same argument is explained here more convincingly on the basis of a very well-known example of everyday life.

Sūtra 26

[Answer] No [i.e. the origination of the self with desire etc is not like the origination of ordinary things endowed with qualities], because deliberation (*saṃkalpa*) is the cause of desire etc. // iii.1 26 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The origination of the self and its desire is not like the origination of ordinary things endowed with qualities Why ? Because deliberation is the cause of desire etc. It is observed that the desire of the living beings who enjoy the objects is produced by deliberation and this deliberation is born of the recollection of the objects previously perceived. From this it is inferred that the desire of the just-born baby also originates from the recollection of objects previously perceived. Only if [it is permissible to admit that the self has an origin], it can be argued that [the quality in the form of] desire is produced from the material cause [*adhikaraṇa* : literally, 'the substratum'] of the self and as such the cause of desire is something other than deliberation, as it is in the case of the

qualities of an ordinary non-eternal object. However, it is not proved that the self has an origin nor that desire has any cause other than deliberation. Therefore, it is illogical to claim that the origination of the two [viz. the self and its desire] is like the origination of an ordinary thing endowed with qualities.

It may be argued that desire has a cause other than deliberation, namely, *adṛṣṭa* in the form of 'virtue and vice' (*dharma-adharma*). Even admitting this, the connection of the self with a previous body cannot be discarded, because [in the case of the just-born baby] it [i.e. the *adṛṣṭa*] is not produced in this birth.

Desire is produced from 'involvement in the object' (*tanmayatva*) and by involvement in the object is meant the repeated experience of the object, which is the cause of 'reminiscent impression' (*saṃskāra*).

Also, a specific desire is due to a 'specific form of *adṛṣṭa*' (*jāti-viśeṣa*). [By the term *jāti-viśeṣa* (lit. 'birth in a specific form') is to be understood] *adṛṣṭa* which is actually the cause of 'birth in a specific form'. It is clear that the word [for the effect] often signifies that from which it is produced [i.e. the cause]. Hence it is disproved that desire has for its cause something else than deliberation.

Elucidation

Gautama argues that desire is due to nothing but deliberation (*saṃkalpa*). Vātsyāyana explains that this being a fact established by common observation is to be extended also to the case of the just-born baby. Uddyotakara says that by *saṃkalpa* is to be understood the craving for the object previously experienced. Vācaspati elucidates this further : An experience of an object results in a continuous stream of recollections about it, which produces a craving for it and this finally results in the desire for the object. According to Viśvanātha, *saṃkalpa* here means the knowledge of an object as conducive to one's own welfare ; such a knowledge is the source of the desire for the object. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa concludes that whatever may be the exact meaning of the word *saṃkalpa*, the main point is that it is the cause of the desire for an object.

In defence of the theory that the self has an origin, it is argued that the material cause of the self is also the cause of its qualities in the form of desire etc, just as the qualities of a jar like its colour are produced from the qualities of its material cause, viz. the earth. In refutation of this, Vātsyāyana says that such an argument would have been tenable only if it could ever be proved that desire etc were produced not from deliberation but from something else. But there is no proof whatsoever for such an assumption, nor is there any proof for the origin of the self. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa stretches the argument to claim that those who want to prove the origin of the self from certain material causes cannot point to what these material causes actually are and how the quality in the form of desire is generated in these alleged material causes. This point,

he says, would be taken up again in the refutation of 'the doctrine of the origin of consciousness from matter' (*bhūta-caitanya-vāda*) in the second *āhnika* (*Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 2.35ff).

Even if one argues that the desire of the just-born infant is due to its *adṛṣṭa*, one will have to admit its previous birth when alone such an *adṛṣṭa* can be accumulated. However, the position of Nyāya is as follows: 'Involvement in an object' (*tanmayatva*) produces its 'reminiscent impression' (*bhāvanā*)[1]; *bhāvanā* produces recollection (*anusmaraṇa*); recollection produces deliberation (*saṃkalpa*) and *saṃkalpa* produces desire.

It may be objected that the self, after leaving the human body, may in its next birth have the body of a camel. According to the above argument, in such a case it should have the desire etc characteristic of a human being rather than those of a camel. But the fact is that the just-born camel is found to have the desire etc characteristic only of the camel. How are we to account for this? It is answered that in the course of its thousands of previous births, it had once the body of a camel and the reminiscent impressions of that camel life are revived in the self during its present camel birth; the reminiscent impression of its immediately preceding human life are not revived during its present camel life, because the forces to revive those are not present; while those of his previous camel life are revived now because the forces that revive those are present. This explanation is also to be found in the *Yoga-sūtra, kaivalya-pāda* viii-ix.

The main point established by the present discussion is that the self is eternal and hence is different from the body which is non-eternal. It is also clear that in the Nyāya view there is a multiplicity of selves as residing in the different bodies and that they are endowed with qualities like desire etc. Elsewhere also Gautama clearly admits the multiplicity of selves (cf *Nyāya-sūtra* iii.2.66f). Further, in his commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra* iii 2.37 & iii.2.50, Vātsyāyana explicitly states that the selves as residing in different bodies are different from one another. Therefore, it is futile to try to prove that Gautama and Vātsyāyana also subscribed to the Advaita view of there being only one self.

In the Vaiśeṣika system, which is allied to Nyāya (*samāna-tantra*), it is argued that the self cannot be viewed as one. In the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* iii 2.19, is mentioned as a *pūrva pakṣa* the view of the unity of the self and in the next *sūtra* this view is refuted with the following argument: if the self were one, the pleasure or pain of one person should have simultaneously been the pleasure or pain of everybody else, whereas the fact is that the experience of pleasure or pain belongs specifically to the different individuals. From this it follows that there exist different selves in different bodies and hence the self cannot be viewed as one.

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1. Impression (*saṃskāra*) is conceived in three forms: (1) *vega* or the tendency to maintain a uniform motion; (2) *sthiti-sthāpaka* or elasticity and (3) *bhāvanā* or reminiscent impression.

It may be argued that the scriptures declare that there is only one self; hence any inference to the contrary will have to be discarded as contradicting the scriptures (*āgama-viruddha-anumāna*). To this Phaṇibhūṣaṇa answers that the declarations of the scriptures which mention the unity of the self are to be understood as referring to *paramātman* or God and the declarations mentioning the multiplicity of selves are to be understood as referring to the *jīvātman* or individual selves. Where the scriptures clearly mention one self—and this evidently not in the context of the *paramātman* but specifically in that of the *jīvātman*—these are to be understood as referrring to the 'general class' (*jāti*) of the individual selves and not to the unity of the self. Hence the view of the multiplicity of selves does not really go against the scriptures.

Some of the recent representatives of the Advaita view try to prove that even Kaṇāda subscribed to the theory of the unity of the self. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa concludes his present elucidation by pointing to the utter untenability of such an interpretation of Kaṇāda. In this connection he strongly criticises the tendency of some of the recent scholars to interpret all the systems of philosophy as culminating in the Advaita view.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE ETERNALITY OF THE SELF

(*ātma-nityatva-prakaraṇa*)

VI. ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF BODY

Bhāṣya

It has already been said that the connection of the conscious self with the body is without a beginning. This body has for its cause one's own actions and it serves as the locus for the experiences of pleasure and pain by the self. It is now being critically examined.

[The doubt, as the precondition for the critical examination of the body, is :] Is it, like the olfactory sense etc, composed of a single element or is it composed of various elements ? What is the cause of such a doubt ? The doubt is due to 'contradictory notions' (*vipratipatti*). Different thinkers consider different numbers of material elements like the earth etc as constituting the body [and as such there is doubt concerning the number of elements constituting the body]. What, then, is the truth in this regard ?

Sūtra 27

[Human body] is made of earth, because the human body is found to be characterised by the specific quality [viz. smell] which is different from [the specific qualities belonging to all the elements other than the earth, e g the water]. // iii. 1. 27 //

Bhāṣya

Of these, the human body is made of earth. Why ? Because the specific quality of earth alone is found in it. Earth has the quality of smell and the human body also is characterised by the quality of smell. The other elements like water etc are devoid of smell and hence, if the human body were made of these, it would have had no smell. However, if it were composed of pure earth without any mixture with the other elements like water etc, it could not really be viewed as the substratum of action, senses and pleasure-pain [as defined in *Nyāya-sūtra* i 1. 11] Therefore, [it is to be admitted] that the human body is produced when there is the conjunction of the five material elements [Thus the *sūtra*] does not reject the mutual conjunction of the five material elements [in the human body]. In the other spheres (*loka*) exist bodies made of water, made of fire and made of air. In these also there is the conjunction of material elements

which enables the self to experience pleasure and pain. Even in the production of the objects like the jar etc, it is indisputable that there is no production without the conjunction of water etc.

Elucidation

Following the sequence of his enumeration of the 'objects of valid knowledge' (*prameya*), Gautama, after the critical discussion of the *self*, passes on to discuss the *body*. Vātsyāyana shows that there is also a logical sequence of this discussion, inasmuch as the body is the substratum of the experience of pleasure and pain by the self and it is due to the actions of the self itself. Therefore, only with the discussion of the body the discussion of the self becomes complete.

The doubt, presupposed by the critical discussion of the human body, is expressed by Vātsyāyana by pointing to the various ways of viewing the material elements that constitute the body : it may be viewed as made of earth alone ; or of earth and water ; or of earth, water and fire ; or of earth, water, fire and air ; or of all the five material elements. Hence is the doubt : Is the human body made of only one element, as the olfactory sense, e.g., is made of earth alone, or is it made of various elements ?

According to Gautama, the human body is made of earth and the reason for this is mentioned as *guṇāntara-upalabdhi*, which means the perception of the specific quality other than the specific qualities of the four other material elements like water etc, i.e. the perception of the specific quality of earth alone, which is smell. According to both Kaṇāda and Gautama, smell is the specific quality of earth. Hence, whatever is found characterised by the quality of smell is to be viewed as made of earth. The human body is characterised by smell and so it is made of earth. However, argues Vātsyāyana, though the human body is made of earth, this does not exclude the possibility of the earth being conjoined with the other four material elements in the making of the human body ; without admitting such a conjunction, the definition of body given in *Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.11 remains unexplained. [This point is unfortunately not elucidated either by Vātsyāyana or by Phanibhūsana]. Thus, just as the jar, though made of earth, is produced when this earth is conjoined with other elemens like water etc, so also the earth, of which the human body is made, is conjoined with the other material elements.

Sūtra 28

[Objection] [The human body] is made of the three material elements, namely earth, water and fire, because the specific qualities of these three [viz. smell, viscosity (*sneha*) and warmth respectively] are experienced in it. //iii.1.28//

Sūtra 29

[Another objection] [The human body] is made of four material elements, because of the inhalation and exhalation observed in it. //iii.1.29//

Sūtra 30

[Further objection] [The human body] is made of five material elements, because it is found to have smell, 'liquid excretion' (*kleda*), digestion (*pāka*), breathing (*vyūha*), etc and also openings (*avakāśa-dāna*). //iii.1.30//

Bhāṣya

These alternatives are ignored by the author of the *sūtra*-s, because the grounds on which these depend are doubtful. Why doubtful ? The experience of the qualities of the material elements may be due to their being the actual constituents [of the body] ; and also—when these are not the actual consitituents—[the said experience] may be due to their contiguity provided there is no bar against their coming in conjunction, just as in the case of the jar [there is the experience of the qualities of water etc, because of the conjunction of] water, fire, air and empty space. Thus, on the assumption that the human body is constituted by the various material elements, it would become devoid of smell, taste, colour and touch, because of the 'law that the specific qualities of the effect come from the specific qualities of the material cause' (*prakṛti-anuvidhāna*). [Thus : being made of earth excludes the possibility of its having the specific quality of water etc, viz. taste etc, and being made of water excludes the possibility of its having the specific quality of earth etc, viz. smell etc.] But it [i.e. the human body] is not like that. Therefore, [the human body] is made of earth, because of 'the perception of the specific quality other than the specific qualities of the four other material elements' (*guṇāntara-upalabdhi*).

Elucidation

In the above three *sūtra*-s, the objectors argue that in view of the presence of the specific qualities of the different material elements in the human body, it is to be considered as made of all these material elements. Vātsyāyana says that Gautama simply ignores these objections, for the grounds on which these are based are doubtful.

The presence of the specific qualities of the different material elements in human body may be considered as due to two different circumstances altogether. First, these material elements are the actual constituents of the human body. Secondly, even though all these are not the actual constituent elements, the other four material elements are conjoined with earth, which alone is the material cause of the human body. Thus, the presence in the human body of the specific qualities of the different material elements does not necessarily prove that all these are to be considered as its actual constituents. Of these two alternative possibilities, Vātsyāyana admits the second and shows the fallaciousness of the first. Thus, the assumption that the human body is made of all the material elements should logically make the human body devoid of the specific quality of any of these material elements, because the presence of each of the material elements in the making of the body would exclude the possibility of there being the specific qualities of the other material elements.

According to some, the last three *sūtra*-s mentioned above are not genuinely Gautama's *sūtra*-s, because Gautama himself does not refute the views mentioned therein. The text of Uddyótakara's *Nyāya-vārtika* as we have it indicates the same possibility. However, Vācaspati Miśra—both in his *Nyāya-sūcī-nibandha* and *Nyāya-tattvāloka*—accept these as genuine *sūtra*-s. Viśvanātha also expresses the same view as that of Vātsyāyana regarding these *sūtra*-s. Kaṇāda, in *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* iv.2.2-3, refutes the same views that we come acrosss in the 28th and the 30th *sūtra*-s above. He gives the following argument against the view that all the five material elements constitute the human body. That which inheres in the perceptible as well as the imperceptible objects is itself imperceptible, for example, the conjunction between a tree and empty space. In this case, the relation of conjunction inheres in both the tree and empty space, of which the former is perceptible and the latter imperceptible ; hence this relation of conjunction is itself imperceptible. If the human body is assumed to be constituted by all the five material elements, it should inhere in each of these elements. But four of these elements are perceptible, while the fifth one—viz. *ākāśa*—is imperceptible. Thus the human body, as inhering in both perceptible and imperceptible elements, should itself be imperceptible. As against the possibility of the human body being constituted by the three material elements, viz. earth, water and fire, Kaṇāda argues that these constituents being heterogeneous cannot produce something with the specific quality of any of these, like smell, which is the specific quality of earth. This argument is similar to that of Vātsyāyana.

Sūtra 31

[The human body is made of earth] because of
the testimony of the scriptures. //iii.1.31//

Bhāṣya

In the *mantra* beginning with *sūryaṃ te cakṣuḥ gacchatāt* [literally, 'let thy visual sense go to the sun'], we have *pṛthivīṃ te śarīram* [lit., 'thy body to the earth']. There is thus a reference here to the product returning back to the primary elements. In another *mantra*, beginning with *sūryaṃ te cakṣuḥ spṛṇomi* [lit., 'I create thy visual sense from the sun'] we have *pṛthivīṃ te śarīraṃ spṛṇomi* [lit., 'I create thy body from the earth']. There is thus a reference here to the product as emerging from the material cause. It is also observed in the cases of the jar etc that the effect is produced by homogeneous material causes. Hence it is illogical to assume that heterogeneous elements can produce an effect.

Elucidation

Gautama apprehends some possible objections here. Thus, it may be argued that the presence of smell in the human body may as well be due to the conjunction of earth with the other elements which actually constitute the body. Secondly, certain scriptural declarations are understood by others as indicating that the human body is constituted by the five elements. To silence such objections, Gautama cites here the scriptural evidence for the human body being made of earth alone.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF BODY

(*śarīra-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

VII. ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE SENSE-ORGANS BEING MADE OF MATTER

Bhāṣya

Following the order of the objects of valid knowledge, now is being examined the sense-organs. Are these the products of the *avyakta* [i.e. *prakṛti* of the Sāṃkhya] or are these produced from the material elements ? Why is this doubt ?

Sūtra 32

There is doubt, because colour is perceived in the presence of the eye-ball (*kṛṣṇasāra*) and also because colour only at a distance from the eye-ball is perceived. //iii.1.32//

Bhāṣya

The eye-ball is made of material element. When it is not damaged, there is the perception of colour ; when, again, it is damaged, there is no perception. However, only when the object is at a distance from the eye-ball, it is perceived, but not when it is in very close proximity with the eye-ball. The sense-organs, moreover, 'do not perceive that which is not in contact with them' (*aprāpyakārī*). This is possible only when the sense-organ is conceived as not made of material element and as all-pervasive. Thus, there is doubt, because of the apprehension of the characteristics of both [the material and non-material objects].

Elucidation

The doubt presupposed by the critical examination of the sense-organs is as follows. In the Sāṃkhya view, from the *prakṛti* or *avyakta* evolves *buddhi* ; from *buddhi* evolves *ahaṃkāra* and from *ahaṃkāra* evolve the sense-organs. The sense-organs are thus viewed as the products of *avyakta*. But in the Nyāya view the sense-organs are considered as products of the materials elements. Thus, the visual sense is of the nature of fire (*tejas*), the auditory sense of empty space, the olfactory sense of earth, the gustatory sense of water and the tactual sense of air. Gautama mentions here only the visual sense to illustrate the doubt. The two alternative possibilities suggesting the doubt are :

On the one hand, the visual sense, e.g., is made of matter, because the eye-ball is undoubtedly so and the eye-ball is to be considered as the visual sense inasmuch as only when it is not damaged there is visual sensation, while there is no visual sensation when it is damaged. On similar grounds, the other senses also are to be considered as made of material elements.

On the other hand, the visual sense cannot be equated to the eye-ball, because the sense-organs perceive their objects only when these are in contact with the objects (*prāpyakārī*), while we have the visual sensation of an object only when it is situated at some distance from the eye-ball. This is explicable on the admission of the Sāṃkhya view that the sense-organs are not made of matter, but evolve out of *ahaṃkāra* and hence are all-pervasive, i.e. remain in contract with all objects.

Though Vātsyāyana illustrates the doubt by thus counterposing the Nyāya and the Sāṃkhya views, Vācaspati Miśra explains that by implication it is to be understood that there is a further doubt in the form of the confrontation of the Nyāya view with the Buddhist one. Thus, in the Buddhist view the eye-ball itself is the visual sense, while in the Nyāya view the visual sense is something made of fire, which has for its locus only the eye-ball. But Phaṇibhūṣaṇa comments that the reading of this second doubt in Gautama and Vātsyāyana appears to be rather far-fetched.

Bhāṣya

[The senses] are not made of material elements. Thus claims some. Why ?

Sūtra 33

[The ground for the Sāṃkhya view :] Because of the perception of both the enormous (*mahat*) as well as the minute (*aṇu*) objects. //iii.1.33//

Bhāṣya

Thus are perceived the big and the still bigger objects in the form : "It is enormous"—e.g. the banyan tree and the mountain etc. So also are perceived the small and still smaller objects in the form : "It is minute"—e.g., the sprout of the banyan tree. The perception of these two kinds of objects negates the possibility of the visual sense being made of material elements, for an object

made of material elements can pervade only that which is equal to it in magnitude. But something not made of material elements can pervade everything because of its all-pervasiveness.

Elucidation

As Vācaspati and others explain: In the Sāṃkhya view the sense-organs, being the evolutes of *ahaṃkāra*, are not made of matter and hence these are all-pervasive. Thus the visual sense is also all-pervasive. In the present *sūtra*, Gautama explains the ground for this view. The visual sense perceives all sorts of objects with varying magnitude and size. On the one hand, it perceives the big and the still bigger things, while on the other the small and the still smaller ones. But the visual sense, if assumed to be made of material elements, will have to be accepted as having a definite magnitude and as such would be incapable of pervading anything bigger in magnitude. Therefore, the fact that the visual sense perceives objects of both enormous and minute magnitudes shows that it cannot be made of material elements.

Bhāṣya

[An objection against the Sāṃkhya view:] The non-materiality and all-pervasiveness of the sense-organs are not necessarily implied by the fact of their perception of the enormous as well as the minute objects, because this—

Sūtra 34

Perception of the two [i.e. the enormous and the minute] is due to a specific form of contact between the rays [*raśmi*, i.e. the rays supposed to be radiating from the eyes] and the object. //iii.1.34//

Bhāṣya

The perception of both the enormous and the minute is due to a specific form of contact between the visual rays and the object, just as in the case of the rays of a lamp and the object revealed by it. The specific form of contact between the rays and the objects is to be inferred from the evidence of

obstruction. The visual rays do not reveal an object which is obstructed by the hut etc, just as in the case of the rays of the lamp.

Even assuming that [the said contact] is inferred on the evidence of obstruction, [from the Sāṃkhya point of view] it is said—

Sūtra 35

[The Sāṃkhya argument :] It [i.e. the argument mentioned in the previous *sūtra*] is not a proper ground, because these [visual rays] are not perceived. //iii.1.35//

Bhāṣya

The element of fire (*tejas*) has the qualities of colour and touch. Since [the element of fire] has 'intermediate magnitude' [*mahattva*, i.e. neither atomic nor all-pervasive magnitude], is 'composed of many parts' (*aneka-dravyavattva*)[1] and has colour (*rūpa*),—the visual rays [which are of the nature of fire] would have been perceived like the rays of a lamp.

Elucidation

In this *sūtra* is mentioned the objection of those who deny the existence of visual rays. The said visual rays are supposed to fulfil all the preconditions of perceptibility, namely 1) having intermediate magnitude, 2) being made of many parts and 3) possessing colour. Still the fact is that no such ray is actually perceived. Hence these do not exist. The question of inferring these from any ground, therefore, does not arise.

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1. Though the exponent of Navya-nyāya like Viśvanātha considers only *mahattva* as the precondition of perceptibility, in the older view both *mahattva* and *aneka-dravyavattva* are considered to be so. Apart from the present statement of Vātsyāyana, this is evidenced by *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* iv.1.6. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa shows distinct preference for the older view.

Sūtra 36

**[Argument against the Sāṃkhya argument :]
In the case of an object inferentially proved, the absence of perception cannot establish its non-existence. //iii.1.36//**

Bhāṣya

The absence of the perception of the visual rays, which are inferred on the evidence of an obstruction that interrupts the contact with the object, does not prove their non-existence,—just like those of the other side of the moon and of the part of the earth below.

Sūtra 37

Perceptibility is regulated by the difference in the 'characteristic of the substance' (*dravya-dharma*) and the 'characteristic of the quality' (*guṇa-dharma*). //iii.1.37//

Bhāṣya

The characteristic of the substance and the characteristic of the quality are quite different. A substance made of the element of water, in spite of 'having an intermediate magnitude' and of 'being composed of many parts', is not known by perception when its parts are mixed up with some other substance ; but its [quality, viz.] cold touch is perceived. The two seasons, viz. autumn (*hemanta*) and winter (*śiśira*) are ascertained by the contact of such a substance. In a similar condition [i.e. when the parts are mixed up with some other substance] a substance made of the element of fire and characterised by latent (*anudbhūta*) colour, remains unperceived along with its colour ; but [its other quality, viz.] warm touch is perceived. The two seasons, namely, summer and spring, are ascertained by the contact of such a substance.

Elucidation

In the previous *sūtra* it is argued that the existence of the visual rays is proved by inference. But the question arises : Why are not these rays and their colour—like the rays of a lamp and their colour, for example—perceived ? Gautama answers this question in this *sūtra*. The usual preconditions of perceptibility of a substance are : 1) having intermediate magnitude and 2) being made of many parts. But a substance along with some of its qualities, in spite of fulfilling these preconditions, may remain unperceived if its parts are mixed up with some other substance. Vātsyāyana gives two examples of this. Thus, the colour of the substance made of the element of water is not perceived because it remains latent (*anudbhūta*), while its cold touch, which is manifest (*udbhūta*), is perceived. Similarly, the colour of the substance made of the element of fire, being latent, is not perceived, though its warm touch is perceived, because it is manifest.

Bhāṣya

[The conditions] that make such [perception of a substance along with its colour] possible are—

Sūtra 38

The perception of a substance along with its colour is due to its inherence in many substances [i.e. in its constituent parts] as well as a specific property in the colour [i.e. its being manifest]. //iii.1.38//

Bhāṣya

[The difference in the 'characteristic of the substance' and the 'characteristic of the quality' mentioned in the previous *sūtra*] refers to something which, when present, makes possible the perception of colour as well as the substance which is its substratum. The specific property in the colour means that characteristic of the colour, the presence of which makes possible the perception of colour and the absence of which denies perceptibility in the substance. This specific property is known as 'being manifest' (*udbhava=udbhūtatva*). The visual rays are characterised by latent colour, and hence these are not

perceived. The same element of fire is observed to have different characteristics. Thus, the element of fire may sometimes be visible with manifest colour and manifest touch, as in the case of the rays of the sun. The element of fire may, again, be visible with manifest colour but latent touch, as in the case of the rays of a lamp. The element of fire may also be invisible with manifest touch but latent colour, when, e.g., it is mixed up with water etc. The element of fire may moreover be invisible with latent colour and latent touch [as in the case of] the visual rays.

Sūtra 39

The structure of the senses is determined by *karman* and these senses are the means for the experience of pleasure and pain of the individual self. //iii.1.39//

Bhāṣya

The perception of the objects as well as the experience of pleasure and pain are considered to be the motives of the conscious self. In accordance with these, the senses are designed. The structure of the visual rays is designed for the attainment of the objects. That the colour and touch of these rays are latent is admitted for explaining the facts of practical life. That these rays get obstructed when they impinge (*pratighāta*) on an object is also admitted for explaining the facts of practical life. Like that of the senses, the origin of the varied structures of all objects is due to *karman* and these are the means for the experience of pleasure and pain of the individual self. By *karman* is meant the merits and demerits (*dharma-adharma*), which determine the nature of the experiences of the conscious self.

Elucidation

It is presently shown that the visual rays are not visible, because they have no manifest colour. But why, it may be asked, these rays do not possess manifest colour, as is possessed by the other rays? Gautama answers that the nature of the senses is

determined by the *adṛṣṭa* of the individual selves, which leads these to experience the objects and have pleasure and pain. The function of the visual sense is to reveal an object, which is possible when the visual sense comes in contact with it. This contact is explained by the admission of the visual rays. The colour and touch of these rays are, moreover, to be admitted as latent, without admitting which the practical experiences will remain inexplicable. Uddyotakara wants to illustrate and elaborate this inexplicability of the practical experience. Thus, had the warm touch of these rays been manifest, these would have burnt the objects exposed to these for a long time.

Bhāṣya

Getting impinged is the characteristic of something material, because it has invariable concomitance with a material object. In the presence of an obstruction, the sense-organ gets impinged on an object and this impingement is the characteristic of something material and it is never observed to be unrelated to material objects. Nor is it ever observed that impingement is a characteristic of something non-material. But the 'lack of impingement' (*apratīghāta*) has no invariable concomitance, because it is equally found in both material and non-material objects.

Somebody may argue: If the sense-organs are considered to be material because of the fact of impingement, these may as well be ascertained to be non-material because of the fact of non-impingement. Non-impingement of the sense-organs is also observed, for the objects screened off by a pane of glass, by a sheet of mica and by a slab of crystal are also perceived. Such an argument is not valid. Why? Because even a material object is not sometimes impinged. Thus, the rays of the lamp can reveal objects beyond a pane of glass, a sheet of mica and a slab of crystal. Besides, the cooking fire is not impinged by the cooking pot etc.

Elucidation

The main point of Gautama is that the visual sense, having for its material cause the element of fire (*tejas*), is itself something material. Vātsyāyana offers an independent argument to prove the materiality of the visual sense. The visual sense is material, because it gets impinged and whatever gets impinged must be material. But this does not mean that whatever is material must necessarily get impinged.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa comments that what is thus shown of the visual sense is, on similar ground, true of all the other senses.

Bhāṣya

The absence of perception [of the visual rays] is also explained by the special ground—

Sūtra 40

The absence of perception [of the visual rays] is like the absence of perception of the light of a meteor at midday. //iii 1.40//

Bhāṣya

[It has already been said in *sūtra 38*] that the perception of a substance is due to its inherence in many substances [i.e. in the constituent parts] as well as a specific property in its colour [i.e. its being manifest]. In spite of the presence of these causes, the light of a meteor is not visible at midday, because it is subdued (*abhibhūta*) by the light of the sun. In the same manner, in spite of the presence of the causes of being perceived—[as it has been already mentioned] an object is perceived because of its intermediate magnitude, its being made of many parts and its having a specific property in the colour—the visual rays are not perceived, because of there being some special condition to account for the absence of perception. That condition is already explained [by the statement that] an object characterised by latent colour and latent touch is not perceived.

Elucidation

Something made of the element of fire is not necessarily visible. Otherwise, the light of the meteor would have been visible even at midday. A substance, the colour and touch of which remain latent, or a substance the colour of which though manifest is subdued,—is not visible. The invisibility of the visual rays is thus explained.

Bhāṣya

An absolute absence of apprehension is the ground that proves the non-existence of something. Let this be the view of someone who may claim that even a piece of stone may be emitting light though it is not perceived at midday because of being subdued by the light of the sun.

Sūtra 41

No [i.e. it cannot be said that like the meteor everything is luminous], because [the alleged light of the piece of stone etc] is not perceived even (*api*) at night. //iii.1.41//

Bhāṣya

Moreover, it [i.e. the light of the piece of stone etc] is neither apprehended by inference. Thus a piece of stone has no light, because of its absolute absence of apprehension. But the visual rays are not of such nature [because these are inferentially apprehended].

Elucidation

Gautama says that the light of the meteor is not visible at midday, because it is subdued by the light of the sun. On similar ground, it may be argued that a piece of stone as well may be imagined to have light, only this light is not visible during the day. Gautama argues that this cannot be imagined, because no light of a piece of stone is visible even at night when the sun is not there to subdue it. However, the visual rays are perceived neither during the day nor during the night. Even then the non-existence of these rays is not proved, for these are apprehended by inference: only the absolute absence of apprehension of something—i.e. its want of apprehension through any instrument of valid knowledge—can establish its non-existence.

Bhāṣya

It is also quite logical that—

Sūtra 42

There is the absence of apprehension [of the visual ray] because of its colour being latent, for an object is perceived by the eyes with the aid of external light. //iii.1.42//

Bhāṣya

The eyes, as aided by external light, apprehend their objects; in its [i.e. of external light] absence there is the absence of apprehension. But in spite of the cooperation of the external light and, moreover, despite the presence of the apprehension of cold touch, the substance in which it [i.e. the cold touch] inheres is not apprehended by the eyes, because of the colour being latent [e.g. the water-particles mixed up with air in winter]. Thus it is observed that when the colour is latent, the substance in which the colour inheres is not perceived. Therefore, it is illogical to claim [as is claimed in *Nyāya-sūtra* iii.1.35] that it is not a proper ground because these are not perceived.

Elucidation

Gautama offers another argument to prove that the visual rays are unperceived because their colour is latent. The lack of visibility of an object, in spite of the presence of the external light like that of the sun or of a lamp, is due to the latency of its colour. Thus, e.g., the water-particles in the air during the winter, in spite of the presence of external light, remain invisible, due to the latency of their colour. So also the visual rays, in spite of the presence of external light, are invisible because of the latency of their colour.

Bhāṣya

But why is it not asserted that the real cause of the absence of perception of the visual rays is that these are subdued ?

Sūtra 43

Because, something can be said to be subdued only when it is also (*ca*) sometimes perceived. //iii.1.43//

Bhāṣya

The word "also" (*ca*) means "when the aid of external light is not required [for its perception]". The possibility of being subdued arises only for that colour which is visible, i.e. manifest, and also is not dependent on the aid of external light. Otherwise, there is no possibility of being subdued. There is no possibility of being subdued in the case of an object which is either unperceived because of its latent colour or is perceived with the aid of external light. Thus it is established that the visual rays exist.

Elucidation

Why does not Gautama say that the visual rays are not perceived because these are subdued, like the light of the meteor at midday? The answer is that neither of the two preconditions of being subdued exists in the case of the visual rays. These preconditions are : 1) having manifest colour and 2) the want of any external light for its perception. The visual rays have no manifest colour and the question of their dependence on any external light for being perceived does not arise.

Sūtra 44

[The visual rays] exist also because the nocturnal animals are observed to have visual rays. //iii.1.44//

Bhāṣya

The visual rays of the nocturnal animals like cats and others are actually observed. From this are inferred the visual rays of the other animals. It may be objected that there is difference in the nature of the sense-organs just as there is difference in species. [To this the answer is :] it is not logical to assume the difference only in one characteristic, because [in the case of the visual sense of the cat also] the sense-object contact is found to be interrupted by an obstruction.

Elucidation

In the nocturnal animals like the cat etc, the visual rays are actually observed. From this it is inferred that such rays exist also in the human eyes. To this it may be objected that just as there is a difference in species between the animals and the human beings, so also there is a difference in the nature of their visual senses, that is, the visual sense of a nocturnal animal has rays whereas the visual sense of a human being has no ray. To this Vātsyāyana answers that such a difference cannot be admitted. The visual sense of all the animals are similar in nature, as is evidenced by the fact that the visual sense of a cat is as much obstructed by a wall as that of the human being.

That the visual sense is 'made of the element of fire' (*taijasa*) is denied by the Jainas who moreover claim that the visual sense does not actually reach the object for its perception. This is elaborately discussed in the concluding portions of the *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* and also in Ratnaprabhācārya's commentary on *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka-alaṃkāra*. One of the main arguments of the Jainas against the Nyāya view is that the visual sense cannot be made of fire, because it also reveals darkness. That which is made of fire—e.g. the sun or a lamp—cannot reveal darkness and that which reveals darkness cannot be made of fire. Assuming the visual sense to be made of fire, it would have been impossible for us to see darkness.

The main issue here is concerned with the nature of darkness. Unlike the Mimāṃsakas who view darkness as a substance, the Naiyāyikas consider it as the non-existence (*abhāva*) of the element of fire in the special form in which its colour is manifest and not subdued. The knowledge of non-existence is not possible when the counter-positive (*pratiyogī*) is present. Thus in the presence of the jar there is no knowledge of the non-existence of the jar. The light of the lamp is the counter-positive of darkness or the non-existence of light. Therefore, in the presence of the lamp there is no question of the knowledge of darkness. But the visual rays, because of the latency of their colour, cannot be considered as the counter-positive of darkness. Hence it is possible to have the knowledge of darkness in spite of the presence of the visual rays. Thus, the Jainas cannot claim that nothing made of fire can reveal darkness. Only that specific product of the element of fire which is the counter-positive of darkness cannot reveal darkness. The products of the element of fire in other forms may reveal darkness.

The other claim of the Jainas that the visual sense does not actually reach the object for its perception will be presently refuted.

Bhāṣya

[Objection] It is not logical to claim that the sense-object contact is the cause of perceptual knowledge. Why?

Sūtra 45

[Objection] [The visual sense] can perceive an object without actually coming in contact with it, because an object screened off by a pane of glass, a sheet of mica or a slab of crystal is also visually perceived. //iii.1.45//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] It is observed that a blade of grass driven by wind gets obstructed by a pane of glass or a sheet of mica. The contact of something is possible only with an object which is not obstructed. The obstruction goes against the contact. If the contact of the visual rays [with the object] is assumed to be the cause of perception, there can be no perception [of an object obstructed by something] because there can be no contact with an object thus obstructed. But the fact is that an object, though obstructed by a pane of glass or a sheet of mica or a slab of crystal, is actually perceived. This shows that the senses need not come in actual contact with the objects perceived. And since the coming into actual contact is the mark of an object being material, the senses cannot be considered as material.

Sūtra 46

[Answer] [The above argument] does not disprove [that the sense-object contact is not the cause of perceptual knowledge], because an object obstructed by a wall is not perceived. //iii.1.46//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] If the senses are considered as giving perceptual knowledge without coming in actual contact with the objects perceived, there cannot be the absence of perception of an object obstructed by a wall.

[Further objection] If the senses are considered as giving perceptual knowledge after actually coming in contact with the object, there cannot be the perception of what is obstructed by a pane of glass, a sheet of mica or a slab of crystal.

Sūtra 47

[Answer] [In the case of an object obstructed by a pane of glass etc] the sense-object contact is possible, because these do not obstruct [the visual rays]. //iii.1.47//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] A pane of glass or a sheet of mica does not obstruct the visual rays and hence the visual rays, being unobstructed, can come in contact [with the object beyond].

It is maintained by some that a material object can never be unobstructed. But this is not so.

Sūtra 48

Because there is no obstruction in the cases of 1) the rays of the sun, 2) what is separated by a slab of crystal and 3) the thing burned. //iii.1.48//

Bhāṣya

The word 'non-obstruction' (*avighāta*) being connected with each of the three expressions, yields three different statements, namely, 1) "because there is no obstruction in the case of the rays of the sun", 2) "because there is no obstruction in the case of what is separated by a slab of crystal", and 3) "because there is no obstruction in the case of what is burned". Three different meanings result from the three different statements. Thus :

1) The rays of the sun are not obstructed by the jar etc ; being unobstructed, these produce heat in the water contained in the jar. Because of this conjunction [with rays of the sun], in this water is perceived the quality of a different substance, viz. heat [which is a quality of fire], and the cold touch [i.e. the actual quality of water] gets subdued by it.

2) In the case of something separated by a slab of crystal, there is no obstruction between the rays of the lamp and the object to be revealed. Because of this want of obstruction, there can be conjunction [between the two] resulting in perception.

3) Things placed on a frying pan (*bharjana-kapāla*, the earthen frying pan) get burned by the heat of fire. There is conjunction [between the objects placed on the pan and the fire below the pan] because of the lack of any obstruction. And this conjunction causes burning, inasmuch as the element of fire (*tejaḥ*) does not act without getting conjoined.

The word "non-obstruction" is being repeatedly used. What does this "non-obstruction" mean? Non-obstruction of an object means the absence of being totally blocked by another object, the blocking object having no space separating its parts (*avyūhamāna-avayava*). In other words, it is the absence of any factor counteracting the cause of an action, i.e. the want of the cancellation of conjunction. As it is observed, the cold touch of water contained within a jar is perceived on the outer side also [of the jar]. The touch of a substance which is not in contact with the sense-organ is not perceived. It is also observed that water oozes out (*parisravaṇa*) and comes out in droplets (*praspanda*) [from a jar].

Therefore, there being no obstruction separating the visual rays from an object beyond a pane of glass or a sheet of mica etc, the contact between them is possible and as such there is the perception of the object.

Sūtra 49

> [Objection] No [i.e. it cannot be claimed that the visual sense is not obstructed by a pane of glass etc], because it leads to the absurdity of imputing the characteristic of something to something else. //iii.1.49//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] [Is it to be claimed that] there is no obstruction in the cases of the wall etc, as in the cases of a pane of glass, a sheet of mica and the like? Or, [is it to be claimed that] there is obstruction in the cases of a pane of glass, a sheet of mica and the like, as in the cases of the wall etc? A specific cause has got to be mentioned for the law [concerning obstruction and non-obstruction in the cases admitted].

To be continued

Sūtra 50

[Answer] [An object screened off by a pane of glass etc] is perceived, just as the image (*rūpa*) is perceived in the mirror and water, 'because these are transparent by nature' (*prasāda-svābhāvyāt*). // iii. 1. 50 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] Transparency (*prasāda*), which is a special quality (*rūpa*), is found in a mirror and water and it is a specific quality of [only such things], because this is uniformly observed. It is the very nature of transparency 'to reflect an image' (*rūpa-upalambhana*). The visual rays impinge on the mirror and, being rebounded back, come in contact with one's face. Thus one has the perception of one's own face, which perception is called the cognition of the image. The cause of this cognition is the mirror, which is aided by its transparency. With the loss of this quality of a mirror [viz. its transparency], there can be no such cognition. But in the case of the wall etc, there is no such cognition of an image. Thus, because of the specific nature of the different substances, the visual rays do not get obstructed by a pane of glass or a sheet of mica etc, while they get obstructed by the wall etc.

Elucidation

In answer to the objection raised in the previous *sūtra*, Gautama argues that it is a fact that the different substances have different specific characteristics. Therefore, only some of the substances (the wall, for example) obstruct the visual rays, while others (the glass, for example) do not. This difference in the specific nature of the substances is illustrated by Gautama with the quality of transparency, which exists only in the mirror etc.

Sūtra 51

[Answer continued] It is illogical to attribute or deny in an arbitrary manner any quality to a substance the nature of which is perceptually or inferentially determined. // iii. 1. 51 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer continued] [Arbitrary attribution or denial of a quality to a substance is not permissible], because the instruments of valid kowledge alone determine the exact nature (*tattva*) of a substance. A person critically examining a substance, the nature of which is already determined by perception or inference, cannot dictate to it: "Be like this", nor can he prohibit it: "Do not be like this". Nobody can claim: "Let smell as well be visually known, as is colour", or "Let not colour be visually known, like smell". Nor can one claim: "Let the smoke lead to the knowledge of water, as it leads to the knowledge of fire", or "Let the smoke fail to lead to the knowledge of fire, as it fails to lead to the knowledge of water".

Why is this so? Because the substances are known by the *pramāṇa*-s in their real nature, i.e. as they actually are—characterised by their specific nature, by their inherent qualities. The *pramāṇa*-s have for their objects the substances as they actually are. You have made two statements dictating and prohibiting as follows: "Let there be non-obstruction even by the wall etc, as in the case of a pane of glass or a sheet of mica, etc", and "Let there be no non-obstruction by a pane of glass or a sheet of mica etc, as in the case of the wall etc". This is not permissible. The characteristic of a substance is determined by perception or inference. The characteristic of causing obstruction or non-obstruction is determined by the perception or want of perception [of the object beyond]. It is inferred that obstruction is caused by the wall etc, because an object behind these is not perceived. It is inferred that obstruction is not caused by glass or mica etc, because an object beyond these is perceived.

Elucidation

Gautama shows that because of the inherent nature of the substances, certain types of substances obstruct the visual rays while certain other types do not. In the event of this obstruction, there is no perception, which takes place only when the visual rays are not obstructed. This shows that the senses act after actually coming in contact with the object. This, in its turn, proves that the senses are made of material elements and, as such, the sense-object contact is the immediate cause of perception. But the nature of the sense-object contact varies, because the objects perceived are different in nature, like the substance, quality, etc. Uddyotakara, therefore, enumerates six kinds of sense-object contacts, which are already discussed by Phaṇibhūṣaṇa in his elucidation of *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 4.

These six forms of sense-object contact are considered as ordinary or *laukika* by the later Naiyāyikas, who add to these three other forms of sense-object contact called extra-ordinary or *alaukika*. These are : *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, *jñāna-lakṣaṇa* and *yogaja*. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa argues that though Gautama does not speak of these forms of extra-ordinary sense-object contact, these are nevertheless implied by his use of the word *sannikarṣa* in the definition of perception. Moreover, Gautama has to admit *jñāna-lakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* for the following reason. He uses the word *avyabhicārin* or 'non-illusory' in the definition of perception. This means that he admits the possibility of illusory perception, from which valid perception is differentiated. Now, in the case of the illusory perception, there is no question of any ordinary sense-object contact, because the object perceived in illusion is not actually present there. Hence it is to be admitted that in the case of an illusory perception there must be an extra-ordinary sense-object contact, in the form of the recollection of that object previously perceived elsewhere. And this is nothing but the *jñāna-lakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* of the later Naiyāyikas. Again, towards the end of the fourth *adhyāya*, Gautama speaks of the need of *yoga* etc for one who wants to attain liberation (*Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 2. 46f). This, argues Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, is an evidence that Gautama admits *yogaja-sannikarṣa*. Similarly, it has to be admitted that while perceiving an individual case of smoke, we have the perception of all cases of smoke in so far as they are characterised by the universal "smoke-ness." In the case of such a perception, we have to admit the extra-ordinary sense-object contact in the form of the knowledge of the universal "smoke-ness", without which there wil be no explanation for a doubt in the form : Is smoke an invariable concomitant of fire ? Thus, even when one perceives smoke actually coexisting with fire in the kitchen, one may have the doubt concerning the coexistence with fire of all cases of smoke, which, in its turn, implies a contact with all cases of smoke. Such a contact is called the *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE SENSE-ORGANS BEING MADE OF MATTER
(*indriya-bhautikatva-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

VIII. ON THE PLURALITY OF THE SENSE ORGANS

Bhāṣya

Even, then, [there persists the doubt] : Is the sense-organ one or are there many sense-organs ? What is the cause of such a doubt ?

Sūtra 52

There is doubt because [while, on the one hand] the objects in different locations are different [and, on the other hand] the 'whole' (*avayavin*), though inhering in the different locations [i.e. the parts] is one. // iii. 1. 52 //

Bhāṣya

It is observed that different objects exist in different places and also that in spite of occupying different places [i.e. as inhering in different parts], the 'whole' is one.

Elucidation

After establishing that the sense-organs are material, Gautama now proceeds to the critical examination of their number. The doubt presupposed by this critical examination is explained in this *sūtra*. On the one hand, the five sense-organs are located in different places and it is a matter of common observation that the objects occupying different places are different. However, on the other hand, the same thing is observed as occupying different places, as for example, the same 'whole' like the human body or the tree inheres in its different component parts.

Thus, though the sense-organs are located in different places (i.e. in different parts of the body), there is doubt whether they are one or many.

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The sense-organ is one.

Sūtra 53

[Objection] The cutaneous sense is the only sense-organ, because of the non-absence (*avyatireka*) [i.e. the presence of the cutaneous sense in the locations of all the other sense-organs]. // iii. 1. 53 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] It is said that the cutaneous sense is the only sense-organ. Why ? Because of the non-absence (*avyatireka*) [of the cutaneous sense]. Thus, no location of a sense-organ can be pointed to which is without the cutaneous sense and, moreover, no object is known in the absence of the cutaneous sense. Therefore, the cutaneous sense—which pervades all locations of the sense-organs and in the presence of which alone an object is known—is the only sense-organ.

Elucidation

On the evidence of the *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* ii. 2. 10 and the *Bhāmatī* thereon, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out that the view under consideration is actually upheld by an ancient section of the followers of the Sāṃkhya. Gautama mentions the argument in favour of this view and Vātsyāyana explains why, according to it, the admission of any other sense-organ is redundant.

Bhāṣya

[Answer] No [i.e. the cutaneous sense is not the only sense-organ], because there is no knowledge of that which is the object of some other sense-organ. In spite of the presence of 'that which is responsible for the cutaneous sensation' [i.e. the cutaneous sense] and in spite moreover of touch being known by the cutaneous sense, the blind men cannot apprehend objects like colour etc, which are the appropriate ones for the other sense-organs. Assuming that there is no sense-organ other than the cutaneous one, let the blind men, endowed with the cutaneous sense, perceive colour etc. But the fact is that they do not have such perceptions. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that the cutaneous sense is the only sense-organ.

[The objector may argue] Even colour etc can be perceived [by the cutaneous sense], as in the case of the perception of smoke by a particular part of the cutaneous sense. That specific part of the cutaneous sense which is attached to the eye can alone apprehend the touch of smoke ; and this is not possible for any other part of the cutaneous sense. Similarly, some specific part of the cutaneous sense [is to be regarded as] the cause of the perception of colour etc, which, when destroyed, makes the blind incapable of perceiving colour etc.

[To this Vātsyāyana answers] The ground mentioned is untenable, because of contradiction. You have first claimed that the cutaneous sense is the only sense-organ 'because of the non-absence of the cutaneous sense' (*Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1. 53) ; and then you claim that even colour etc can be perceived [by the cutaneous sense], as in the case of the perception of smoke by a particular part of the cutaneous sense. Assuming this, it is to be admitted that [the different sense-organs made of] different elements are the receptors of different objects, because of specific object being perceived by specific sense-organs : only in the presense of that particular organ there is the perception of that particular object, while, in its absence, there is no such perception. Thus, your first statement is contradicted by the second one.

Besides, the ground, namely 'the non-absence of the cutaneous sense' is a doubtful one. [It may as well be claimed that] the locations of the different sense-organs are pervaded by the elements like earth etc and in the absence of these elements also there can be no knowledge of an object. Thus, neither the cutaneous sense alone nor any other single sense-organ can be admitted as the receptor of all sorts of objects.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana explains the objection raised in the *sūtra* and offers his own answer to it. According to the objector, the cutaneous sense is the only sense-organ. But Vātsyāyana argues that assuming this even a blind man endowed with the cutaneous sense should have the perception of colour.

The objector may rejoin : Though the cutaneous sense is the only sense-organ, its different parts are responsible for the sensations of different objects. Thus, only that portion of the cutaneous sense which is attached to the eye can have the tactual sensation of smoke, while the cutaneous sense as located in other parts of the body cannot have this sensation. Similarly, it is to be conceived that certain part of the same cutaneous sense acts as the receptor of smell, certain other as that of colour, and so on.

To this Vātsyāyana answers that the objector, by assuming this position, virtually admits the multiplicity of the sense-organs, which he wants to deny. If only some specific parts of the cutaneous sense is said to act as the specific receptors of the different objects like colour etc, it has got to be admitted that the part responsible for receiving taste is incapable of receiving colour, just as the part responsible for receiving colour is incapable of receiving taste. This amounts to the admission that there are different sense-organs acting as the receptors of the different objects. Thus the objector is led to contradict his own thesis that there is only one sense-organ.

Uddyotakara explains this further : Are you going to admit that the different parts of the cutaneous sense alleged to receive the different objects are themselves to be considered as sense-organs ? If you do, you have to admit the multiplicity of the sense-organs. If you do not admit this, you have to go against the accepted view that colour etc are the 'objects of the sense-organs' (*indriya-artha*).

Vātsyāyana points to another defect in the argument of the objector. As Phaṇibhūṣaṇa explains it, the objector (unlike the Naiyāyika) does not admit that the 'whole' (*avayavin*) is totally different from the parts (*avayava*-s). From this standpoint, therefore, there is no difficulty in viewing the different parts of the cutaneous sense as the cutaneous sense itself. But Vātsyāyana argues that, even admitting this, the main position of the objector—viz. that thecutaneous sense is the only sense-organ, because it pervades all the locations of the senses—remains at best a doubtful one : on the same ground, one may as well argue that the five elements like earth etc are the sense-organs, inasmuch as these also pervade all the locations of the senses.

Sūtra 54

[Answer] No [i.e. the cutaneous sense is not the only sense-organ], because the different objects are not simultaneously perceived. // iii. 1. 54 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The self comes in conjunction with the internal sense, the internal sense with the [only external] sense-organ [which, according to the objector, is the cutaneous one] and the sense-organ is conjoined with various objects. [In such circumstances] there should have been the simultaneous perceptions of various objects due to these conjunctions of the self, the external sense-organ, the internal sense and the objects. However, the different objects like colour etc are not simultaneously perceived. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that there is only one sense-organ apprehending all sorts of objects.

It cannot be claimed that there is only one sense-organ apprehending all sorts of objects, further because there is no co-oxistence (*sāhacarya*) of the perceptions of the different objects. The admission of the co-existence of the perceptions of the different objects leads to the absurdity of there being none as the blind etc.

Elucidation

In the present and the following few *sūtra*-s, Gautama refutes the view that there is only one sense-organ.

In the present *sūtra* he argues that assuming the cutáneous sense to be the only sense-organ there should have been the simultaneous perceptions of the different objects, which is never possible.

To this Vātsyāyana adds another argument. If one, while having the perceptions of one object can have the perception of some other objects as well—it will be a case of the co-existence (*sāhacarya*) of perceptions. However, there can never be the co-existence of perceptions because in that case a blind man, while having the perception of touch, should also have the perception of colour and this would mean that there cannot be any blind man as such. This absence of the co-existence of perceptions is a further proof for the multiplicity of the sense-organs.

Sūtra 55

[Answer continued] The cutaneous sense is not the only sense-organ also because of coutradiction (*vipratiṣedha*). //iii. 1. 55//

Bhāṣya

[Answer continued] Is cannot be admitted that the cutaneous sense is the only sense-organ because of contradiction. [The contradiction is as follows]. Assuming that the cutaneous sense can perceive collour etc which have no physical connection with it, and hence it 'can perceive objects without having a physical connection with the object' (*a-prāpya-kārin*),—let the same possibility be admitted even in the case of touch etc [which is palpably absurd]. However, since the cutaneous sense can perceive touch etc only when they come in physical contact with it, it is to be admitted that it cannot perceive colour etc which have no physical contact with it.

[The objector argues] Why not admit that the cutaneous sense can perceive objects both with and without the physical contact with them ?

[Answer] [This cannot be admitted] because it fails to explain the fact of obstruction (*āvaraṇa*) and leads to the possibility of the perception of any and every object [whether obstructed or not]. [The argument is further explained]. You may claim that the cutaneous sense perceives touch etc which have physical connection with it and that it perceives colour etc which have no physical connection with it. In that case, however, the fact of obstruction cannot be explained and, there being no explanation for the fact of obstruction, each and every colour—whether it is obstructed or not—should be perceived.

Besides, this will fail to explain the law that colour etc, when near, are perceived and, when at a distance, are not perceived. Assuming that the cutaneous sense can perceive colour which has no physical connection with it, it is not possible to explain the following law : colour is not perceived when at a distance, while when nearer, it is perceived.

Elucidation

If the cutaneous sense, as the only sense-organ, be admitted to be the receptor of colour as well, it will have to be viewed as capable of perceiving an object even without coming in physical connection with it. This will lead to the absurdity of having the perception of touch even without the physical connection with the object. To evade this difficulty, the objector may argue that some part of the cutaneous sense (viz. the part perceiving touch) acts as the receptor when in physical connection with the object, while some part of the same (viz the part perceiving colour) acts as the receptor even without any physical connection with the object. Such an argument, however, is committed to two absurdities. First, it cannot make any difference to the possibility of the perception of colour whether obstructed or not. The objector does not admit the need of the physical connection of the sense-organ with the object in the case of the perception of colour ; hence a colour—whether obstructed or not—should be equally perceptible. Secondly, the fact is that colour, though unobstructed, is not perceived when it is at a distance ; it is perceived only when it is both nearer as well as unobstructed. But if there is no need of a physical connection between the sense-organ and colour for its perception, this fact will remain unexplained.

Bhāṣya

The multiplicity of the sense-organs is already proved by the refutation of the view that it is only one. Now are being offered [positive] grounds to establish it [i.e. the multiplicity of the sense-organs].

Sūtra 56

[Answer continued] Because of the five-fold purpose (*artha*) served by the sense-organs [they are five]. // iii. 1. 56 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer continued] The word *artha* means purpose. The purposes served by the sense-organs are five. When touch is perceived by the cutaneous sense, there is no perception of colour by the same. Therefore, the visual sense is inferred as serving the purpose of the perception of colour. When touch and colour are perceived [respectively by the cutaneous and the visual senses], there is no perception of smell by them. Therefore, the olfactory sense is inferred as serving the purpose of the perception of smell. When the three [viz touch, colour and smell] are perceived [by their respective senses] there is no perception of taste by them. Therefore, the gustatory sense is inferred as serving the purpose of the perception of taste. When the above four are perceived [by their respective senses], there is no perception of sound by them. Therefore, the auditory sense is inferred as serving the purpose of the perception of sound.

Of the purposes served by the sense-organs, the purpose of one is not served by another. Hence the sense-organs are to be admitted as five.

Elucidation

Though Vātsyāyana takes the word *artha* here in the sense of *prayojana* or purpose, the later interpretors like Viśvanātha and others take it to mean the five kinds of objects perceived by the five senses. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa comments that this latter interpretation is not only simpler but also agrees with the use of the word *artha* in the next *sūtra*.

Sūtra 57

> [Objection]. No, [i.e. the sense-organs are not five], because the objects [of the senses] are numerous. // iii. 1. 57 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] It is not proved that the sense-organs are five because the objects of the senses are five-fold. Why ? Because their objects are numerous. The objects of the senses are in fact numerous. Thus, touch may be cold, hot or temperate ; colour may be white, green and so on ; smell may be attractive, foul or neutral ; taste may be bitter etc. Sound also may be different in nature—articulate and mere sound. Therefore, those who admit that the sense-organs are five because the objects of the senses are five-fold, should as well admit that the sense-organs are numerous because the objects of the senses are numerous.

Sūtra 58

> [Answer] [The view that the sense-organs are five] is not negated, because 'the general property of smell' (*gandhatva*) etc exist in all cases of smell etc. // iii. 1. 58 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] [The objector claims that] the perceptions of different smells being not possible for the same receptor, [necessitate the admission of different sense-organs] ; but these [perceptions of different smells]—which are all determined (*kṛta-vyavastha*) to be nothing but smell by their general property of *gandhatva*—do not necessitate the admission of separate sense-organs. The ground for the inference of a sense-organ is the general group of the same type of objects and not the separate divisions of them.

How are smell etc determined to be nothing but smell in general by their own general property of *gandhatva* etc ? The three forms of touch, viz cold, hot and temperate, are collected under the same group because of their

own general property of touch-ness (*sparśatva*). Therefore, once the sensation of cold is apprehended [and the cutaneous sense is admitted to be the cause thereof], the apprehensions of hot or temperate touch do not necessitate the admission of any sense-organ over and above, because the different forms of touch can be apprehended by the same means: the same sense-organ that apprehends the cold touch also apprehends the other two types. Similarly, [all forms of smell, colour, taste and sound are determined to be nothing but smell etc] because of 'the general properties of smell, colour, taste and sound' (*gandhatva, rūpatva, rasatva* and *śabdatva*) respectively. However, the perceptions of smell etc [i.e. smell, colour, taste, touch and sound] necessitate the admission of different sense-organs, because they cannot be apprehended by the same means. Thus, it is well-said that the sense-organs are five because the objects of the senses are five-fold.

Elucidation

The objector argues that for the apprehension of the different froms of smell, it is necessary to admit different sense-organs. But Gautama answers that all the different forms of smell share the common property of smell or *gandhatva* and as such can be apprehended by the same sense-organ, namely the olfactory one. Similar are the cases of the perceptions of the different forms of colour, taste, touch and sound.

However, these five objects of perception—namely smell, colour, taste, touch and sound—cannot be brought under the same class and hence five different sense-organs are to be admitted for their perceptions.

Bhāṣya

Admitting the general characteristic to be the ground for bringing under the same class, it would follow that these sense-organs—

Sūtra 59

[Objection] are only one, because 'the general property of being the object of sense' (*viṣayatva*) exists [in all the objects like smell, colour etc]. // iii. 1. 59 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Smell etc can be brought under the same class, because of their sharing the general property of object-ness (*viṣayatva*).

Sūtra 60

[Answer] No [i.e. the sense-organs are not one, their fivefold-ness being proved by] the fivefold-ness of—1) the apprehensions which are the marks [for inferring the sense-organs], 2) the locations, 3) the 'process of getting connected' (*gati*) [with the object], 4) size (*ākṛti*) and 5) material cause (*jāti*). //iii.1.60//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] It cannot be inferred that the different types of objects determined to be nothing but sense-object in general by the common property of *viṣayatva*, do not need different receptors and are apprehended by the same means. What is inferred instead is that the five types of objects like smell etc—determined to be nothing but smell etc by their own general property of *gandhatva* etc—are apprehended by different sense-organs. Therefore, it [i.e. the claim of the objector] is meaningless. The same view [namely the view expressed in *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1. 56] is reiterated here as: "because of the fivefold-ness of the apprehensions which are the marks [for inferring the sense-organs]"—

1) The apprehensions themselves are the marks, because the sense-organs are inferred on the basis of the perceptions of objects. All these are already explained in the commentary on the *sūtra* [i.e. *Nyāya-sūtra* iii.1.56], "because of the fivefold-ness of the objects of sense". Therefore, because of the fivefold-ness of the apprehensions which are the marks, the sense-organs are five.

2) Also the locations of the sense-organs are five. The cutaneous sense, which is inferred from the perception of touch, extends all over the body. The visual sense, which is inferred from the perception of colour and which can move out, is located in the eye-ball (*kṛṣṇasāra*). The olfactory sense is located in the nose. The gustatory sense is located in the tongue. The auditory sense is located in the ear-hole. Thus, [the sense-organs are

five], because they are inferred from the perceptions of smell, taste, colour, touch and sound.

3) The multiplicity of the sense-organs is also proved by the difference in the 'process of getting connected' (*gati*) [with the object]. The visual sense, which is located in the eye-ball moves out and comes in contact with the objects that possess colour. By contrast, in the case of the cutaneous and other senses, the objects themselves—due to the movement of their own substrata—get connected with them. The auditory sense comes in contact with sound through its successive waves.

4) Size (*ākṛti*) means magnitude (*parimāṇa*), i.e. the space occupied. And it is of five kinds. The olfactory, gustatory, and cutaneous senses pervade their own locations only, as it is inferred from the perception of their respective objects. The visual sense, which is located in the eye-ball and which can move out, pervades the object perceived. The auditory sense is not different from *ākāśa*, which is all-pervasive and which is inferred from the perception of sound alone but which manifests sound as par specific locations determined by the *adṛṣṭa* of the human beings (*puruṣa*).

5) The word *jāti* (material cause) means the source. The root causes of the sense-organs are the five forms of elements (*bhūta*-s) like earth etc. Therefore, from the fivefold-ness of their material cause, it is proved that the sense-organs are five.

Elucidation

In this *sūtra*, Gautama offers five positive grounds to prove that there are actually five different sense-organs. The first of these grounds is a reiteration of what is already stated in *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1. 56. The second ground is that the locations of the sense-organs are five. If the difference in the locations of the senses is not admitted and the entire body is viewed as their substratum, the facts of blindness, deafness, etc remain unexplained. The fifth ground is that the five different senses originate from the five different elements (*bhūta*-s). According to Vātsyāyana the word *jāti* here means the *yoni* or the material cause of the sense-organs. Such a meaning of the word, however, is difficult to accept in the case of the auditory sense, which is of the nature of *ākāśa* and is eternal. Hence Uddyotakara suggests that here the word *yoni*, used by Vātsyāyana as a synonym for *jāti*, should preferably be taken to mean identity (*tādātmya*). Gautama's fifth ground thus ultimately means that the five sense-organs are identical with the five different elements. But Phaṇibhūṣaṇa doubts Uddyotakara's interpretation and suggests his own.

These five sense-organs apart, the Sāṃkhyas conceive five *karmendriya*-s or

motor organs. But Vācaspati Miśra, in the *Tātparyaṭīkā*, argues that these *karmendriya*-s are not sense-organs at all, because they do not give any perceptual cognition. If the motor organs are considered as sense-organs on the ground of the specific functions discharged by them, on the same ground, various other bodily organs—like heart, liver, etc—are to be considered as sense-organs.

Bhāṣya

But how is it known that the sense-organs have for their material cause the elements and not the *avyakta* ?

Sūtra 61

[Each sense-organs is] identical [with one of the elements] because each perceives the specific quality of an element. // iii.1.61 //

Bhāṣya

It is observed that there is a law that each of the elements like air etc causes the manifestation of a specific quality of an element. Air causes the manifestation of touch, water causes the manifestation of taste, fire causes the manifestation of colour and an object made of earth causes, the manifestation of the smell of a substance. In the case of the sense-organs also there is the same law of the manifestation of a specific quality of an element. Therefore, because of such manifestation of the specific quality of an element, we think that the sense-organs have for their material cause the elements and not the *avyakta*.

Elucidation

In continuation of his defence of the fivefold-ness of the sense-organs, Gautama refutes here the Sāṃkhya view that *ahaṃkāra* alone is the material cause of all the sense-organs. He also offers an argument to prove his main thesis that each sense-organ is made of a specific element. His argument is that each sense-organ manifests a

specific quality of one of the elements and hence is to be considered as made of that element. Thus :

Of all the specific qualities like colour etc, only smell is manifested by the olfactory sense and hence it is made of earth.

Of all such specific qualities, only taste is manifested by the gustatory sense and hence it is made of water.

Of all such specific qualities, only colour is manifested by the visual sense and hence it is made of fire.

Of all such specific qualities, only touch is manifested by the cutaneouse sense and hence it is made of air.

Of all such specific qualities only sound is manifested by the auditory sense and hence it must be of the nature of *ākāśa*.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE PLURALITY OF THE SENSE-ORGANS

(*indriya-nānātva-prakaraṇa*)

IX ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE OBJECTS OF THE SENSE-ORGANS

Bhāṣya

It has been already stated [in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 14] that smell etc are the qualities of earth etc. This statement is equally possible [in the sense of] either that earth etc have respectively only one [of these] qualities or that earth etc have more than one [of these] qualities. For this reason, Gautama says—

Sūtra 62

Of [the five qualities, namely,] smell, taste, colour, touch and sound, the [four qualities] 'ending with touch' (*sparśa-paryantāḥ*) belong to earth. // iii. 1. 62 //

Sūtra 63

[Of the first four qualities mentioned above], the qualities in exclusion of each preceding one belong respectively to water, fire and air. [The quality] 'next to' (*uttara*) [touch in the above list] belongs to *ākāśa*. // iii 1. 63 //

Bhāṣya

[The expression *sparśa-paryantāḥ* in *sūtra* 62] is to be read as *sparśa-paryantānām* by altering the case-ending. Sound, which is mentioned next to the qualities ending with touch, is the quality of *ākāśa*

[Objection] How, then, the suffix *tarap* is used [in the word *uttara*]? [Answer] Because it [i.e *uttara*] can be used independently [as a separate word which does not express the etymological sense of the comparative] It follows therefrom that the word *uttara* may express the simple sense of 'next to' (*para*). In the *sūtra* enumerating [the qualities] also, sound is mentioned next to the qualities ending with touch.

Or, it is a case of re-utterance (*tantra*) [of the word *sparśa*], for touch is intended to be expressed. Thus, [the meaning is that] touch is the last one of the four qualities ending with touch, which are specifically determined [to be the qualities of earth etc], and sound which comes next to such quality of touch [is the quality of *ākāśa*].

Elucidation

After indicating the doubt presupposed by the critical examination of the objects of the senses, Vātsyāyana points out that these two *sūtra*-s are designed to enumerate clearly and specifically the qualities of the five material elements. Thus, earth has the qualities of smell, taste, colour and touch. Water has the qualities of taste, colour and touch. Fire has the qualities of colour and touch. Air has the quality of touch only. Empty space has the quality of sound only.

Vātsyāyana here does not comment on the former *sūtra*. Commenting on the latter, he says that the expression *sparśa-paryantāḥ* of the former is to be understood as following in the latter also, though with a different case-ending. Otherwise, the meaning of the expression 'each preceding one' (*pūrvam pūrvam*) cannot be explained.

Vātsyāyana also notes and answers an objection against the use of the word *uttara*. The word *uttara* is formed by the addition of the comparative suffix *tarap* to the term *ut* and means etymologically 'the latter one of the two'. In the present case, however, sound is stated to be the last quality in relation to the four qualities ending with touch.

The answer is given in two ways. First, the word *uttara* is to be taken here as a non-derivable (*avyutpanna*) word which signifies the simple sense of 'next to'. Secondly, the word *sparśa* of the former *sūtra* is to be repeated once again as connected with the word *uttara* in the latter *sūtra*. Thus, the meaning is 'sound which is the latter one of touch and sound' and there is no objection to the use of *uttara* in its etymological sense. Such re-utterance of the same word is technically called *tantra* and it is sanctioned by the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vaiyākaraṇas.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa comments that the reading *tantram vā* of the *bhāṣya*, though generally accepted, does not make a clear sense. From Vātsyāyana's way of explaining it and Uddyotakara's remark (*bhavatu vā taravnirdeśaḥ*) it seems probable that the actual reading might have been *tarav vā*, which has ultimately led to the corrupt reading of *tantram vā*.

Sūtra 64

[Objection] No [i e. the above rule regarding the distribution of qualities is not logical], because all the qualities are not apprehended [by the same sense]. // iii.1.64 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] This 'rule regarding the distribution of qualities' (*guṇa-niyoga*) is not proper. Why ? [Because] all the qualities that [are supposed to] belong to a material element are not apprehended by the sense which is made

of the same [material element]. Thus, through the olfactory sense which is made of earth, the four qualities ending with touch are not apprehended, but smell only is perceived.

Similar is the case with the rest [i.e. in the case of water etc and their qualities like taste etc].

Elucidation

The opponent's contention is as follows. The olfactory sense which is made of earth apprehends in earth smell alone, and not taste, colour or touch. The gustatory sense which is made of water apprehends in water taste alone, and neither colour nor touch. The visual sense which is made of fire apprehends in fire colour alone, and not touch. As such, the distribution of quality given by Gautama is not acceptable.

Bhāṣya

How, then, these qualities are to be distributed [among the different material elements] ? [To this, the opponent gives his own answer]—

Sūtra 65

[Objection continued] [Of the five qualities like smell etc], each of the following qualities belongs respectively to each of the following [material elements like earth etc] and as such, there is no apprehension of any other [quality] // iii. 1. 65 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection continued] [Of the five qualities like] smell etc, each one belongs respectively to [each of the five material elements like] earth etc. Therefore, there is no apprehension of the rest, i.e. there is no perception of the three [in earth], of the two [in water] and of the one [in fire]. Thus, taste, colour and touch are not apprehended by the olfactory sense. Colour and touch are not apprehended by the gustatory sense. And touch is not apprehended by the visual sense.

[Objection] How, then, material elements are perceived as endowed with more than one quality? [Answer] The apprehension of more than one quality [in the same element] is due to mixture [with other elements]. Thus, taste and other [qualities] are perceived in earth because of its mixture with water and other [elements].

Similar is the case with the rest [i.e. the elements of water, fire and air].

Elucidation

According to the opponent, each material element is endowed with only one quality. Thus, smell alone is the quality of earth, taste alone is the quality of water, colour alone is the quality of fire and touch alone is the quality of air. This is the reason why the other qualities (e.g. taste, colour and touch in the case of earth) are not apprehended in an element by the sense made of that particular element.

It may be argued against the opponent that sometimes earth or the like is actually perceived as endowed with more than one quality. How then can it be explained if earth is not characterised by any quality other than smell? The opponent answers that such a perception is due to the mixture of one element with some other elements. As for instance, in a flower, which is a substance made of earth, a particular taste or a particular touch is apprehended only because some particles of water or air are also mixed with it. Such mixture is to be admitted even by Gautama himself, for otherwise it would not be possible for him to explain, for instance, the occasional perception of bad or good smell in the air.

Bhāṣya

[Objection] But, then, there being no specific rule regarding mixture, there can be no explanation for the rule that earth is a substance with four qualities, water is a substance with three qualities, fire is a substance with two qualities and air is a substance with only one quality. [Answer] The rule can be explained. How?

Sūtra 66

Because one element is pervaded (*viṣṭa*) by another. // iii. 1. 66 //

Bhāṣya

[Of the different material elements like] earth etc, each preceding one is pervaded by the following ones and as such, there is a rule regarding the mixture

[of the elements]. This [mixture of the elements], it is to be noted, occurs at the time of the 'creation of elements' (*bhūtasṛṣṭi*), and not at the present time.

Elucidation

The opponent maintains that earth is always pervaded by water, fire and air; there is no earth which is not accompanied by water, fire and air. For this reason, the qualities other than smell—viz. taste, colour and touch—are always perceived in earth. Water, however, is not always pervaded by earth and as such, the quality of smell is not always perceived in water.

Similarly, the qualities of colour and touch are always perceived in water, because water is always pervaded by fire and air. The quality of touch also is always perceived in fire, because fire is always pervaded by air.

From the remarks of Vācaspati Miśra who takes the word *bhūtasṛṣṭi* of the *bhāṣya* in the sense of Puranic passages describing the process of creation, it appears that the view described above is to be found in the Purāṇa. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, points out that no such passages occur in any of the Purāṇas. It cannot also be the view of Manu, for, according to him, the five elements, though first characterised by only one quality, acquire later other qualities as well. Nor can it represent the view of Āyurveda, for the *Caraka-saṃhitā* and the *Suśruta-saṃhitā* speak of only the excellence of qualities due to intermixture of the elements. A similar view, however, may be traced in the *Śāntiparvan* of the *Mahābhārata* (*mokṣadharma*, *adhyāya* 246, verses 9-12).

Sūtra 67

[Gautama's answer] No [i.e. the opponent's view is not tenable], because a substance made of earth or water is also apprehended [by the visual sense]. // iii. 1. 67 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] By the word 'no' [Gautama] rejects the three preceding *sūtra*-s [i.e. *sūtra*-s 64-66 above]. Why? Because a substance made of earth or water also is apprehended by the visual sense. [A substance is] visually known when it has intermediate magnitude, is composed of many parts and possesses colour. Thus, a substance made of fire alone—and not one made of either earth or water—would be visually known, for [according to the opponent] colour is not present [in a substance made of earth or water]. In fact, a substance made of earth or water being as perceptible as a substance made of fire, [it cannot be claimed that]

many qualities are perceived [in the same element] only because of mixture. [That is, it is to be admitted that one element has more than one quality and earth or water also is characterised by colour].

If one argues that a substance made of earth or water [though without colour] is visually known due to its connection with some other element [i.e. fire which possesses colour], one would have to admit even the visual knowledge of air, [because the connection of fire may as well be present in air]. Otherwise, let one mention [some specific] ground for the rule [that the connection of air is present in fire and not *vice versa*].

Or, [the opponent's view is not tenable], because taste is also perceived in earth or water. The taste of earth is of six kinds [viz. sweet, sour, saline, pungent, astringent and bitter], while the taste of water is only sweet. But it [i.e. the perception of six kinds of taste in earth] is not possible only because of mixture [with water which possesses sweet taste alone]. [It is to be admitted, therefore, that earth and water have tastes of their own].

Or, [the opponent's view is not tenable], because the colour of earth or water—when assisted (*anugṛhīta*) by the colour of fire—is perceived. If [the perception of colour in earth or water is admitted to be due to] mixture alone, the colour of fire would only be 'a cause of manifestation' (*vyañjaka*) and not also an 'object manifested' (*vyaṅgya*). [But the fact is that the colour of fire, while manifesting the colour of something else, is itself also manifested].

[The opponent's view is not tenable], also because the colour of earth is perceived to be of many kinds, while that of water is perceived to be of only one kind. Thus, the colour of earth is of many kinds, such as, green, red, yellow and the like. The colour of water, again, is only white which does not manifest the colour of anything else. But it [i.e. the perception of the said forms of colour] in earth and water which [according to the opponent] possess only one quality each cannot be explained [only by their] mixture [with fire, the colour of which is only white which manifests the colour of something else] [It is to be admitted, therefore, that earth and water have colours of their own].

This [i.e. the expression *pārthivāpyayoḥ* in the *sūtra*] is said by way of illustration. Further explanation may be offered as follows.

[The opponent's view is not tenable], also because [a specific form of] touch is perceived in earth or fire. The touch of earth is perceived to be temperate (*anuṣṇāśīta*) and that of fire to be warm (*uṣṇa*). But it [i.e. the perception of the said forms of touch] in earth and fire which [according to the opponent] possess only one quality each cannot be explained [only by their] mixture with air which is characterised by temperate touch only.

Or, [the opponent's view is not tenable], because a substance made of earth or water is perceived as characterised by some specific (*vyavasthita*) qualities. It is perceived that a substance made of earth has four particular qualities and a substance made of water has three particular qualities. From this is inferred their

cause of the same nature [i.e. from the perception of a substance made of earth as characterised by four qualities, it is inferred that its constituent atoms also possess four qualities]. An effect is the ground for inferring its cause, for the presence of the effect follows from the presence of the cause. Similarly, from the perception of the specific qualities in a substance made of fire or air, the presence of those specific qualities is inferred also in the substances [i.e. the atoms] that constitute them.

The 'absence of connection' (*viveka*) [with other elements] also is observed, because a substance made of earth or water is perceived [as characterised by more than one quality, even when no other element is mixed with it]. A substance made of earth is perceived as separated from water and the like, one made of water is perceived as separated from fire and air, and one made of fire is perceived as separated from air. But [even at that time] none [of these three kinds of substances] is perceived as characterised by only one quality. [It is therefore, to be admitted that earth and other are really endowed with many qualities].

Besides, [the opponent's contention, viz.] 'because one element is pervaded by another' cannot be established by inference, because there is no probans as the ground of such an inference—[a ground] by which one may acquire such inferential knowledge.

Moreover, it has been maintained that the fact of one element being pervaded by another is to be understood as occurring at the time of the creation of elements and not at the present time. This is illogical, for there is no ground to prove the rule [that earth has smell only and no other quality]. It is observed, even at the present time, that one element is pervaded by another and that fire too is pervaded by air.

'Being pervaded' (*viṣṭatva*) means having [a specific form of] conjunction. Such conjunction is the same in respect of both [the objects conjoined], and there is no ground to prove a rule that 'fire, because of being pervaded by air, has the quality of touch', but not that 'air, because of being pervaded by fire, has the quality of colour'.

It is also observed that the touch of air, when subdued (*abhibhūta*) by the touch of fire, is not perceived. It can never be that it [i.e. the touch of air, a conjunction with which, according to the opponent, is responsible for the perception of touch in fire] is subdued by its own self. [That is, it is to be admitted that fire also has touch of its own and hence one touch is subdued by another].

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana interprets the present *sūtra* as offering a series of arguments to disprove the opponent's contention that each material element is characterised by only one quality. First, he takes the words *pārthiva* and *āpya* here in the senses of substan-

ces made of earth and water, tastes as located in earth and water, and colours as located in earth and water. Secondly, he considers the expression *pārthivāpyayoḥ* to be an illustration which points to various further implications. In the concluding lines, he offers an indepenđent argument also.

In this connection, Vātsyāyana moreover refutes the opponent's argument offered in the previous *sūtra*. He contends that 'being pervaded' (*viṣṭatya*) cannot mean the 'relation of being the-pervaded-and-the-pervader' (*vyāpya-vyāpaka-bhāva*) because, in spite of the absence of any such relation, the quality of fire (i.e. hotness) is perceived in a piece of iron which is conjoined with fire and also, in spite of the presence of such a relation, the quality of fire is not perceived in the rising smoke. It is to be admitted, therefore, that 'being pervaded' means only 'having a specific form of conjuction'. Such a conjunction being the same in respect of both the relata (viz. fire and air in the present case), the opponent would have to admit even the visual apprehension of air, because air too being conjoined with fire would be characterised by colour.

Bhāṣya

Thus refuting the illogical (*nyāya-viruddha*) contention [of the opponent], Gautama now replies to the objection raised by 'no, because all the qualities are not apprehended' [i.e. *sūtra* 64 above]—

Sūtra 68

Each preceding one [i.e. each of the five senses] is primary (*pradhāna*) in respect of only one [particular quality] because of the excellence of [that particular] quality [in it]. //iii. 1. 68 //

Bhāṣya

The senses like the olfactory and others do not individually perceive all the qualities [like smell, taste and others], because each preceding one [i.e. each of the five senses] is primary in respect of only one particular quality, due to the excellence of that particular quality [in it]. What is meant by primariness (*pradhānatā*) ? Being the instrument in the perception of an object [i.e. a particular quality]. What is meant by 'excellence of a quality' (*guṇotkarṣa*) ? Capability of manifesting that quality.

Thus, the external substances made of earth, water and fire which respectively possess four qualities, three qualities and two qualities do not manifest equally all the qualities, but due to the excellence of the qualities of smell, taste and colour respectively manifest the qualities of smell, taste and colour. In the same way, the olfactory, the gustatory and the visual senses—though possessing

respectively four qualities, three qualities and two qualities—are not each the instruments for the perception of all the qualities, but due to the excellence of smell, taste and colour respectively become the instruments for the perception of smell, taste and colour. Therefore, each of the senses like the olfactory and others do not perceive all the qualities.

One who claims that the olfactory sense is an instrument for the perception of smell, because it has the quality of smell, and similar is the case with the gustatory and other senses, would be led to [the absurd position] that, according to the connection of the various qualities, the olfactory or any other sense is also an instrument for the perception of [the other] qualities.

Elucidation

Gautama says here that each sense does not receive all the qualities, because a sense can receive only that quality the excellence of which is present in it. The olfactory sense, being a substance made of earth, is characterised by the four qualities of smell, taste, colour and touch. Still, it receives smell only and not the others, because there is excellence of smell in it. There can be no rule that a sense would receive all the qualities of the substance it is made of. Similar is the case with the other senses.

The argument that the olfactory sense receives smell alone, because it is characterised by smell alone, does not stand to reason. It has been already established that the element of earth is characterised by four qualities. The olfactory sense too, being made of earth, is characterised by the same qualities. Thus, according to the opponent's argument, the olfactory sense should also receive other qualities, viz. taste, colour and touch—which is absurd.

Bhāṣya

What is the basis of the specific rule that some sense is [said to be] made of earth and not everyone, while some others are [said to be] made of respectively water, fire and air, and not everyone ?

Sūtra 69

The 'specific rule' (*vyavasthāna*) regarding them [i.e. the senses] is due to 'greater proportion' (*bhūyastva*) [of one particular element]. // iii. 1. 69 //

N. 3. 13

Bhāṣya

Greater proportion means greater connection—due to the peculiar *adṛṣṭa* of the human beings—with a substance which is different from the other substances and is capable of accomplishing some human end. The use of the word *bhūyastva* in the sense of 'greater amount' (*prakarṣa*) is indeed observed, as for instance, some object [when present] in great quantity is said to be *bhūyas* (much).

Thus, objects like poison, herbs, gems and others have been produced—due to the peculiar *adṛṣṭa* of human beings—each as capable of fulfilling different purposes and not everyone as capable of fulfilling every purpose. In the same way, the senses like the olfactory and others have been produced each as capable of receiving a particular object and not everyone as capable of receiving all the objects.

Elucidation

Different objects are produced as capable of fulfilling different human ends. The purpose served by a herb is quite different from the one served by a piece of gem. Vātsyāyana says that it is due to the peculiar *adṛṣṭa* of the human beings that one particular object can fulfill only a specific purpose. Similar is the case with the senses, each of which can receive only one particular quality and not all.

Bhāṣya

But, why do not the senses cognise the qualities located in their own selves ?

Sūtra 70

Because [a sense] is considered a sense as endowed with its quality. // iii. 1. 70 //

Bhāṣya

The senses like the olfactory and others do not receive their own smell etc. What is the cause [for this] ? Because the olfactory and other senses are considered senses only as endowed with their own qualities. The olfactory sense receives external smell along with its own smell which too performs the same function [viz. the cognition of external smell]. Thus, the olfactory sense cannot receive its own smell due to the absence of the accessory (*sahakārin*).

Similar is the case with the other senses.

Elucidation

A sense is considered to be an instrument for the perception of a quality as endowed with its own quality, and not as such. The olfactory sense, for instance, receives the smell of an object as endowed with its own peculiar quality, viz. smell. In other words, in the perception of external smell, the smell which is located in the olfactory sense becomes an accessory to the olfactory sense. As such, it cannot be cognised by the olfactory sense due to the absence of the accessory.

Bhāṣya

If smell is considered to be an accessory to the olfactory sense, let it also be an object cognised by [the olfactory sense]. To this, Gautama says—

Sūtra 71

> And also because it [i.e. the olfactory sense] cannot be perceived by itself. // iii. 1. 71 //

Bhāṣya

The senses do not receive their own qualities [because they cannot be perceived by themselves]. It would be as if one argues that, just as an external substance is cognised by the visual sense [i.e. the eyes], let the eye also be cognised by the same eye. In both these cases, there equally occurs the absence of the cause for cognition.

Elucidation

The olfactory sense means the particular sense-organ as endowed with its smell. In other words, the smell located in the sense too is not actually different from the olfactory sense. Thus, the cognition of that smell through the olfactory sense would mean a cognition of that sense by the sense itself, which is, however, an absurd position. It is to be admitted, therefore, that a sense cannot receive its own quality.

Sūtra 72

> [Objection] No [i.e. it cannot be argued that a sense does not receive its own quality], because sound [as located in the auditory sense] is perceived [by the same]. // iii. 1. 72 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] It cannot be maintained that the senses do not receive their own qualities, for the auditory sense [which is of the nature of *ākāśa*] receives its own sound.

Sūtra 73

[Answer] It [i.e. the quality of sound] is received, because the various substances and the qualities are dissimilar in nature. //iii. 1. 73//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] It is not that *ākāśa* as endowed with a quality—viz. quality of sound—is considered to be the [auditory] sense. Sound is not a cause for the manifestation of sound. Nor [is it proved] through either perception or inference that the olfactory and other senses receive their own qualities. It is, however, [proved] inferentially that *ākāśa* in the form of the auditory sense receives [its own] sound and that sound is the quality of *ākāśa*.

The inference is to be taken as a residual (*pariśeṣa*) one. The self is the 'agent that hears' (*śrotā*) and not the instrument (*karaṇa*). If the mind is accepted to be the auditory sense, there will be [the absurdity of] the total absence of the deaf, [because mind being an eternal entity can never be destroyed]. Earth and the other elements which are capable of constituting the olfactory and other senses, are incapable of constituting the auditory sense. Still, there is a sense in the form of the auditory and there remains the element of *ākāśa*. There being thus no other alternative, *ākāśa* is ultimately considered to be the auditory sense.

Elucidation

The rule that a sense cannot receive its own quality does not apply to the case of the auditory sense. Gautama says that this is due to the fact that the substances and the qualities differ in nature from one another and each one has some specific characteristic of its own.

Explaining further the implication of Gautama's argument, Vātsyāyana shows how it is established by inference that sound which is a quality of *ākāśa* is received by the same *ākāśa* in the form of the auditory sense.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE OBJECTS OF THE SENSES

(*artha-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

FIRST ĀHNIKA OF THE THIRD CHAPTER ENDS

I. ON KNOWLEDGE BEING NON-ETERNAL

Bhāṣya

The senses and their objects have been critically examined. Now is the occasion for the critical examination of *buddhi*. Is *buddhi* non-eternal or eternal ? What is the cause of such a doubt ?

Sūtra 1

There is doubt, because [*buddhi* has] similarity with action [which is non-eternal] as well as *ākāśa* [which is eternal]. // iii. 2. 1 //

Bhāṣya

Absence of touch which is the common characteristic of the two [viz. action and *ākāśa*] is apprehended in *buddhi*, and the specific characteristic of being characterised by origin and destruction, or the respective opposite characters of the eternal and the non-eternal [i.e. non-eternality and eternality] are not apprehended in *buddhi*. Therefore, there is a doubt.

[Objection] Such a doubt is not at all justified, for everyone is aware of the fact that *buddhi*, just like pleasure etc, is non-eternal. One has such 'mental cognitions' (*samvitti*) as 'I shall know', 'I know' and 'I knew'. But unless the origin and destruction [of *buddhi* are admitted], there can be no knowledge about the three times [in relation to *buddhi*]. It is, therefore, proved that *buddhi* is non-eternal, because the three times are known [in relation to it].

Moreover, this [non-eternality of *buddhi*] which is a proved fact is reiterated in the Śāstra [i.e. Nyāyaśāstra] also—'[perception is knowledge] which is produced by sense-object contact' [*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 4], 'the absence of the occurrence of simultaneous cognitions is a probans for the inference of the mind' [*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 16] and so on. Therefore, the said process of doubt is not justified.

[Answer] This section is designed to refute the doctrine (*pravāda*) of a particular system (*dṛṣṭi*) [i.e. the Sāṃkhya system]. The followers of Sāṃkhya conclude, after critical discussion, that *buddhi* which is the 'internal organ' (*antaḥkaraṇa*) of the *puruṣa* is eternal.

Elucidation

Following the order of the *sūtra* enumerating the different *prameya*-s, Gautama now starts the critical examination of *buddhi*. This is the proper context for the present discussion, also because the nature of *buddhi* or knowledge can be understood better, after one has rightly understood the nature of the senses and their objects.

After explaining the doubt presupposed by the critical examination of *buddhi*, Vātsyāyana comments that there is actually no scope for such a doubt, because Gautama, on more than one occasion, has already clearly indicated that *buddhi* is non-eternal. Vātsyāyana, therefore, contends that the present section is intended to refute the Sāṃkhya view of the eternality of *buddhi*.

However, considering its manifestation (*āvirbhāva*) and disappearance (*tirobhāva*), *buddhi*, in the Sāṃkhya view too, is to be admitted as non-eternal. This is also corroborated by the *Sāṃkhya-sūtra* (5.72) and the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* (verse 10). Still, Vātsyāyana here speaks of the eternality of *buddhi* for the following consideration. In the Sāṃkhya view, the non-existent (*asat*) never comes into being and the existent (*sat*) is never absolutely destroyed. Thus, even at the time of dissolution (*pralaya*), *buddhi* exists, though in an unmanifested form, in the 'ultimate root-cause' (*mūla-prakṛti*). It is to be admitted, therefore, that *buddhi* exists always.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out that, nevertheless, Gautama's statement clearly indicates that his intention here is only to discuss the nature of *buddhi* or knowledge, the fifth *prameya*. In spite of there being actually no scope for the doubt as mentioned here, Gautama speaks of it only to emphasise the principle that a logical discussion is necessarily preceded by some doubt. Perhaps that is why the later commentators like Viśvanātha and others explain the doubt as such and do not point to its untenability.

Explaining further the point of Vātsyāyana, Vācaspati Miśra says that, according to the Sāṃkhya view, *jñāna* is a modification (*vṛtti*) of *buddhi* or the internal organ. If *buddhi* is taken in the sense of *jñāna*, there can be no doubt regarding its eternality or non-eternality, because *jñāna* is admitted to be non-eternal even by the followers of Sāṃkhya. Nor can *buddhi* be taken in the sense of what, in the Sāṃkhya view, is termed *antaḥkaraṇa* or *mahat*, because such an entity being itself unproved, there can be no doubt as to its characteristics. It follows, therefore, that Gautama here does not really intend to discuss the non-eternality of *buddhi*. What he intends to establish is that *buddhi* and *jñāna* are not different from each other, that *jñāna* cannot be a modification of *buddhi*. If it can be shown that there is no ground to prove the eternality of *buddhi*, it would follow that *buddhi* and *jñāna* actually mean the same thing, and that is why Gautama starts by referring to a doubt concerning the eternality or non-eternality of *buddhi*.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa lastly points out that the present *sūtra* clearly indicates that in Gautama's view *ākāśa* is an eternal entity. The view that Gautama's *sūtra* and Vātsyāyana's *bhāṣya* support the Vedānta position in this regard is thus proved to be incorrect.

Bhāṣya

They [i.e. the followers of Sāṃkhya] also mention the ground [for the eternality of *buddhi*]—

Sūtra 2

> [Objection] [The internal organ or *buddhi* is eternal], because an object is re-cognised. // iii. 2. 2. //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] What is meant by this re-cognition? Re-cognition is the knowledge that the two cognitions [as referred to by the expressions] 'I now perceive an object that I perceived previously' [i.e. the present and the past cognitions] relate to the same object. Such [re-cognition] can be justified only if *buddhi* is [conceived as] permanent (*avasthita*).

If, on the other hand, [it is admitted that] *buddhi* is many, i.e. there are different pieces of *buddhi* 'which are destroyed just after their production' (*utpannāpavargin*), the fact of re-cognition cannot be explained, for an object perceived by one cannot be re-cognised by another.

Elucidation

In the Sāṃkhya view, *buddhi* which is the first evolute of *prakṛti* is conceived as the internal organ or *antaḥkaraṇa*. The qualities like agent-hood (*kartṛtva*), knowledge (*jñāna*), pleasure (*sukha*) and others belong to *buddhi* and are only modifications of it. The *puruṣa* which is eternal and of the nature of consciousness cannot suffer any modification and as such, it cannot be the locus of the said qualities.

Re-cognition, being a form of knowledge, must be located in *buddhi*. It is to be admitted, therefore, that the same *buddhi* persists during the period the different pieces of knowledge leading to the ultimate re-cognition are produced. If *buddhi* is considered to be impermanent and the *buddhi* which is the locus of the first knowledge does not continue to exist till the moment the second knowledge is produced, it would follow that an object cognised by one *buddhi* is re-cognised by another *buddhi*. This is, however, quite absurd.

Sūtra 3

[Answer] [The ground mentioned in the previous *sūtra*, viz re-cognition of an object] is not a valid gronnd, because it is 'similar to the probandum' (*sādhya-sama*). [That is, the presence of re-cognition in *buddhi* is yet to be properly established and hence it cannot be taken as the probans of the inference]. // iii. 2. 3 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] Just as eternality is yet to be proved as a property of *buddhi*, so also is re-cognition. What is the ground? [The ground is that] a property [viz. re-cognition] that belongs to the conscious agent [i.e. the *puruṣa* or self] cannot be present in the instrument [viz. *buddhi*]. [All the different forms of knowledge, viz.] *jñāna*, *darśana*, *upalabdhi*, *bodha*, *pratyaya* and *adhyavasāya* are the properties of the conscious self. It is the conscious self which re-cognises an object previously perceived and on this ground [of re-cognition] only its eternality can be justified.

If [the opponent admits] consciousness in the instrument, [he will have to] explain the nature of the conscious [*puruṣa* or self]. It is not possible to conceive of any other self the nature of which cannot be specifically described [i e. the *puruṣa* or self which is unqualified or *nirguṇa*]. To explain, if knowledge is admitted to be [a property of] the internal organ, what will then be the real nature, the specific character or the essence of the conscious self?

And what does the conscious self do with the knowledge [which is not its own property, but] is only present in *buddhi*? [Opponent] If it be said that the *puruṣa* [or self] becomes conscious [with the knowledge]? [Answer] It does not mean that [consciousness is someting] different from the quality of knowledge. The statements 'the *puruṣa* becomes conscious' and '*buddhi* knows [an object]' do not signify that [consciousness is something] different from the quality of knowledge. The expressions—'becomes conscious' (*cetayate*), knows (*jānīte*), perceives (*paśyati*) and apprehends (*upalabhate*)—all signify the same thing. [Opponent] If it be said that *buddhi* communicates (*jñāpayati*) [the knowledge]? [Answer] Let it be so. It is quite true that the self knows and *buddhi* communicates. But, if such a position is accepted, it is proved that knowledge is a property of the self and not of *buddhi* which is the internal organ.

Moreover, [the opponent must] mention some ground to refute the view [of one who may] put forward the rule that each of the different terms [referring to

knowledge] signify quite different *puruṣa*-s as their loci. One may maintain that [there are really different *puruṣa*-s of which] some *puruṣa* becomes conscious, some *puruṣa* cognises, some *puruṣa* apprehends and some *puruṣa* perceives—that is to say, we have different *puruṣa*-s as the conscious, the cogniser, the apprehender and the perceptor ; and the characteristics [like consciousness etc] do not belong to one and the same *puruṣa*. What, [according to the opponent], would be the ground to refute such a view ? If it is claimed that the terms have the same meaning [and as such, they refer to one and the same *puruṣa*], it would be similar [to the case of consciousness and knowledge]. To explain, [the opponent may argue that] these terms are all synonymous and hence the rule [that they refer to different *puruṣa* s or selves] is not justified. This is, however, equally [plausible in the case of consciousness and knowledge also]. In the case of the statements—'the *puruṣa* becomes conscious' and '*buddhi* knows'—also the meaning is not different. Thus, if both *buddhi* and the *puruṣa* become characterised by consciousness, one of them would be redundant. [That is, there is no justification for admitting more than one conscious agent in the body.]

Again, it may be maintained that the word *buddhi* being derived in the instrumental sense as 'that by which an object is cognised' means the mind which is 'an instrument of cognition' (*bodhana*) and the mind is eternal [even in the Nyāya view]. Let it be so. Still, it cannot be argued that the eternality of the mind is proved by the re-cognition of an object, because it is observed that, even if the instrument is different, there can be re-cognition due to the identity of the knower, as in the case of eyes, [an object] perceived with the left eye is re-cognised with the right eye [when the left one is damaged] or as in the case of lamps, an object perceived with the help of one lamp is re-cognised with the help of another. It follows, therefore, that [this fact of re-cognition] is a ground for the eternality of the knower [i.e. the self] only.

Elucidation

Gautama argues here that presence of re-cognition in *buddhi* is not a proved fact and hence, if put forward as the probans of an inference, it involves the fallacy of the unproved (*sādhya-sama*). Vātsyāyana explains further that re-cognition being a form of knowledge is a property of the conscious self and not of the internal organ. It can, therefore, prove the eternality of the self only.

Vātsyāyana also offers an independent criticism of the Sāṃkhya view. He argues that *caitanya* (consciousness) and *jñāna* (knowledge) signify the same thing. If *jñāna* or *caitanya* is admitted to be a property of *buddhi*, *buddhi* itself would be the conscious agent and the other qualities like pleasure, pain, merits and demerits etc would belong to it. What, then, will be the specific characteristics of the *puruṣa* or

self? It cannot be said that the *puruṣa* or self is an unqualified entity, for there is no proof for the existence of such an indeterminate self.

Even admitting, for argument's sake, that knowledge is a property of *buddhi*, it may be asked, what purpose of the *puruṣa* is served by such knowledge? First, it may be answered that the *puruṣa* becomes conscious with the knowledge as located in *buddhi*. This, however, would go against the Sāṃkhya view, because, consciousness and knowledge being the same thing, the *puruṣa* too would have to be admitted as characterised by the quality of knowledge. Secondly, it may be maintained that the *puruṣa* acquires the knowledge and *buddhi* communicates the knowledge to it. This also does not substantiate the Sāṃkhya view, for it clearly shows that knowledge is produced in the *puruṣa* and hence cannot be a property of *buddhi*.

According to the Sāṃkhya view, the terms *caitanya*, *buddhi* and *jñāna* signify different things. Consciousness or *caitanya* constitutes the essence of the *puruṣa*—the *puruṣa* is conscious only because it is consciousness itself. Intellect or *buddhi* is the internal organ of the *puruṣa*. Knowledge or *jñāna* is the modification of *buddhi*. Vātsyāyana objects to this form of distiction and says that it leads to the absurdity of admitting different kinds of *puruṣa*. One may, for instance, have the cognitions 'I know', 'I apprehend', 'I cognise', 'I perceive' and so on. Why should not these different forms of cognition point to different *puruṣa*-s as their basis?

It may be objected that *buddhi* being an instrument of cognition is the same as *manas* or the mind which, according to Nyāya also, is eternal. How, then, Gautama here refutes the eternality of *buddhi*? To this, Vātsyāyana answers that the mind is proved to be eternal on a quite different logical ground and not on the ground of re-cognition. Even if the mind were non-eternal, re cognition would be possible, because the knower or the self is eternal. In re-cognition, what is needed is the identity of the knower and not the identity of the instrument of knowledge.

Bhāṣya

It has also been maintained that the cognitions (*jñāna*) which are only modifications [of *buddhi*] come out, corresponding to the form of the objects, from *buddhi* which is ever-existing (*avasthita*) and the modification (*vṛtti=jñāna*) is not anything different from 'what is modified' (*vṛttimat=buddhi*). This is, however,—

Sūtra 4

Not tenable, because [the different objects] are not all known simultaneously. // iii. 2. 4 //

Bhāṣya

If *vṛtti* and *vṛttimat* are [viewed to be] identical, the presence of *vṛtti*-s would follow from the presence of *vṛttimat*. That is, all the cognitions of the different objects [which are only modifications of *buddhi*] would be ever-present and as such, there will be the absurdity of all objects being known simultaneously.

Elucidation

Gautama argues that if *jñāna* were a modification of *buddhi* and were also identical with it, all the objects would have been known simultaneously, for the constant presence of *buddhi* would mean also the constant presence of different pieces of knowledge. This is, however, an absurd position and as su.h, the Sāṃkhya contention is not tenable.

Sūtra 5

In the 'absence of re-cognition' (*apratyabhi-jñāna*), the destruction [of *buddhi*] is to be admitted. // iii. 2. 5 //

Bhāṣya

When [the *vṛtti* or knowledge in the form of] re-cognition disappears, the *vṛttimat* [viz. *buddhi*] too would disappear and the destruction of the internal organ will have to be admitted.

If, however, the opposite [i.e. *vṛtti* disappears, but *vṛttimat* remains] is [accepted to be true], the two [*vṛtti* or knowledge and *vṛttimat* or *buddhi*] would be different entities.

Elucidation

In the Sāṃkhya view, *vṛtti*-s appear from and disappear in *buddhi* and are identical with it. To this, Gautama objects that, if *vṛtti*-s are identical with *buddhi*, the disappearance of *vṛtti*-s will mean the disappearance of *buddhi* also and thus, *buddhi* will be non-eternal. If, on the other hand, it is admitted that *buddhi* remains, in spite of the disappearance of *vṛtti*-s, *buddhi* must be an entity different from them.

'Absence of re-cognition' in the *sūtra* implies the disappearance of the different forms of knowledge or *vṛtti*-s.

Bhāṣya

The mind which is not all-pervasive [i.e. atomic in magnitude] and is one [in the same body] gets conjoined with the senses in succession and thus—

Sūtra 6

Due to successive conjunction [of the mind with the senses], objects are not simultaneously known. // iii. 2. 6 //

Bhāṣya

That is, [there is no simultaneous knowledge] of the different objects of the senses, because *vṛtti* and *vṛttimat* are different from each other. On the identity of the two, however, there can be no appearance or disappearance [of *vṛtti*-s].

Elucidation

Gautama here incidentally explains how non-simultaneity of cognitions can be justified in his own view.

Vātsyāyana brings out the real implication of Gautama as follows. On the admission that *vṛtti* is identical with *vṛttimat*, the statements '*vṛtti* appears from *buddhi*' and '*vṛtti* disappears in *buddhi*' amount to saying '*buddhi* appears from *buddhi*' and '*buddhi* disappears in *buddhi*'. This is, however, quite absurd.

Sūtra 7

Moreover, [an object is] 'not apprehended' (*apratyabhijñāna*, lit. not re-cognised) because of the mind's attention to another object. // iii. 2. 7 //

Bhāṣya

The word *apratyabhijñāna* [in the *sūtra*] means non-apprehension. The non-apprehension of a particular object can be explained [only on the admission that] the mind is attentive to some other object, because *vṛtti* and *vṛttimat* are different from each other. On the identity of the two, however, there can be no sense [in admitting] 'attention to a different object' (*vyāsaṅga*).

Elucidation

It is a fact that an object, in spite of its contact with the sense, is not apprehended, if the mind remains turned to some other object. This is known by the term *vyāsaṅga*. Gautama argues that, in the Sāṃkhya view, *vyāsaṅga* cannot be admitted, because *vṛtti*-s of all forms of objects being identical with *buddhi* which is always present would also remain always and thus, *buddhi* would always be related to all the objects.

Bhāṣya

If the internal organ is [admitted to be] all-pervasive, its conjunction with the senses in succession—

Sūtra 8

Is not possible because of the absence of movement (*gati*). // iii. 2. 8 //

Bhāṣya

[If *buddhi* or the internal organ is admitted to be all-pervasive], all the senses have already 'got related' (*prāpta*) and as such, there can be no movement [in *buddhi*] which is the cause of 'getting related' (*prāpti*). Thus, because of the impossibility of successive conjunction [of *buddhi* with the senses], the absence of simultaneous cognitions cannot be logically explained.

The absence of simultaneous cognitions which is disproved, in the case of an all-pervasive internal organ, on the ground of the absence of movement cannot be inferentially established [even] by any other probans. For instance, the movement of the visual sense—though denied on the ground that both a hand which is proximate and the moon which is far away are perceived at the same time—is inferentially established on the [stronger] ground of its being obstructed by [an object] that disconnects it [from the object of cognition].

Actually, this dispute [between Nyāya and Sāṃkhya] does not concern either the existence of an internal organ or its eternality. It is established [beyond doubt] that the mind is the internal organ and it is eternal. What, then, is the point of dispute? The dispute is about its all-pervasiveness, which not being established by any *pramāṇa*, is denied [by Nyāya].

[It has been said that] the internal organ is one, while its modifications which are the different pieces of knowledge are many—such as, the visual sensation, the olfactory sensation, the sensation of colour and the sensation of smell [and so on]. This, however, cannot be justified on the identity of *vṛtti* (=*jñāna*)

and *vṛttimat* (=*buddhi*). [That is, the *vṛtti*-s which are different from one another cannot be all identical with one and the same *buddhi*.]

[It is to be admitted, therefore, that] the *puruṣa* knows [i.e. is the locus of *jñāna*] and not the internal organ. This also repudiates the possibility of 'attention to a different object' (*viṣayāntara-vyāsaṅga*) in the case of the internal organ. 'Attention to a different object' which [amounts to] nothing but the cognition of a different object is really a characteristic of the *puruṣa* and not of the internal organ. If, however, attention to a different object is [taken to mean] connection with some sense and absence of connection with some other, it can be [admitted to be] a characteristic of [only an atomic] mind [and not of an all-pervasive internal organ]

Elucidation

The mind which is atomic in magnitude can move and have successive conjunction with the different senses. Accordingly, the cognitions also can be produced in different moments. Movement being impossible for an all-pervasive entity, the successive production of cognitions cannot be justified on the admission of an all-pervasive internal organ.

It may be argued by the opponent that a thesis, though discarded on one ground, may be proved true on some other stronger ground. As for instance, some claim that the hand which is nearer and the moon which is far away are both visually perceived at the same time. This proves that the visual sense has no movement, for an object cannot be simultaneously conjoined with two objects, one nearer and the other lying at a great distance. Still, the movement of the visual sense is admitted. It is observed that an object lying beyond a wall or a screen is not visually perceived. It means that the visual sense is prevented, by the wall or the screen, from being cojoined with the object lying beyond. But conjunction presupposes movement, for an object gets conjoined with another when it moves from its own place to that of the other. It is, therefore, to be admitted that the visual sense gets conjoined with the object it reveals and has also movement. Similarly, if the absence of simultaneous cognitions is really the fact, it is to be justified even for an all-pervasive internal organ with the help of some other ground.

Foreseeing such an objection, Vātsyāyana comments that there is in fact no such different ground.

From the remarks of Gautama, Vātsyāyana and Vācaspati also, it appears that the all-pervasivenes of the internal organ is a doctrine of the Sāṃkhya system. However, in the explanation of *Sāṃkhya-sūtra* 3.14, Aniruddha states that the mind is atomic in magnitude and in the *Yogavārtika*, Vijñānabhikṣu notes that, according to Sāṃkhya, the mind is equal in magnitude to the body it inhabits. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, therefore, concludes that the view refuted here represents the position of some section of old Sāṃkhya or that of Patañjali.

Bhāṣya

[The followers of Sāṃkhya maintain] that the internal organ is one and its modifications are many. [Gautama now states their ground justifying] that *vṛtti* is identical [with *buddhi*]—

Sūtra 9

[Objection] *Vṛtti* is [wrongly] characterised to be different, just as a piece of crystal is [wrongly] characterised to be different // iii. 2. 9 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] There is a [wrong] attribution (*abhimāna*) of difference to *vṛtti*. As for instance, a [white] piece of crystal when placed near some other substance [of a different colour] is characterised as 'blue', 'red' [and so on]. Similarly, [*vṛtti* is wrongly characterised to be different], because of its relation with different objects. [That is, *vṛtti*-s always being forms of cognition are not materially different from one another. They appear to be different only because the objects they reveal are different in each case.]

[Answer] 'No, because there is no ground' (*na, hetvabhāvāt*). There is no ground to establish that, just like the attribution of difference to a piece of crystal, the attribution of difference to the cognitions [i.e. *vṛtti*-s] also is secondary [*gauṇa*, i e. false] and not [primary or real], just like the attribution of difference to smell [and the other objects of cognition].

[Objection] If it be argued that, in the same way, there is no ground [to establish that the cognitions differ materially]? [Answer] No, because the successive production and destruction of cognitions are observed. It is observed that the cognitions of the various objects of the senses are produced as well as destroyed only in succession. It follows, therefore, that the attribution of difference to the cognitions [i.e. *vṛtti* s] is [as primary or real] as in the case of the attribution of difference to smell [and the other objects of cognition]. [That is, the successive production and destruction of the cognitions indicate that they are really different from one another.]

Elucidation

Attribution (*abhimāna*) may be false as well as true. As for instance, the attribution of difference to a piece of crystal is false, while the attribution of difference to the

objects of senses is true. Vātsyāyana argues that the opponent has here mentioned only an instance and not also a logical ground to substantiate his stand. An instance by itself does not prove anything. On the contrary, as Vātsyāyana points out, the Nyāya view is established on the basis of not only an instance, but also a logical ground.

Uddyotakara advances a number of independent arguments against the Sāṃkhya view. He contends that even the attribution of difference to a piece of crystal cannot be justified without admitting difference in the cognitions, for the same piece of crystal is characterised to be many only because it is represented differently by different cognitions, such as 'the piece of crystal is blue', 'the piece of crystal is red' and so on. Besides, if the cognitions are admitted to be identical, there can be no justification for admitting the various forms of *pramāṇa* as the instruments for different forms of cognitions.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out that the expression *na hetvabhāvāt* in the *bhāṣya* is read as an independent *sūtra* by Viśvanātha and others, for otherwise the objection raised in the present *sūtra* remains unanswered by Gautama himself. Vācaspati Miśra who does not read it as a *sūtra* in the *Nyāya-sūcī-nibandha* says that the argument that an instance unaccompanied by a logical ground does not prove anything has already been stated by Gautama in *Nyāya sūtra* ii. 2. 43. The same argument applies here and hence Gautama does not refute the present *sūtra* explicitly. By the expression *na hetvabhāvāt* Vātsyāyana only recalls that argument here.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON KNOWLEDGE BEING NON-ETERNAL

(*buddhi-anityatā-prakaraṇa*)

11. ON THE DOCTRINE OF MOMENTARINESS

Bhāṣya

Denying [the instance of the previous *sūtra*, viz.] 'it is similar to the wrong attribution of difference to a piece of crystal', the Kṣaṇikavādin [i.e. one who admits the momentariness of all objects] says—

Sūtra 10

[Objection] There is no ground [for the view that the attribution of difference to a piece of crystal is false], because, all the objects being momentary, new pieces of crystal appear every moment, one after another, in a piece of crystal also. [That is, the piece of crystal being a new one every moment, the attribution of difference to it is real.] // iii 2.10 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The contention, that a piece of crystal which continues [to exist as] one [and the same] is wrongly characterised—because of the difference of the 'extraneous conditions' (*upadhāna*) [e g. something naturally red or blue situated nearby]—to be different, has no ground for it. Why ? Because in a piece of crystal also, there are produced new pieces of crystal, one after another, [in each following moment]. That is, in the case of a piece of crystal also some prototypes of it are produced and some prototypes of it are destroyed [in each successive moment]. Why ? Because all the objects are momentary (*kṣaṇika*). Moment (*kṣaṇa*) means the minutest division of time and the objects having existence for one moment only are all momentary.

How is it known that all the objects are momentary ? Because of the observation of continuous growth and decay in the body and the like. There goes on a continuous process of growth and decay in the body, as the essentials of the food taken—being extracted through the process of digestion—are assimilated in the form of blood or the like. From [continuous] growth [it is inferred that] different bodies are produced and from [continuous] decay [it is inferred that] different bodies are destroyed. Thus, only from a specific change in the component [cells] of the body can its growth in the future time be understood.

This [momentariness] which is thus [proved to be] the property of a specific object [viz. the body] is to be understood [to be so] in the case of each and every object.

Elucidation

Explaining the view of the Kṣaṇikavādin, Vātsyāyana says that the momentariness of objects is proved by the instance of the body. The same person has quite different bodies in the different stages of his life. This means that one's body in childhood is replaced by a new one in youth and so on. All this, again, is possible only through a continuous process of creation and destruction in the body, which, in other words, implies that the body goes on changing every moment, and the latter ones are different from the previous ones.

Sūtra 11

[Answer] There being no ground for the rule [that, like the body, every object continuously grows and decays], [the nature of an object] is admitted as it is actually observed to be. // iii. 2. 11 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] There is no specific rule that, just like the body, all the objects are characterised by a continuous process of growth and decay. Why? Because of the absence of any ground. There is neither perception nor inference which would prove [the above rule]. As such, [the nature of an object] is admitted as it is actually observed to be. The production of new prototypes, one after another, [in different moments] is inferred by the observation of a continuous process of growth and decay only in the case of the objects which are actually observed to have continuous growth and decay, as for instance, in the body etc. [Such production of new prototypes], on the other hand, is denied in the case of objects where [continuous growth and decay] are not observed, as for instance, in the stone etc.

In a piece of crystal also no continuous process of growth and decay is actually observed. It is, therefore, illogical to claim 'because new pieces of crystal appear every moment, one after another, in a piece of crystal also' etc. This [i.e. the argument of the Kṣaṇikavādin] is as absurd as arguing that the pungent taste of an *ākanda* fruit indicates that the taste of each and every substance is pungent.

Elucidation

The nature of an object—whether it is momentary or permanent—is to be

determined by proper observation. The objects like the stone etc are not observed to be changing constantly and hence the inference of momentariness in them would be contradicted by perception.

It is to be noted that the body also is not admitted to be momentary in the Nyāya view, for momentary changes are not observed in it. Still, to show the utter untenability of the opponent's view, Vātsyāyana speaks of it only as a tentative assumption or *abhyupagama-siddhānta.*

Bhāṣya

There are some who maintain that momentariness means the production—in a continuous stream of substances [i e. the prototypes of a substance]—of a 'completely new prototype' (*apūrva*) which appears after the 'complete destruction' (*aśeṣa-nirodha*) of the preceding prototype and has no connection [with the preceding prototype]. Their view, however, is—

Sūtra 12

Not [tenable], because the cause for production as well as destruction is observed. // iii.2.12 //

Bhāṣya

The cause for production of the anthill (*valmīka*) and the like is observed to be the accumulation (*upacaya*) of the component parts [i.e. the particles of earth] and also, the cause for destruction of the jar and the like is observed to be the disjunction of the component parts.

However, in the view of one who admits that an object 'without having any diminution of its component parts' (*anapacita-avayava*) is destroyed and that an object 'without having any further growth of its component parts' (*anupacita-avayava*) is newly produced, no cause can be mentioned for either the complete destruction [of the preceding prototype] or the production of a completely new prototype which has no connection [with the preceding prototype].

Elucidation

In the previous *sūtra*, it has been shown that there is no ground to prove the momentariness of objects. The present *sūtra* shows that there is really a ground to disprove it.

Explaining the position of Gautama, Vātsyāyana says that the production or destruction of an object is generally due to the growth or diminution of its component

parts. The Kṣaṇikavādin maintains that an object lasts for one moment only and immediately after its complete destruction in the second moment a completely new prototype appears. Thus, neither growth nor diminution is possible in the case of a momentary object which is too shortlived to have any such changes. This, however, leads to the absurdity that an object is produced or destroyed without any cause.

Offering an alternative interpretation of the *sūtra*, Uddyotakara says that 'cause' signifies the substratum (*ādhāra*) and 'effect' the thing contained (*ādheya*). If all objects are admitted to be momentary, there can never be a relation of 'the-container-and-the-contained' (*ādhāra-ādheya-bhāva*) between two objects and without the said relation there can also be no cause-effect relation.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa notes that in the explanation given by Vātsyāyana here, which is supported by Uddyotakara also, the particle *na* in the *sūtra* has been taken as a separate word. It may, however, be taken also as compounded with the words following it. The implication of the *sūtra* would then be : no cause for either the production or the destruction of an object in each following moment is ever observed and hence the objects cannot be momentary.

Sūtra 13

[Objection] [The non-apprehension of the causes for the production and destruction in the case of a momentary object] is to be explained just like the non-apprehension of the causes for the destruction of milk and the production of curd. // iii. 2. 13 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Just as a cause for the destruction of milk and a cause for the production of curd—though not apprehended—are admitted, so also in the case of a piece of crystal and its different prototypes [that appear in each following moment], a cause for production and a cause for destruction are to be admitted [somehow].

Elucidation

The Kṣaṇikavādin may contend that non-apprehension of a cause does not necessarily prove its absence. When milk is destroyed and curd is produced, no cause for destruction or production is perceived to be present in the immediately preceding moment. Still, some specific causes for them are admitted. Similar is the case with the production and destruction of momentary objects.

Sūtra 14

[Answer] [The causes for destruction of milk and production of curd] are known through a probans [i.e. inference] and hence it cannot be said that they are non-apprehended. // iii. 2. 14 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The cause for destruction of milk has as its probans [the effect, viz.] the destruction of milk, and the cause for production of curd has as its probans [the effect, viz.] the production of curd. They are thus known inferentially and hence there is no non-apprehension of them.

In the case of objects like a piece of crystal etc, however, the opposite is observed. [That is, no cause for destruction and production in every moment is observed in the case of a piece of crystal etc.] There is no ground to indicate that [in every moment] the prototypes of an object are produced, one after another, and hence it is [better to admit] the absence of [such continuous] production [of an object].

Elucidation

The destruction of milk and the production of curd are facts which are directly known. As effects, they can therefore be the grounds for the inference of their specific causes. On the contrary, the production of a new prototype in each moment is not proved by any *pramāṇa* and as such, no cause can be inferred on its basis.

Bhāṣya

According to some, the refutation [of the objection in *sūtra* 13 above] is as follows—

Sūtra 15

[Objection] No [i.e. there is actually no destruction of milk when curd is produced], because there is either transformation (*pariṇāma*) or 'emergence of a new quality' (*guṇāntara-prādurbhāva*) in milk. // iii.2.15 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] According to some, milk is only transformed and not destroyed [when curd is produced]. Transformation means the production of a new essential property in an unchanging (*avasthita*) substance after the disappearance of its previous essential property.

According to others, there only emerge some new qualities in milk [when curd is produced]. [The emergence of new qualities] means the production of certain other qualities in an unchanging substance after the disappearance of its previous qualities.

These two views are almost identical. The refutation of both is [as follows]—

Sūtra 16

> [Answer] The destruction of the previous substance is inferred by the observation of the production of a new substance due to a different form of arrangement (*vyūha*) [of the component parts]. // iii.2.16 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] When it is perceived that a new substance in the form of curd has been produced due to a different form of arrangement of the component parts—i e. a 'peculiar type of conjunction [among the parts which occurs after the disintegration of the milk-particles]' (*sammūrchana*), it is inferred that the previous substance in the form of milk has been destroyed due to the disjunction of the component parts. As for instance, when a new substance in the form of a 'cooking pot' (*sthālī*) is produced due to a different form of arrangement of the earth-particles, [it is observed that] the previous substance in the form of a lump of clay has been destroyed due to the disjunction of the earth-particles.

Just like an earthen [cooking pot], milk and curd also have connection with the [ultimate] component parts [i.e. the atoms]. In the event of there being a complete destruction [of a substance], the production of a new substance without having any connection [with the ultimate parts] would not be possible. [That is, on the admission that even the atoms or the root-causes of a substance are destroyed, no further production of any substance due to a different type of conjunction would be possible.]

Elucidation

Refuting the view that milk is only transformed and not destroyed when curd is produced, Gautama says that the destruction of milk is proved inferentially. When milk comes in contact with a substance of sour taste, its constituent atoms disintegrate. The same atoms which acquire afterwards a different taste and also other qualities are ultimately combined, through a specific form of conjunction, into a new substance in the form of curd. The production of curd, therefore, presupposes the disjunction of the milk-particles, which proves beyond doubt that milk is destroyed.

As against the Buddhist view, Vātsyāyana lastly points out that a complete destruction of a substance cannot be admitted, because, in that case, the constituting atoms being destroyed and there being no ultimate basis for the production of an object, nothing at all can come into being from the substance so destroyed.

Bhāṣya

Even admitting [for argument's sake] that the destruction of milk and the production of curd are without causes, [the objection raised in *sūtra* 13 above] can be refuted as follows.

Sūtra 17

[Answer] [The instance of milk and curd] is 'not valid' [*anekānta*, literally, irregular], for sometimes the cause for destruction is not apprehended, while sometimes it is apprehended. // iii.2.17 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] That the destruction and production of the prototypes of a piece of crystal etc are without causes, as in the case of milk and curd—does not indicate a valid instance. Why? Because of the absence of a ground. There is no ground to prove that the destruction and production of the prototypes of a piece of crystal etc, just like the destruction and production of milk and curd, are without causes; and not that the destruction and production of the prototypes of a piece of crystal are due to the presence of the causes for their destruction and production, as for instance, a jar is destroyed when the cause for its destruction is present and again, it is produced when the cause for its production is available.

Besides, the statement of the instance is without any basis. If [continuous] destruction and production in a piece of crystal etc were really observed, [the statements concerning] the instance—namely, 'it is just like the non-apprehension of a cause for the destruction of milk' or 'it is just like the non-apprehension of a cause for the production of curd'—would have been justified. But they [i.e. constant destruction and production] are not really observed. Hence the statement of the instance is without any basis.

Moreover, the admission of continuous production and destruction of a piece of crystal necessitates [a reference to an instance] which establishes them and, if such an instance is admitted, [the presence of causes for destruction and production] cannot be negated. As an instance, [the opponent] can admit [no other instance] except that, just like [the destruction and production] of a jar, the destruction and production of a piece of crystal etc are also not without causes. This is because [such an instance] cannot be logically refuted.

[On the other hand, the opponent's instance that], just like the destruction and production of milk and curd, the destruction and production [of a piece of crystal] are without causes can be logically refuted on the ground that destruction and production are always observed to be due to specific causes. One perceiving the destruction and production of milk and curd [and not perceiving their causes] concludes that their causes are to be inferred, for a cause has for its probans an effect.

It is, therefore, justified that *buddhi* is non-eternal.

Elucidation

The Buddhist doctrine of momentariness has been subjected to strong criticism in almost all the schools of Indian philosophy. The arguments for and against the Buddhist may briefly be noted here.

Establishment of the doctrine of momentariness : Whatever is existent (*sat*) is momentary. Being existent means 'being capable of fulfilling some purpose' (*artha-kriyā-kāritva*), or simply, producing some effect. This is because whatever produces some effect is existent, e.g. the seed that produces a sprout, and again, whatever does not produce any effect is non-existent, e.g. horns grown on the head of a man.

Now, a real object, the seed for instance, is to produce its effect, viz. a sprout, either in succession or simultaneously, there being no third alternative. If the seed is admitted to be permanent, it cannot be the cause of a sprout, because, in that case, there being no difference between a seed in the barn and a seed in the field, a sprout may spring even from a seed in the barn.

It may be replied that the seed produces a sprout when the co-operating (*sahakārin*) causes like earth, water and others are present, and hence the seed produces its effect in succession. As against this, the Buddhist asks, is the permanent seed really capable of producing a sprout or not? If it is really capable, it must produce a sprout always and everywhere—not only in the field but also in the barn. If it is not really capable, it can never produce a sprout—just like a pieee of stone —even when the co-operating causes are present.

Moreover, what do the co-operating causes do, so that the seed produces a sprout in their presence? Do they produce any potency (*śakti*) in the seed? If they do, the potency itself and not the seed would be the cause of a sprout, because a sprout comes into being only in the presence of the potency. If they do not, they would have nothing to do with the production of a sprout and hence would cease to be causes at all.

It may be argued that each cause has the capability of producing the effect. Still, they do not produce it individually, because it is the very nature of an effect that it appears only when all the causes have collected together. Thus, a sprout is produced only when the seed and the co-operating causes are present together. This argument, however, does not stand, for an effect really is dependent on the nature of its cause and not *vice versa*.

It cannot also be contended that it is the very nature of a cause to produce the effect in succession, because, in that case, it would be impossible, even on the presence of the cause, to determine at what particular moment the effect will come into being. The reply that the effect will come into being the moment the co-operating causes assemble is of no avail, for it cannot be specifically determined which one of the causes is primary and which one of them is the co-operating one. It has been already pointed out that the so-called co-operating causes of a sprout—earth, water and the like—have really nothing to do for its production.

In fact, the concept of co-operating cause itself is without any basis. The seed alone is the cause of a sprout. How is it then that the seed in the barn does not produce a sprout? This is because the seed, in the immediately preceding moment of the production of a sprout, is characterised by a 'specific property' (*jāti-viśeṣa*) in the form of 'efficiency for an effect' (*kurvad-rūpatva*). The seed which is in the barn is without such a property and hence no sprout is produced there. Again, the seed which is in the field is characterised by such a property and hence a sprout is produced there.

Thus, from the above, two points are established clearly. First, the seed of the 'immediately preceding moment of the production of a sprout' (=say, the 'first moment') exists only for one moment, because in none of the moments preceding the 'first moment' or following the moment of production, a sprout comes into being. Secondly, the seed of the 'first moment' is quite different from the seed of the moment immediately preceding the 'first moment', because the former is characterised by efficiency and the latter is not. In other words, it is to be concluded that a permanent seed cannot produce a sprout in succession.

Nor can a permanent seed be the cause of a sprout *simultaneously*. It is never observed that the seed produces—at the same moment—all the sprouts or the other effects it is capable of producing.

In short, it is to be admitted that there is no permanent seed, but only a stream of seeds each seed of which lasts for only one moment and is destroyed immediately after its production. In the same way, it can be proved that all the existent objects produce their effects in succession only because they are momentary.

Refutation of the doctrine of momentariness : In the Buddhist view, there can be no explanation for the fact of re-cognition (*pratyabhijñā*). The seed, for instance, perceived once in some place may be perceived on another occasion in some other place and be re-cognised as 'this is the same seed as was perceived previously'. Such re-cognition proves that the seed is a permanent object and hence the inference seeking to prove momentariness would be contradicted by perception.

The Buddhist may contend that re-cognition is really knowing again—not the same object—but only a complete prototype of it, as in the case of the perception of the flame of a lamp which, though different in every moment, is cognised to be one and the same. This is, however, not logical, because there is no ground to prove a rule that re-cognition invariably refers to a different but similar object and never to the same one.

Moreover, recollection or re-cognition implies a permanent knower who perceives an object, receives the impression therefrom and at a later time recollects or re-cognises the same. But if all the objects are admitted to be momentary, the knower being different in each moment, how can there be recollection or re-cognition ?

To the above, the Buddhist may answer that the knower is only a stream (*santāna*) of consciousness consisting of 'individual pieces' (*santānin*) of consciousness which are continuously produced and destroyed. Thus, recollection or re-cognition can be explained as pertaining to the *santāna* which persists in spite of the destruction of the *santānin*-s. As against this, the opponents of the Buddhist ask, is the so-called *santāna* something quite different from the so-called *santānin*-s ? If the *santāna* is not different, it would be as momentary as the *santānin*-s and there would be no explanation for recollection or re-cognition. If, again, the *santāna* is different, it would mean the admission of a permanent entity.

Besides, it is not possible to explain how the reminiscent impression belonging to one *santānin* is transferred to the later *santānin*-s, and as such, recollection and re-cognition too remain unexplained.

Further, the seed alone is not the cause of a sprout. The permanent seed along with the different co-operating causes produces sprouts in succession. Each of the causes have the capability of producing the effect. Still, the effect comes into being only when all the causes have assembled together. As for instance, of the many palanquin-bearers, each person individually cannot carry the palanquin. Yet when they combine it can be easily carried and each person is accordingly called a palanquin-

bearer. Similarly, the co-operating causes do not produce any potency in the seed. But it is observed that when the co-operating factors are present a sprout is produced and when they are absent there is no sprout. Thus, through 'agreement in presence' (*anvaya*) and 'agreement in absence' (*vyatireka*), the co-operating factors are determined to be the causes of a sprout.

The Buddhist claims that the seed characterised by a specific property in the form of 'efficiency' (*kurvad-rūpatva*) is the cause of a sprout. But, then, in the same way, let it be admitted that earth or water alone—as characterised by the so-called efficiency—is the cause of a sprout.

Uddyotakara says that the Buddhist cannot even defend the 'preliminary thesis' (*pratijñā*) of their inference, viz. all objects are momentary (*sarvaṃ kṣaṇikam*). What, he asks, would be the meaning of the word *kṣaṇika* here? It cannot mean 'what is subject to quick destruction', because there being no permanent object in the Buddhist view, the adjective 'quick' becomes redundant. It cannot also mean 'what is destroyed immediately after production', because the causes of both destruction and production of an object cannot be present in the same moment. Moreover, there is no object which can be indisputably taken as momentary in the Buddhist sense, and be cited as a corroborative instance to substantiate the inference of momentariness.

Lastly, as the Jaina philosophers point out, 'producing an effect' does not invariably mean 'being existent'. A rope in the darkness may produce all the effects of coming upon a snake. Still, it does not indicate the presence of a real snake.

[Though Uddyotakara, Vācaspati and others explain the present section to be a refutation of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa argues that Gautama here actually refutes some independent doctrine of momentariness, and as such, the contention that the author of the *Nyāya-sūtra* is later than Gautama Buddha or that some *sūtra*-s were added at a later period to the original body of the *Nyāya-sūtra* as a refutation of the Buddhist position is not justified.]

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE DOCTRINE OF MOMENTARINESS

(*kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-prakaraṇa*)

III. ON KNOWLEDGE BEING A QUALITY OF THE SELF

Bhāṣya

It is now to be determined : of the self, the senses, the mind and the sense-objects, to which one does belong the quality of knowledge ? Though the matter is wellknown [i.e. though by the critical examination of the self it is clearly established that knowledge is a quality of the self], [Gautama] resolving 'I shall make the critical examination [of the *prameya*-s] exhaustive' discusses [the matter here again].

The said doubt regarding knowledge occurs because [at the time of the production of knowledge] contacts are produced [among the self, the mind etc], and also because no specific characteristic [dispelling the doubt] is apprehended. In this regard, the specific characteristic is as follows—

Sūtra 18

Knowledge is not a quality of the sense or the sense-object, because knowledge [i.e. recollection] is produced even when they are destroyed. // iii. 2. 18 //

Bhāṣya

Knowledge is a quality of neither the senses nor the sense-objects, for knowledge is produced even when they are destroyed. Thus, even when the sense or the object has ceased to exist, one has the knowledge 'I saw'. But such knowledge cannot be produced, if the knower ceases to exist. [That is, the production of knowledge in spite of the absence of the sense or the object indicates that the knower or the locus of the quality of knowledge is a different entity.]

[Objection] The knowledge which is produced from a contact between the sense and the object [i.e. external perception] is of a distinct nature, and it is not produced when the sense and the object are destroyed. But the knowledge which is produced from a contact between the self and the mind [i.e. internal perception] is also of a distinct nature and it can be produced [even in the absence of the sence and the object].

[Answer] The knowledge 'I saw' is really a piece of recollection having for its object something previously perceived. But, if the knower ceases to exist, no recollection can be produced due to previous perception, for an object perceived by one cannot be recollected by some one else. If, however, [to avoid the difficulty] the mind is admitted to be the knower [i.e. the locus of the quality

of knowledge] the thesis that the sense and the object are knowers can never be put forward.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana introduces the present *sūtra* by explaining how a doubt concerning the substratum of knowledge is produced. A contact between the self and the mind is a cause for knowledge in general, and a contact between the sense and the mind as well as between the sense and the object is a cause for all 'ordinary perceptions' (*laukika-pratyakṣa*). Thus, the contacts or the causes for the production of knowledge are present in the self, the mind, the senses and the objects. It is, therefore, possible that knowledge or the effect also is present in all of them, for the presence of the cause implies the presence of the effect. Moreover, there is no specific ground to establish that knowledge belongs to only one of them in exclusion of the others. As such, there occurs a doubt. In the present *sūtra*, Gautama states the specific ground which proves that knowledge does not belong to the senses or the objects cognised.

It may be objected against Gautama's answer that, in the absence of the senses and the objects, an external perception which results from a sense-object contact cannot be produced. Still, at that time, there can be an internal perception which results from a contact between the self and the mind—both of which are eternal entities.

To this, Vātsyāyana answers that the knowledge 'I saw' is not an internal perception, it is only a piece of recollection. If the sense or the object is accepted to be the locus of knowledge or the knower, the impression produced by knowledge—which is the cause of recollection—would be located in either of them. Thus, when the sense or the object is destroyed, the impression too ceases to exist and there can be no recollection.

The opponent may persist that the eternal mind would be the knower and the locus of impression. Vātsyāyana replies that it is of no avail, for it means a surrender of the opponent's original stand.

Bhāṣya

Let, then, knowledge be a quality of the mind. [To this, the answer is]—

Sūtra 19

Knowledge is not a quality of the mind, because the objects of cognition are not apprehended simultaneously. // iii. 2. 19 //

Bhāṣya

The probans for the internal sense [i.e. the mind] is the absence of simultaneous cognitions of the objects of knowledge. Knowledge is not a quality of the internal sense the existence of which is inferred from the absence of simultaneous cognitions of the objects of knowledge.

What, then, [is the locus of knowledge] ? [Knowledge is a quality] of the knower [i.e. the agent that knows] because of the knower's independence (*vaśitva*). The knower is independent (*vaśin*) and the instrument is dependent (*vaśya*) [upon the agent]. [If it be admitted that] the mind is the locus of knowledge, the mind [itself being the knower] ceases to be the instrument.

The knowledge of smell etc is acquired by the knower through the instrumentality of [the external] senses like the olfactory etc. It is thus inferred that the knowledge of pleasure etc and recollection are acquired by the knower through the instrumentality of an internal sense [which is the mind]. [That is, the mind is thus proved to be only an instrument for internal perception.]

[Even if it be admitted that] the mind when characterised by the qualtiy of knowledge [i.e. when assuming the role of the knower] is denoted by the term *ātman* and the same when [assuming the role of] the internl instrument is denoted by the term *manas*, there would be a difference only in terminology and not a difference in the actual order of things. [That is, there is no denying the fact that the agent that knows is something different from the instrument that leads to knowledge.]

Or, the particle *ca* [in the *sūtra*] signifies '[knowledge is not a quality of the mind], because the different objects of cognition are apprehended simultaneously by a *yogin*.' After attaining 'superhuman powers' (*ṛddhi*), a *yogin* who acquires extraordinarily powerful instruments of knowledge may construct for himself different bodies with the various sense-organs in them and [with those bodies] may apprehend different objects of cognition simultaneously. Such [simultaneous apprehension] can be justified only if the knower is all-pervasive, and not if [the knower be] the mind which is atomic in magnitude [and cannot come in contact with the different senses at the same moment].

Even if the mind be all-pervasive, it is not disproved that knowledge is a quality of the self. To explain, [the opponent may admit that] the mind which is the internal sense is all-pervasive in magnitude. But, then, because of its conjunction with all the senses at the same moment, the cognitions [in the case of an ordinary person even] would be produced simultaneously.

Elucidation

In the present *sūtra*, Gautama states the ground why knowledge cannot be a

quality of the mind. Explaining the implication of Gautama's argument, Vātsyāyana says that the self is the agent (*kartṛ*) that knows, for it is independent in the act of knowing. The mind, on the other hand, is only the instrument (*karaṇa*) for internal perception and can be led to act only as subordinated to a conscious agent. As such, the quality of knowledge belongs to the self and not to the mind. This argument has been already discussed under *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1. 16-17.

Vātsyāyana lastly states and explains a further ground proving that the mind is not a locus of knowledge, and claims that it is implied by Gautama by the addition of the particle *ca* in the *sūtra.*

Sūtra 20

[Objection] It [i.e. the absurdity of the production of simultaneous cognitions] is equally possible, even if knowledge be a quality of the self. // iii. 2. 20 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The self being all-pervasive is conjoined with all the senses at the same moment and hence, there is the absurdity of the production of simultaneous cognitions.

Sūtra 21

[Answer] Cognitions are not produced simultaneously because of the absence of the contact between the mind and the senses. // iii. 2. 21 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] Just like the sense-object contact, the contact of the mind [with the senses] too is a cause for the perception of smell and the like. Such a contact is non-simultaneous, for the mind is atomic in magnitude. Thus, because of the non-simultaneity of this contact, the cognitions—in spite of being the quality of the self—are not produced simultaneously.

Why not admit that knowledge is produced only from the contact among the self, the senses and the objects [and there is no necessity of a contact of the mind with the sense] ? [To this, Gautama says]—

Sūtra 22

No [i.e. the above contention does not stand], because no proof (*kāraṇa*) for the production

[of knowledge without a contact between the mind and the senses] has been stated. // iii. 2. 22 //

Bhāṣya

It is merely stated that knowledge is produced only from contacts among the self, the senses and the objects. But no proof for the productiou of knowledge [without a contact between the mind and the senses] has been stated, so that one can understand it [i.e. the opponent's position].

Sūtra 23

[Objection] If the cause for the destruction of knowledge is not apprehended, [knowledge is to be admitted as] remaining [always]. As such, there would follow the absurdity that knowledge is eternal. // iii. 2. 23 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The present *sūtra* joins itself with [*sūtra* 20 above, viz.] 'it is equally possible, even if knowledge be a quality of the self'. [That is, just like *sūtra* 20, the present *sūtra* too is an objection against the view that knowledge is a quality of the self.]

The cause for the destruction of a quality is twofold, namely, the destruction of the substratum in which the quality inheres and the production of a quality opposed [to the existing one]. The first one is not possible [in the case of knowledge], for the self [which is the substratum] is eternal. Nor is there perceived [in the self] any quality which is opposed to knowledge. Therefore, if knowledge be a quality of the self, there would follow the absurdity that knowledge is eternal.

Sūtra 24

[Answer] Knowledge is ascertained to be non-eternal and hence [it is admitted that] one piece of knowledge is destroyed by another piece of knowledge, as in the case of the quality of sound. // iii. 2. 24 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The fact that knowledge is non-eternal is internally perceived by all the living beings. It is observed that the different pieces of knowledge are produced in a series. It is thus inferred that, in the series, one piece [i.e. the preceding] of knowledge has for a quality opposed to itself another [i.e. the succeding] piece of knowledge ; as for instance, in a series of sounds, one sound [viz. each preceding one] is opposed [i.e. destroyed] by another sound [viz. each succeeding one].

Elucidation

It has already been critically established that knowledge is non-eternal. It follows therefrom that there must be some cause for its destruction. Gautama says that, as in the case of sounds produced in a series, one piece of knowledge is destroyed by another piece of knowledge.

In this connection Phaṇibhūṣaṇa notes (i) that an ultimate (*carama*) knowledge, not followed by the production of any other knowledge, is destroyed by time (*kāla*) or an impression (*saṃskāra*) and (ii) that a piece of knowledge may be destroyed also by some other 'specific quality' (*viśeṣa-guṇa*) of the self, as for instance, pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*) etc which may be produced in the following moments.

Bhāṣya

All the innumerable reminiscent impressions which are produced by the different cognitions and are [the special] causes of the different pieces of recollection inhere in the self [at the same moment]. The contact between the self and the mind—which is the common cause of recollection [and all other forms of knowledge] is also always present. Thus, if knowledge be a quality of the self, there being no non-simultaneity of the cause [i.e. the special as well as the common causes of recollection being present at the same moment], all the pieces of recollection [about different objects] should appear simultaneously.

To justify the non-simultaneity of the contact [so that the above absurdity does not arise], some say—

Sūtra 25

The pieces of recollection are not produced simultaneously, because a piece of recollection is due to a contact of the mind with that

part (*pradeśa*)[1] of the self in which the impression [*jñāna*, literally, knowledge] inheres. // iii. 2. 25 //

Bhāṣya

The word *jñāna* here refers [in a secondary sense], to the reminiscent impression produced by *jñāna*. The mind [being atomic in magnitude] is conjoined—successively [and not simultaneously]—with the different parts of the self in which the different reminiscent impressions [produced by cognitions] inhere. Thus, because of [successive] contacts between the mind and the self, the pieces of recollection also are produced in succession.

Sūtra 26

No [i e. the answer given in the previous *sūtra* is not correct], because [so long as one lives] the mind remains located inside the body [and cannot move out of it]. // iii. 2. 26 //

Bhāṣya

The living state is admitted to be [the presence of] the conjunction of the mind with the self as endowed with a body—when [the conjunction is also] accompanied by 'merits and demerits' (*karmāśaya*=*dharma-adharma*) which are yielding their results. Thus, until death, the mind which is located inside the body cannot be conjoined with the different parts of the self lying outside the body in which the different reminiscent impressions produced by cognitions inhere.

Elucidation

The implication of Gautama here is as follows. Those who admit that the mind successively comes in contact with each part of the self as characterised by a particular impression have to admit further that one particular part of the self can be the locus of one particular impression only. If the same part be the locus of more than one impression, more than one piece of recollection would appear simultaneously

1. The self being an eternal entity is really partless. 'Part of the self' is, therefore, to be understood in a secondary sense, to mean parts imagined for the sake of convenience only.

as soon as the mind gets conjoined with that part. Thus, when the parts of the self segmented by the body have been completely filled up by impressions, the impressions produced afterwards must reside in those parts of the all-pervasive self which lie outside the body. But so long as one lives, one's mind cannot leave the body and come in contact with the outside parts of the self. As a result, there can never be any recollection from the impressions that are produced at a later time and are supposed to inhere in the outside parts of the self. This is, however, an absurd conclusion and hence, the explanation given in the previous *sūtra* is not acceptable.

Sūtra 27

[Objection] [The ground mentioned in the previous *sūtra*, viz. because the mind remains located inside the body] is not a valid ground, because [the fact mentioned as the ground] is yet to be proved. // iii. 2. 27 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The living state is [to be defined] only [as the presence of] merits and demerits that are yielding their results. Thus, it is yet to be proved that [so long as one lives] the mind remains located inside the body.

Sūtra 28

[Answer] It cannot be denied [that during the living state the mind remains located inside the body], for it is observed that the body of a person who recollects holds on. // iii. 2. 28 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] A person intending to recollect an object may concentrate his mind and recollect the object after a long time. It is, however, observed that, while he recollects, his body holds on. An 'internal effort' (*prayatna*) which is produced by a contact between the self and the mind is of two kinds : what causes to hold on (*dhāraka*) and what incites to action (*preraka*). If the mind [is supposed to] move outside the body, there would be no internal effort that causes to hold on. Thus, the body of the person who recollects would fall to the ground because of its heavy weight.

Elucidation

The cause of an internal effort which makes the body hold on is a contact of the mind with the self as endowed with a body. If it is admitted that, while recollecting an object, the mind goes out of the body to get conjoined with some other part of the self, the mind would have contact with the self as without a body. Therefore, due to the absence of the cause, the said kind of internal effort would not be produced and the body of the person who recollects would fall to the ground. This absurdity can be avoided only by admitting that so long as one lives, the mind does not leave the body.

Sūtra 29

[Objection] It is not so [i.e. the body does not fall to the ground even when the mind leaves it], because the mind has very swift movement. // iii. 2. 29 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The mind can move very swiftly. It is quite possible for the mind to perform both the functions—(i) to come in contact with those parts of the self which lie outside the body and are the loci of the impressions produced by cognitions and (ii) to return immediately to the body to produce an internal effort [that causes the body to hold on].

Or, [it may be said that] the mind moves out of the body only after producing an internal effort that would cause the body to hold on and hence, it is observed [that the body] holds on [in spite of the absence of the mind].

Sūtra 30

[Answer] No [i.e. the argumeut that the body holds on because of the swift movement of the mind does not stand], because there is no specific rule as to the amount of time [taken by the act of] recollection. // iii. 2. 30 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] Some object is recollected in a moment, and some after a long period. When an object is recollected after a long period, one intending to recollect concentrates the mind and there follows a series of different pieces

of recollection. Thus, after the specific mark of some object is rightly recalled, [the mark] becomes a cause of the recollection [of that object]. In such a case, the mind being out of the body for a long time, it becomes impossible [for the body to hold on].

A conjunction between the self and the mind—if independent of a conjunction with the body—cannot be the cause of recollection, because the body is the locus through which [the self has] experiences (*upabhoga*). To explain, the body of the person who knows is the locus through which [the self] experiences [pleasure, pain etc]. A mere conjunction of the self with the mind which has moved out of the body cannot produce [the qualities of] knowledge, pleasure etc [in the self]. [If the production of knowledge etc] be possible [even in the absence of the body], the body would be redundant.

Elucidation

Gautama contends that an object may sometimes be recollected after a long time. Thus, a person intending to recollect a particular object may concentrate his mind for a long time and after recollecting various other objects may at last be able to call up a specific mark of that particular object. The recollection of the specific mark then leads to the recollection of that particular object. In such a case, the mind would be forced to remain out of the body for quite a lot of time and the body will collapse. During this period, even an internal effort would not be able to make the body hold on, for an internal effort does not last for more than three moments.[1]

Vātsyāyana lastly offers an independent argument against the opponent. He says that the body is the locus through which the self acquires experiences. As such, recollection which is a form of knowledge cannot be produced due to the absence of a connection with the body when the mind is itself out of the body and has contact only with the parts of the self lying outside the body.

Sūtra 31

[Some maintain that] the peculiar conjunction [of the mind with the self] cannot occur [outside the body], because it can be due to neither an urge (*preraṇa*) from the self nor accident (*yadṛcchā*) nor consciousness (*jñatā*). // iii. 2. 31 //

1. In the Nyāya view, the 'specific qualities' (*viśeṣa-guṇa*) of the self, namely, *jñāna, icchā, prayatna* etc, do not last for more than three moments—they are produced in the first moment, exist during the second and are destroyed in the third.

Bhāṣya

Which one [of the following three]—(i) an urge from the self, (ii) accident or mere chance and (iii) consciousness of the mind—is the cause of the mind's peculiar conjunction with the self outside the body ? [Such a conjunction] can be explained by none [of the above causes] Why ? (i) Because [the object is] yet to be recollected, (ii) because recollection is due to the will of the knower and (iii) because consciousness of the mind is impossible.

(i) If [it is assumed that, while recollecting an object,] the self first discerns that, 'the impression which is the cause of recollection of this particular object inheres in this particular part of the self and hence let the mind have conjunction with it' and thus urges the mind [to move out], the object would be one already recollected (*smṛta*) and not one 'yet to be recollected' (*smartavya*). [That is, the object would be recollected even before the mind is urged to move out.]

Neither a part of the self nor an impression can be perceived by the self ; it cannot be logically justified that they are internally known by the self. [That is, it cannot also be claimed that the self urges the mind to move out, after *perceiving* the impression and the part of the self in which it inheres.]

(ii) [It is observed that] one being moved by the desire for recollecting concentrates one's mind and finally recollects the object after a long time and not that [one recollects an object] accidentally. [It cannot therefore be claimed that the mind moves out by mere chance.]

(iii) The mind has no consciousness, for the consciousness of the mind has already been refuted.

Elucidation

The present *sūtra* refers to an alternative refutation of the view that, while recollecting, the mind moves out of the body. It is shown that none of the three alternative causes that may be suggested for explaining the mind's movement outside the body can be logically defended.

Bhāṣya

Such a refutation, however, is—

Sūtra 32

Equally applicable to the case of the conjunction [of the mind with the self] which is the

cause of pain in the foot of a person who has his mind turned to some other object. // iii. 2. 32 //

Bhāṣya

It is to be admitted that, when, in some place, a person with his mind turned to some other object feels pain in the foot due to a 'chip of stone' (*śarkarā*) or a thorn, there occurs a specific conjunction between the self and the mind, for the production of pain and the sensation of pain are both observed there. The refutation [given in the previous *sūtra*] is applicable to this [form of conjunction] also.

There would be no difference [even admitting that the conjunction] is due to accident, for neither movement nor conjunction can occur merely by chance.

[Objection] If it be argued that the cause of movement is *adṛṣṭa* which is produced by action and is the cause of the experience [of pleasure or pain]? [Answer] It may be similarly applied. [Objection explained] It may be argued that the cause of movement in the mind is *adṛṣṭa* which is produced by action, resides in the self and is the cause of the self's experience [of pleasure or pain]. [Answer explained] It can be similarly applied, i.e. [it may be explained that] the peculiar conjunction [of the mind with the self occurring outside the body] is due to the presence of the cause for recollection [viz. a peculiar *adṛṣṭa*]

Thus, the statement 'that the peculiar conjunction cannot occur [outside the body], because it can be due to neither an urge from the self nor accident nor consciousness' is not a proper refutation. The proper refutation is the one mentioned earlier [in *sūtra* 26 above]: 'no, because the mind remains located inside the body'.

Elucidation

The present *sūtra* is a refutation of the previous one. A person quite absorbed in a charming scene or some melodious music, may get hurt by a chip of stone or a thorn under his foot and have a sensation of pain. It is to be admitted that, at that moment, in spite of the person's attention to some other object, the mind moves swiftly to get conjoined with the self at the particular part of the foot which registers the pain, for no sensation of pleasure or pain is produced without a conjunction of the mind with the self. The argument stated in the previous *sūtra* goes against even such a conjunction which is an established fact. One may, for instance, argue: the above conjunction cannot occur, because it can be due to neither an urge from the self nor accident nor consciousness of the mind.

It may be argued that the conjunction referred to in this *sūtra* is an established

fact and hence it is not to be refuted in the above way. It is, on the contrary, to be justified—even admitting it to be due to accident or chance. Foreseeing this objection, Vātsyāyana adds that neither movement nor conjunction can occur merely by chance.

Bhāṣya

But, then, what is the cause of the absence of simultaneous recollections in spite of the simultaneous presence of the causes [viz. the different reminiscent impressions and the conjunction of the mind with the self]? [To this, it is said]—

Sūtra 33

> The absence of simultaneous recollections is due to the absence of simultaneity of [the other causes like] concentration of mind, knowledge of a distinct mark and so on. // iii. 2. 33 //

Bhāṣya

Just as the conjunction of the mind with the self and the impressions are the causes of recollection, so also are the concentration of mind, the knowledge of a distinct mark [of the object to be recollected] etc. These [other causes] do not appear simultaneously and the recollections are not produced simultaneously due to the non-simultaneity of causes.

[Objection] There would be an absurdity of simultaneity in the case of those recollections which, like 'intuitional knowledge' (*prātibha-jñāna*), are independent of concentration of mind etc. [It is observed that] sometimes recollection is produced, just like intuitional knowledge, independent of concentration of mind etc. It is possible that [such pieces of recollection] would sometimes appear simultaneously, for [the non-simultaneous] causes of recollection are absent [i.e. not required] there.

[Answer] Recollection is sometimes wrongly considered to be similar to intuitional knowledge because of the non-apprehension of the cause of recollection. In a series of recollections where the objects [to be recollected] are many in number, some one of them [viz. a specific mark of the object to be recollected] is the cause of the recollection of someone else [viz. the particular object sought to be recollected]—i.e. the recollection of the former leads to the recollection of the latter. It is not that the person who recollects also ascertains all the

causes of recollection in the form 'my recollection is due to these causes'. Thus, because of the non-apprehension of the cause one wrongly thinks 'this piece of recollection is similar to intuitional knowledge.' In fact, there is no recollection which is independent of [other causes] like concentration of mind etc.

[Objection] Why is [there no simultaneity in the case of] intuitional knowledge itself? [Answer] The rule is as in the case of experiencing (*upabhoga*) [pleasure or pain] resulting from a specific *adṛṣṭa* of a person. [Objection explained] Why is it that intuitional knowledge [which is independent of causes like concentration of mind etc] is not produced simultaneously? [Answer explained] Just as *adṛṣṭa* which is the cause for [a person's] experiencing [pleasure or pain] does not lead to all those experiences simultaneously, so also the specific form of *adṛṣṭa* of a person which is the cause of intuitional knowledge does not produce numerous pieces of intuitional knowledge simultaneously. [That is, it is observed that, in spite of their simultaneous presence in the self, the different forms of *adṛṣṭa* produce the sensations of pleasure and pain only in succession. Similar is the case of intuitional knowledge.]

[Objection] [The above argument] is not logical, for there is no ground. [Answer] No, because an instrument of knowledge is able to produce knowledge only in succession. [Objection explained] If it be contended that the statement 'the rule is as in the case of experiencing [pleasure or pain]' refers only to an instance, but there is no ground [to substantiate it]? [Answer explained] No [i.e. such a contention is not possible], because an instrument of knowledge is capable of producing knowledge only in succession. [It is observed that] simultaneous cognitions are produced in respect of neither the same object nor the different objects. From this observed fact—that the cognitions are produced in succession—it is inferred that such capability [of producing knowledge in succession] belongs to the instrument, and not to the knower [i.e. the self], because a *yogin* having extraordinarily powerful instruments of knowledge [i.e. sense-organs] may acquire cognitions simultaneously through his different bodies [which he may assume in order to destroy the fruits of action in a shorter period].

[The argument of *sūtra* 25 above] may also be refuted by a different ground: there would be the absurdity of the recollection of many objects being simultaneously produced, because of the inherence of many cognitions [and the impressions produced by them] in the same part of the self as delimited by the body. To explain, in some part of the knower [or the self] as delimited by the body there constantly occur different forms of conjunctions with the senses and the objects, and the various cognitions [due to these conjunctions as well as the impressions produced by the cognitions inhere in the same part of the self]. Thus, when the mind gets conjoined with that part [in which many impressions inhere], why should not there be the simultaneous recollections of the different objects previously perceived, for the mind has conjunction with that part not in succession [but simultaneously]?

[Objection] The refutation of the simultaneity of recollections is not justified, for the different parts of the self actually represent one and the same substance [viz. the self] and there is no difference in the inherence of the cognitions in the same substance [viz. the self].

[Answer] In the case of a series of sounds, a sound is heard due to its connection with the seat of the auditory sense [i.e. the particular sound which originates in the ear-hole]. In the same way, there is no absurdity of the simultaneous production of recollection, for recollection is produced only when the mind is accompanied by the co-operating causes of impressions [viz. concentration of mind etc].

[Gautama in the present *sūtra* has already established] through the refutation of the opponent that in spite of the inherence of many cognitions in the same part of the self, there is no absurdity of simultaneous recollection [in Gautama's own view].

Elucidation

In the concluding portion of the *bhāṣya*, Vātsyāyana offers his own argument against the view set forth in *sūtra* 25, which has already been refuted by Gautama in *sūtra* 26.

The underlying implication of Vātsyāyana is that if the different impressions are admitted as inhering in only those parts of the self which are located inside the body, it is also to be accepted that one and the same part is the locus of numerous impressions, for the self as delimited by the body has a limited number of parts, whereas the impressions are unlimited in number. Thus, when the mind comes in contact with any such part of the self which is the locus of many impressions, the simultaneous recollections of numerous objects becomes a possibility in the opponent's view.

It may be objected that Gautama's position too involves the above absurdity. The so-called parts of the self are not really anything different from the self as such and, therefore, in whichever part may an impression be located it is to be admitted as located in the self as such. Thus, even admitting that one impression inheres in one part only, there would be the absurdity of simultaneous recollections of objects, for a contact of the mind with any one part of the self amounts to a contact of the mind with the self as such—which is the locus of numerous impressions.

In answer, Vātsyāyana says that, in the case of a series of sounds all the sounds though inhering in the same *ākāśa* are not perceived, there being the perception of only that particular sound which is produced inside the ear-hole. Similarly, all the impressions though inhering in the same self do not simultaneously produce the

recollections, there being recollection only from an impression which is activated (*udbuddha*) by the factors like 'concentration of mind' (*praṇidhāna*) etc.

Bhāṣya

According to some philosophers, knowledge is a property of the self, while desire, aversion, internal effort, pleasure and pain are the properties of the internal organ. This view is refuted [as follows]—

Sūtra 34

[Desire and aversion are the properties of the knower], because exertion (*ārambha*) and 'absence of exertion' (*nivṛtti*) are respectively due to the knower's desire and aversion. // iii. 2. 34 //

Bhāṣya

The knower first determines [the nature of an object] : 'it would cause me pleasure' or 'it would cause me pain'. Ascertaining thus, the self strives to attain what is the cause of pleasure and strives to avoid what is the cause of pain. Exertion is the peculiar effort—on the part of one led by the desire of attainment—for the attainment of what produces pleasure. Absence of exertion is the shunning—by one led by the desire of shunning—of what produces pain.

Thus, it follows that knowledge, desire, internal effort, aversion, pleasure and pain are all related to [i.e. the properties of] one and the same substance and that knowledge, desire and exertion have one common agent as well as one common substratum [which is the self]. Therefore, desire, aversion, internal effort, pleasure and pain are [proved to be] the properties of the knower and not of an unconscious [internal organ].

Exertion and absence of exertion are directly known in the case of one's own self. On its basis, [the same] are to be ascertained through inference in respect of the selves of other persons.

Elucidation

From an exertion for the attainment of an object or its absence it is proved that knowledge, desire or aversion relate to one and the same agent, for the knowledge of one cannot produce desire or aversion in somebody else. It is, therefore, illogical to maintain that knowledge belongs to the self, and desire etc to the internal organ. The

internal organ being unconscious is not a locus of knowledge and hence it cannot also be a locus of desire etc which are produced by knowledge.

Uddyotakara says that it is a fact that desire etc are internally perceived. But, if they are admitted to be the qualities of the internal organ or the mind, the self cannot perceive them internally, for the desire etc belonging to one cannot be so perceived by someone else. Besides, the qualities of the mind are imperceptible, for the mind is atomic in magnitude. Thus, on the assumption that the qualities of desire etc belong to the mind, they would also become imperceptible.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out that the concluding remark of Vātsyāyana cannot be taken in its literal sense, because an exertion for the attainment of an object or its absence really means some form of physical action which cannot exist in the self and the statement of Vātsyāyana that they 'are directly known in the case of one's own self' becomes incongruous. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, therefore, suggests that the real implication of Vātsyāyana is to be understood as follows. When one mentally perceives the agenthood (*kartṛtva*) of one's own self—e g. I am taking food—in the act of taking food, the act of taking food also may be said to be an object of the mental perception. Similarly, when one mentally perceives the agenthood of one's own self—e.g. I exert myself for attaining an object—in the act of exerting itself for attainment, the physical effort too may be said to be the object of the mental perception. It is in this sense that Vātsyāyana says that exertion and its absence are directly known in the cases of one's own self.

Bhāṣya

In this context, the Bhūtacaitanyavādin [i.e. one who admits the consciousness of material elements] says—

Sūtra 35

> [Objection] The probantia for the inference of desire and aversion are [exertion and its absence]. As such, [consciousness] cannot be denied to the bodies made of earth etc. // iii. 2. 35 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Desire and aversion have for their probantia respectively exertion and its absence. Thus, it follows that knowledge as well as desire and aversion all belong to what is characterised by exertion and its absence. Exertion and its absence are observed to exist in the bodies—made of earth, made of water, made of fire and made of air. As such, they must be characterised by desire, aversion and knowledge, and also be the loci of consciousness.

Elucidation

The cause and its effect must be located in the same substratum. Thus, the effect—exertion or its absence—is located in the body and hence the cause—desire or aversion—must also be located in the body. In the same way, knowledge being the cause of desire or aversion must also be located in the body itself. It is concluded, therefore, that consciousness belongs to material elements.

Sūtra 36

[Answer] [Consciousness does not belong to the body], because exertion or its absence is observed even in the case of an axe etc. // iii. 2. 36 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] Consciousness does not belong to the body. If it be argued that the body is characterised by desire, aversion and knowledge—because exertion and its absence are observed in it, it would as well be proved that consciousness belongs to instruments like the axe etc, for exertion and its absence are observed also in them.

Again, if it be said that on the basis of exertion or its absence the relation [i.e. presence] of desire etc is proved in the body only ; and exertion or its absence does not invariably point to [the presence of desire etc] in the case of instruments like the axe etc, the statement 'the bodies—made of earth, made of water, made of fire and made of air—are characterised by desire, aversion and knowledge, because exertion and its absence are observed to exist in them' does not represent a valid ground. [In short, the presence or absence of mere physical action is not a valid ground for the inference of consciousness.]

[Objection] Let then [the implication of the previous *sūtra*, viz.] 'the probantia for the inference of desire and aversion are [exertion and its absence] ; and as such, consciousness cannot be denied to the bodies made of earth etc' be interpreted in a different way [as follows]. Exertion (*ārambha*) in the case of material elements like earth etc [i.e. the atoms of earth etc which constitute the body] means a specific form of activity (*pravṛtti*) which is inferred through the probans—viz. the peculiar conjunction of the component parts [i.e. the atoms]—in the bodies of beings moving (*trasa*) as well as stationery (*sthāvara*). Absence of exertion is the absence of the specific form of activity, as in the case of a piece of stone etc in which the above probans [viz. the peculiar conjunction of the atoms] is absent. Thus, exertion and its absence [as described above] are the probantia

for the inference of desire and aversion. Such exertion and its absence being observed in the atoms of earth etc, the connection [i e. presence] of desire and aversion too is proved in them and [from the presence of desire and aversion] is proved the presence of knowledge in them. It is, therefore, established that consciousness belongs to material elements.

[Answer] The above [does not indicate] a valid ground, for [desire or aversion] is not apprehended in the jar etc. To explain, from the peculiar conjunction of the earth-particles constituting the jar etc, exertion in the form of a specific activity is inferred in them also, and [from the absence of a peculiar conjunction leading to the formation of a compact body], the absence of exertion—i.e. the absence of a specific activity—is inferred in the sand-particles. Still, it is never admitted that 'earth or sand is characterised by desire, aversion, internal effort and knowledge, because exertion and its absence are observed to exist in them.' Therefore, the ground mentioned by the expression *tal-liṅgatvād icchā-dveṣayoḥ* [i.e. *sūtra* 35 above] is not a valid one.

Elucidation

According to the alternative interpretation of the previous *sūtra*, attributed to the Bhūtacaitanyavādin, exertion means a specific form of activity in the atoms of earth etc which leads, through a peculiar conjunction of the atoms, to the formation of the body. The presence of exertion in the atoms establishes the presence of its cause—viz. desire—in them, and finally, the presence of desire establishes the existence of consciousness in them, for desire is never possible without consciousness. Thus, the atoms being characterised by consciousness the material elements composed of them will also be so.

In answer, Vātsyāyana contends that the alleged probantia for the inference of exertion and its absence—viz. the peculiar conjunction of parts and its absence—are present in the case of the atoms of a jar and sand also, for a jar is formed only when the atoms of earth are conjoined in a specific way and the atoms of sand do not form a compact substance due to their inability to combine in a specific way. Thus, exertion and its absence are proved in the atoms of a jar and sand, which, however, are not characterised by desire and aversion. In other words, it follows that exertion and its absence are not invariable marks for desire and aversion, and hence they do not establish the presence of desire and aversion in the body.

Sūtra 37

The special characteristics [of desire and aversion] are 'presence of a rule' (*niyama*) and 'absence of a rule' (*aniyama*). // iii. 2. 37 //

Bhāṣya

The special—i.e. distinguishing—characteristics of desire and aversion are presence of a rule and absence of a rule. Exertion and its absence which are due to the knower's desire and aversion do not reside in their own [i.e. of desire and aversion] substratum. What then is [the substratum of exertion and its absence]? Their substratum is what is employed (*prayojya*) [as the means]. [As for instance, in the act of cutting, the desire inheres in the self of the person and the exertion in the form of upward and downward movement inheres in the axe.] Thus, exertion and its absence exist only in the material elements [i.e. objects] which are employed, and not everywhere. Hence the absence of rule [regarding the occurrence of exertion or its absence and desire or aversion] is justified.

Presence of rule is possible in the view of one [viz. the Bhūtacaitanyavādin] according to which, the material elements being themselves conscious, exertion and its absence which are due to desire and aversion reside in their own [i.e. of desire and aversion] substratum [viz. the body].

It is observed, in the case of material elements in general, that the material elements are characterised by exertion [in the form of downward movement] due to some other quality [viz. heaviness] and they are characterised by the absence of exertion [i.e. the absence of the said movement] when the quality [viz. heaviness] is made ineffective. In the same way, exertion and its absence which are due to knowledge, desire and aversion should also reside in their own substratum, viz. material element in general. This is, however, not actually so. It is, therefore, proved that knowledge, desire, aversion and internal effort are located in the employer [i.e. the knower or the self]; while exertion and its absence are located in what is employed [as the means].

There is no ground for the multiplicity of knowers in the same body. In the view of the Bhūtacaitanyavādin, would not there be many knowers in the same body, for the numerous material elements [i.e. the atoms in the body] are all characterised by the qualities of knowledge, desire, aversion and internal effort? There is no ground in favour of one who answers in the affirmative. The existence of different knowers in different bodies is [admitted] because of a specific rule regarding the location of the qualities of knowledge etc [i.e. the rule that each knower experiences only his own pleasure, pain etc]. [If a single body is sought to be proved as a locus of many knowers or selves], such a specific rule regarding the location of the qualities of knowledge etc—which indicates the multiplicity of knowers—is to be admitted in the case of a single body also. [That is, it is to be admitted that each part of the same body has its own pleasure, pain etc. This is, however, not possible and hence it cannot b claimed that the same body has many knowers.]

Elucidation

In the Nyāya view, exertion and its absence have for their substratum the body,

while desire and aversion are located in the self. This difference of substratum is expressed in the *sūtra* by the word *aniyama*.

In the view of the Bhūtacaitanyavādin, however, exertion, absence of exertion, desire and aversion are all located in the same substratum, namely, the body ; for the Bhūtacaitanyavādin admits the consciousness of the body itself. This identity of substratum is expressed in the *sūtra* by the word *niyama*.

After explaining the nature of *aniyama*, Vātsyāyana argues that *niyama* of the Bhūtacaitanyavādin cannot be logically defended. The implication of Vātsyāyana is that the qualities of the material elements are observed to be present in all the cases of the element to which the quality belongs. Heaviness, a quality of earth, for instance, is present in all the cases of earth. If the qualities of knowledge, desire etc. are admitted to be the qualities of material elements, they should be present in all cases of the same. This is, however, contradicted by facts, for a jar made of earth is characterised by none of the said qualities.

As against the above, the Bhūtacaitanyavādin may point out that there can be no rule that each and every substance made of material elements like earth etc. is to be characterised by the quality of knowledge. It is observed, for instance, that molasses, rice and such other objects develop the power of intoxication only when they are transformed through fermentation into a new substance, and not if they are arbitrarily mixed up. In the same way, a material body develops the quality of knowledge, only when the atoms of earth etc. combine themselves, through a specific form of conjunction, into the body of a human being.

Foreseeing this objection, Vātsyāyana says that the above argument presupposes the presence of knowledge in the constituent atoms also, for the quality of an effect is derived from the qualities of its material cause. In that case, there would be a multiplicity of knowers in the same body, which, however, is not proved by any ground. Different knowers in the bodies of different persons are admitted to explain the fact that the pleasure or pain of one person is not experienced by someone else. This is quite possible on the admission that one body is related to one knower or self only.

Vācaspati Miśra says that if the presence of numerous knowers in the same body is admitted, the body would be unable to perform any function, for each knower would have his own desire which would not be in agreement with those of the others. A agreement may sometimes accidentally take place, still it cannot be accepted to be the general rule.

Refuting the view of the Bhūtacaitanyavādin, Udayana says that if the body itself is admitted to be conscious or the knower, a person would not be able to recollect, in his youth or old age, an object perceived in his childhood, for, through continuous production and destruction of the different cells, the body is constantly changing, and an object perceived by one cannot be recollected by someone else.

To this, it may be replied that in spite of the change of the body the group of impressions persists and is transmitted from one body to another, and thus recollection

is possible. Udayana rejects the argument by pointing out that a transmission of impressions is not possible, for, in that case, the impressions of the mother may be said to be transmitted to the child in the womb so that the child even may recollect the objects perceived by its mother.

Still, the Bhūtacaitanyavādin may persist in saying that the impressions located in the material cause only are transmitted and the mother not being the material cause of her child the above difficulty does not arise. However, such a position too involves difficulties. The material cause of the body is the different component parts or the limbs. When any one of the limbs is damaged, the impressions located in it also are destroyed. Thus, according to the Bhūtacaitanyavādin, there can be no recollection of an object perceived through one limb of the body when that limb is destroyed. This is, again, contradicted by facts, for an object known by one's eyes is recollected even when they are damaged and one has turned blind.

Finally, the Bhūtacaitanyavādin may maintain that consciousness as well as the impressions produced by congnitions belong to the atoms that constitute the body. The atoms being eternal, recollection is possible even in later times. To this, Vardhamāna answers that the qualities of atoms are never perceived, for an atom not being characterised by 'intermediate magnitude' (*mahattva*) is imperceptible, and if knowledge be a quality of the atoms, it can never be internally perceived in such forms as 'I know', 'I have a cognition' and so on.

Bhāṣya

It is observed that the particular exertions of the material elements are due to the quality of something else, and this is a ground for inference in other cases also. To explain : it is observed that in the case of material objects like the axe etc. which are used as instruments and the clay etc. which are used as material causes, the particular exertions are due to the quality of something else. This [observed fact] in the ground for the inference of [exertions being due to the quality of something else] even in other cases of bodies, moving and stationary. [It is thus established that] the particular exertions of the material objects—inferred from the peculiar conjunctions of their component parts—are due to the quality of something else. [That is, from the instance of the axe etc, it is inferred that the physical exertions of the body too are due to the urge of something else, which is nothing but the conscious self.]

This quality [of something else which is the cause of physical exertions in the body] is the impression, known as (*dharma*) and *adharma*, which coexists with 'internal effort' (*prayatna*) [i.e. exists in the self], is a cause for all actions and, just like internal effort, is required for the attainment of all human ends.

It is to be noted that [the doctrine of] the consiousness of the material elements is refuted also by the proofs for the existence of the self as well as the proofs for the eternality of the self. Besides, the *sūtra* [i.e. *sūtra* 18 above], viz.

'knowledge is not a quality of the sense or the sense-object, because knowledge [i.e. recollection] is produced even when they are destroyed' is also directed against the same [doctrine].

When [the Bhūtacaitanyavādin] claims, [as in *sūtra* 35 above], that the probantia for the inference of desire and aversion are [exertion and its absence], and as such, consciousness cannot be denied to the bodies made of earth etc', [he wrongly] considers exertion and its absence to be mere physical movement and its cessation. But, as has been stated, these exertion and absence of exertion are actually of a different kind [viz. a specific form of purposive action leading to the attainment or the avoidance of an object]. Such exertion and its absence, however, are not observed in earth etc. and, therefore, it is illogical to claim that 'the probantia for the inference of desire and aversion are [exertion and its absence], and as such, consciousness cannot be denied to the bodies made of earth etc.'.

[In the following *sūtra*], the mind is mentioned only as an instance and it equally negates [the presence of consciousness] in the material elements, the senses and the mind. Thus—

Sūtra 38

> Consciousness is not a property of the mind, [the senses and the material elements]—(i) becauseof the 'grounds already mentioned' (*yathokta-hetu*), (ii) because of 'being subordinated' (*pāratantrya*) and (iii) because of [the absurdity of] the 'attainment of results of actions not performed' (*akṛta-abhyāgama*). // iii. 2. 38 //

Bhāṣya

(i) By 'grounds already mentioned' is meant here [the whole discussion] made already [on the nature of the self] starting from [*Nyāya-sutra* i. 1. 10, viz.] 'the probantia for the inference of the self are desire, aversion, internal effort, pleasure, pain and knowledge'. And this discussion negates the possibility of consciousness in the material elements, the senses and the mind.

(ii) Because of being subordinated : the material elements, the senses and the mind are led—because of the internal effort of the self—to the acts of 'holding on' (*dhāraṇa*), urging (*preraṇa*) and 'constituting something' (*vyūha*), only when they are subordinated [and not out of their own free will]. Had they

been really characterised by consciousness, they would have been able to act independently.

(iii) Because of [the absurdity of] the attainment of results of actions not performed : activity (*pravṛtti*) is [defined to be] exertion through speech, mind and body [*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 17]. If the material elements, the senses and the mind are [admitted to be] conscious [and thereby to be the agents of the different activities producing pleasure and pain], it would lead to the absurd position that the self experiences the results of actions which are performed by someone else [viz. the mind etc.]. On the other hand, if the mind etc. are admitted to be unconscious, it can be logically justified that the self having the mind etc. as the instruments experiences the results of its own actions.

Now [Gautama] sums up his discussion on what has [so long] been established [viz. the thesis that knowledge is a quality of the self].

Sūtra 39

[Knowledge is proved to be a quality of the self] by a residual (*pariśeṣa*) inference and also because of the justifiability (*upapatti*) of the 'grounds already mentioned' (*yathokta-hetu*). // iii. 2. 39 //

Bhāṣya

It follows from the context [that the thesis to be established is :] knowledge is a quality of the self. A residual inference means the definite [inferential] knowledge resting on the residual, when the other possible alternatives are eliminated and there is no possibility of its being relevant for other cases. Thus, when the presence of knowledge is disproved in the material elements, the senses and the mind, and in the case of other substances [viz. *ākāśa*, *kāla* and *dik*] it is known to be irrelevant, the self alone remains. It is, therefore, concluded that knowledge is a quality of the self.

'And also because of the justifiability of the grounds already mentioned' means 'because the grounds proving a self [as distinct from the senses etc]—viz. because of the apprehension of the same object through the visual as well as the tactual senses [*Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1. 1] etc—cannot be refuted'. [Gautama] mentions the expression *yathokta-hetu-upapatti* to indicate the above residual inference as well as the fact that [the thesis] in the present context [viz. knowledge is a quality of the self] is already established [by the foregoing critical examination of the self].

Or, the word *upapatti* is to be taken as referring to a different ground, [which is explained as follows]. The self is eternal, for the same self, after performing some virtuous acts and leaving its previous body assumes a different one in

heaven among the gods ; or the same self, after performing some sinful acts and leaving the previous body goes down to hell and assumes a different body. Thus, *upapatti* which means 'assuming a different body' can be justified only if the existence of an eternal self [is admitted]. It cannot be justified [the Buddhist view admitting] only a continuous stream of momentary consciousness not characterised by [a permanent self], for there would be no basis [i.e. a permanent entity that may be said to assume different bodies at different times].

Moreover, 'worldly existence' (*saṃsāra*) which means connections with different bodies [at different births] having the same self as the basis, and liberation or final freedom which means the annihilation of all [the self's connections] with different bodies can both be justified [only on the admission of a permanent self]. If, on the other hand, only a continuous stream of momentary consciousness is admitted, no single conscious entity can be logically said to last [for more than one moment]. As such, there would be none [i.e. no conscious agent or self] who would go over a long way [i.e. would last during the long period of worldly existence] and, again, there would be none to acquire final freedom through the annihilation of all connections with different bodies. Wordly existence and liberation would thus remain unjustified. [That is, a piece of momentary consciousness can be neither connected with nor disconnected from different bodies and hence to explain the facts of wordly existence and liberation a permanent self is to be admitted.]

Further, if only a continuous stream of momentary consciousness is admitted, the activities of all the various living beings can be neither recalled (*apratisaṃhita*) nor 'dissimilar to one another' (*avyāvṛtta*) nor 'brought to completion' (*apariniṣṭha*), for recollection is not possible in the case of such a stream—it is not what is perceived by one in recollected by someone else. Recollection is a [latter mental] cognition—on the part of the same knower—of an object previously known and is of the form 'I previously apprehended this object of cognition'. Thus, when one and the same knower mentally apprehends an object previously perceived, the mental apprehension of the object is called recollection. It, however, cannot be justified on the admission of only a continuous stream of momentary consciousness not characterised by a permanent self.

Elucidation

Summing up the discussion on knowledge being a quality of the self, Gautama says that there is also an inference of the residual form to substantiate his position. Knowledge being a quality must inhere in some substrtatum. There is no dispute regarding *ākāśa*, *kāla* or *dik* being its substratum, for such a thesis is put forward by none of the systems. The rival views in this regard are generally three—(i) knowledge

belongs to the four elements of earth, water, fire and air ; (ii) knowledge belongs to the senses and (iii) knowledge belongs to the mind. All these three alternatives have been refuted. Hence the obvious conclusion is that knowledge must belong to the only substance that remains, namely, the self.

By taking the word *upapatti* here in the sense of 'connection with different bodies', Vātsyāyana gives an alternative interpretation of the present *sūtra* and criticises, on different grounds, the view of the Buddhist who does not admit a permanent self over and above a continuous stream of momentary consciousness.

The implication of Vātsyāyana's last argument against the Buddhist is as follows. First, it is observed that some work started on the provious day is finished on the next day. Such completion presupposes the agent's resolve 'I shall finish the work started by me', which resolve, tn its turn, has for its precondition a recollection of the unfinished work. But recollection is not possible without the admission of a permanent self.

Secondly, it is observed that a work done by one conscious agent differs from a work done by another consciousness agent. According to the Buddhist, however, a single piece of work even is performed by several conscious agents and still, it possesses a uniform character. This, again leads to the absurdity that in the same way even the different works done by different conscious agents (i.e. persons) would be of a uniform character.

Thirdly, in the Buddhist view, no work can be said to be completed by a single conscious agent, for there would be no permanent self that may persist during the period in which the work is brought to completion.

Sūtra 40

Recollection (*smaraṇa*) also belongs to the self only (*tu*), because the very essential nature of the self is the faculty of knowing [in the present, past and future times]. // iii. 2. 40 //

Bhāṣya

The expression 'is justified' (*upapadyate*) [is to be added to the *sūtra*]. [Thus, the meaning would be : recollection is justified to be a quality of the self along etc.]

Recollection belongs to the self only and not to a mere continuous stream of momentary consciousness. The word *tu* is used in the sense of restriction (*avadhāraṇa*). Why [is recollection said to belong to the self alone] ? Because its very nature is constituted by the faculty of knowing. The faculty of knowing [in the three times] is the essential property—the specific characteristics—of the self, for it is the same self that 'know's, 'will know' and

'knew'. Thus, the same self is related to different pieces of knowledge occurring in the three times.

That the same self is characterised by knowledge occurring in the three times is mentally apprehended by every living being in relation to his own self [in the form] 'I shall know' or 'I know' or 'I knew'. Thus, recollection also must belong to what has such an essential property [i.e. the faculty of knowing] and not to a mere continuous stream of momentary consciousness not characterised by a permanent self.

It has been said [in *sūtra* 33 above] that the absence of simultaneous recollections is due to the absence of simultaneity of the causes of recollection. But, what are the causes for the production of recollection ? [To this, Gautama says that] recollection is—

Sūtra 41

Due to—concentration (*praṇidhāna*), being contained in the same composition (*nibandha*), repeated occurrence (*abhyāsa*), an inferential mark (*liṅga*), an indicative sign (*lakṣaṇa*), similarity (*sādṛśya*), acquisition (*parigraha*), a person who leads (*āśraya*), a person who is led (*āśrita*), some specific relation (*sambandha*), succession (*ānantarya*). separation (*viyoga*), being an agent of the same work (*ekakārya*), opposition (*virodha*), excellence (*atiśaya*), gift (*prāpti*), container (*vyavadhāna*), pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*), fear (*bhaya*), being in need of some object (*arthitva*), effect (*kriyā*), attachment (*rāga*), merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*). // iii. 2. 41 //

Bhāṣya

Praṇidhāna is concentrating the mind for the purpose of recollection or deeply thinking over some mark of the object sought to be recollected, and it is a cause of recollection.

Nibandha is a compilation of different topics into the same composition. The different topics compiled in the same work lead to the recollection of one another in either the order they are stated or some other way. [As for instance, in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, the knowledge of *pramāṇa* leads to the recollection of *prameya*.]

Or, *nibandha* means the attribution of the objects to be recollected [viz. the particular deities] on the objects known [viz. the different limbs of the body, such as the forehead (*lalāṭa*), the palate (*tālu*) etc], as has been explained in the *dhāraṇā-śāstra* [i.e. the texts on the practice of *yoga* composed by sages like Jaigīṣavya and others].

Abhyāsa is the repeated occurrence of knowledge in respect of the same object. [By *abhyāsa* Gautama here] really speaks of the impression which is produced by such repeated occurrence and is a quality of the self. It also is a cause of recollection.

Liṅga is of four kinds—the conjoined (*saṃyogin*), the inhered (*samavāyin*), one inhered in the same locus (*ekārtha-samavāyin*) and the opposed (*virodhin*). Thus, smoke [which conjoined with fire leads to the recollection of] fire, the horn [which inherent in the cow leads to the recollection of] the cow, a hand [leads to the recollection of] a foot [when both inhere in the same body] or a particular colour [leads to the recollection of] a particular touch [when both inhere in the same substance], and the non-existent [which is opposed to the existent leads to the recollection of] the existent.

Lakṣaṇa means an indicative sign, located in the limb of an animal. It leads to the recollection of the particular lineage (*gotra*) [it indicates], as for instance, 'this particular sign is indicative of the lineage of the sage Vida' or 'this particular sign is indicative of the lineage of the sage Garga'.

Sādṛśya, observed in the portrait [of Devadatta], for instance, leads to the recollection of Devadatta himself in the form 'this is an exact reproduction of Devadatta'.

[Recollection is also due to]—*Parigraha* : when the knowledge of the wealth acquired leads to the recollection of the person who has acquired it or the knowledge of the person who has acquired wealth leads to the recollection of the wealth acquired.

Āśraya : when the knowledge of the head of a village leads to the recollection of the villagers under him.

Āśrita : when the knowledge of the villagers under some head leads to the recollection of that head of the village.

Sambandha : when one recollects the preceptor from the knowledge of the pupils studying under him or the person who sacrifices from the knowledge of the priest working for him.

Ānantarya : as in the case of duties prescribed. [It is enjoined, for instance, that one should rise early in the morning, carry out the natural functions, purify oneself by ablution, be engaged in daily worship and so on. Of these various duties, each preceding one leads to the recollection of each following one.]

Viyoga : when, one feeling the pangs of separation, recollects again and again the person one is separated from.

Ekakārya : when [of the many persons completing a piece of work], one person is recollected by observing another.

Virodha : when, of the two parties fighting each other for victory, one is recollected by observing the other.

Atiśaya : when the person who leads to the state of excellence is recollected. [As for instance, a *brahmacārin* recollects his preceptor who, through the ceremonial process of *upanayana*, elevates him to the position of a *brahmacārin*.]

Prāpti : when one repeatedly recollects the person who has made or will make some gift to one.

Vyavadhāna : when the sword etc. are recollected from the perception of the sheath etc.

Sukha and *duḥkha* : when from the presence [of *sukha* and *duḥkha*], their causes are recollected.

Icchā and *dveṣa* : when from the presence of *icchā* and *dveṣa* are recollected the persons who are the objects of desire and aversion.

Bhaya : when from the presence of fear is recollected what one is afraid of.

Arthitva : when a person who stands in need of food or clothing recollects those objects.

Kriyā : when the maker of the chariot is recollected from the knowledge of the chariot.

Rāga : when one constantly recollects the lady one is attached to.

Dharma : when one recollects, in the present birth, the facts of the previous births or the knowledge [gained in the previous births] by reading or listening to [the different *śāstra*-s].

Adharma : when one recollects the cause of pain suffered previously [and being suffered in the present time].

All these causes of recollection cannot be apprehended simultaneously and as such, there can be no simultaneous recollection. The above causes of recollection are stated here only by way of illustration and the above account is not to be taken as a 'complete enumeration' (*parisaṃkhyāna*).

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON KNOWLEDGE BEING A QUALITY OF THE SELF

(*buddhi-ātmaguṇatva-prakaraṇa*)

IV. ON KNOWLEDGE BEING MOMENTARY

Bhāṣya

Non-eternal objects are observed to be both mementary [*utpannāpavargin*, lit. what is destroyed immediately after production] as well as durable [*kālāntarāvasthāyin*, lit. lasting for a long time]. As such, there is a doubt in respect of non-eternal knowledge: 'Is knowledge, just like sound, a momentary entity ? Or, is knowledge, just like a jar, a durable entity ?'

The first alternative is accepted [by the Naiyāyika]. Why ?

Sūtra 42

Because of the apprehension of the shortlived (*anavasthāyin*) movements. // iii. 2. 42 //

Bhāṣya

[Knowledge is momentary], because of the apprehension of the shortlived movements. A series of [shortlived] movements is perceived in an arrow shot [from a bow] until it falls to the ground. The existence of a series of [momentary] pieces of knowledge is proved therefrom, for every piece of knowledge is restricted to [i.e. reveals] a specific object only [i.e. a single shortlived movement].

[Knowledge is momentary], also because, in the perception of a durable (*avasthita*) object, the perception in respect of it ceases when it is screened off. Even when a durable object like the jar is apprehended [for a long time], different pieces of knowledge are produced in the form of a series, until the object is screened off, and that is why the perceptual knowledge ceases when the object is screened off. If, on the other hand, the knowledge were durable, the perception would have continued even when the object visually perceived is screened off.

Recollection is not a probans indicating the durability of knowledge, because the cause of recollection is the impression produced by knowledge. [Objection] One may argue that knowledge is durable, for it is observed that there is recollection concerning an object of [some previous] knowledge. [On the admission that] knowledge is non-eternal [i.e. momentary], such recollection is not possible due to the absence of the cause [viz. the previous knowledge which is momentary and does not persist till the moment of recollection]. [Answer] This [recollection], however, is not a valid probans. Why ? Because the cause of recollection is not knowledge, but a different quality, namely, the impression produced by knowledge. [That is, the impression is durable and in spite of the absence of the knowledge it can produce recollection at a later time].

[Objection] If it be said that the above answer is illogical, for there is no ground [to justify the conclusion that recollection is produced by an impression, and not by a durable knowledge]? [Answer] If knowledge [is admitted to be] durable, recollection would not be possible due to the presence of the perception itself. So long as its perceptual knowledge continues to exist, an object of cognition is apprehended through perception itself and hence, being an object of perception, it cannot be an object of recollection. [That is, an object can be recollected only after its perceptual knowledge has ceased to exist. Thus, perceptual knowledge being opposed to recollection, even a durable piece of such knowledge cannot be the cause of recollection.]

Elucidation

In the Nyāya view, the quality of knowledge, unlike the ordinary non-eternal objects, is considered to be momentary—just like the quality of sound, it is produced in the first moment, exists during the second and is destroyed in the third. After establishing that knowledge is a quality of the self and is non-eternal, Gautama, in the present *sūtra*, gives the argument for the momentariness of knowledge.

Explaining the implication of Gautama, Vātsyāyana says that the movement of an arrow shot from a bow and travelling some distance in the air is not one durable movement, but a series of many shortlived individual movements, because the said movement produces different conjunctions in different points of time and space, and each individual movement is the cause of each particular conjunction. The perceptual knowledge of this series of movements also cannot be a single piece of durable knowledge, for every piece of knowledge is restricted to an object of its own and cannot alone reveal all those shortlived individual movements—the past, the present and the future ones. In other words, it follows that the said perceptual knowledge is a series of many momentary pieces of knowledge—each one of which reveals one individual movement only. It has already been pointed out (under *sūtra* 24 above) that each preceding piece of knowledge is destroyed by each following piece of knowledge.

An objection may be raised against the above. The knowledge of a series of shortlived movements may be proved to be consisting of momentary pieces of cognitions. Still, there is no ground to disprove that the continuous knowledge of a durable object, a jar for instance, is a single piece of durable knowledge. To this, Vātsyāyana answers that such knowledge too consists of a series of momentary pieces of knowledge. If the perceptual knowledge of a durable jar is admitted to be durable, it would be as durable as the jar itself and would continue to exist so long as the jar is not destroyed. This, however, leads to an absurdity, namely, that the perceptual know-

ledge of the jar may be produced, even when the jar is screened off the eyes by a curtain or something else.

As against Vātsyāyana, it may be pointed out that a sense-object contact is one of the causes of perceptual knowledge. When the jar is screened off, the sense-object contact is destroyed and hence, at that moment, there is no possibility of the perception of the jar due to the absence of the cause. Vācaspati Miśra notes the objection and replies that the momentariness of knowledge is really established by the perception of shortlived movements, and this latter argument of Vātsyāyana is of minor importance only. In fact, if the knowledge of a durable object is admitted to be itself durable, neither any specific cause for its destruction nor the exact limit of its durability can be satisfactorily explained. It is, therefore, better to accept that knowledge does not last for more than three moments and each preceding piece is destroyed by each following piece.

Sūtra 43

[Objection] [In the Nyāya view], every object would be indistinctly apprehended due to the momentariness of the knowledge, just like the indistinct knowledge of the colour of an object by a flash of lightning. // iii. 2. 43 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] On the admission that knowledge is momentary, there will be an absurdity, namely, that every object of cognition is only indistinctly apprehended. As for instance, when the lightning flashes, there is only an indistinct knowledge of the colour of an object, for the flash of the lightning is just shortlived. The fact, however, is that objects are known distinctly. As such, the above view [of the momentariness of knowledge] is illogical.

Sūtra 44

[Answer] The thesis to be negated is [actually] to be admitted [by the opponent], for [he has] mentioned a ground [that really proves the Nyāya thesis of the momentariness of knowledge]. // iii. 2. 44 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The thesis to be negated [by the opponent] is : 'knowledge is momentary'. [Instead of being refuted], it is actually accepted by the

[opponent's] statement 'just like the indistinct knowledge of colour, when the lightning flashes'. [That is, the instance of the flash of lightning indicates that the knowledge of objects is indistinct. The indistinctness, again, indicates that the knowledge is too shortlived to become distinct—which means, in other words, that knowledge is momenatry.]

[Objection] Knowledge is momentary only when the knowledge is indistinct, [and not so when the knowledge is distinct, as for instance, the perception of a jar at midday]. [Answer] The change in [the nature of] knowledge is due to a change in [the nature of] the cause of knowledge and not to a change in [the nature of] knowledge itself. [It is observed that] knowledge is sometimes distinct, and sometimes indistinct. Such change is due to a change in [the nature of] the causes of knowledge : when the cause of knowledg [e.g. the flash of the lightning] is shortlived, the knowledge is indistinct, and when the cause of knowledge [e.g. the light of the sun] is durable, the knowledge is distinct. And it [i.e. such change—the distinctness or indistinctness] is not due to the cogntion's durability or absence of durability.

Why ? Because knowledge means the 'awareness of an object' (*artha-grahaṇa*), and this awareness of an object—whether it is distinct or indistinct—is nothing but knowledge. When the general characteristic [of an object] is apprehended and the specific characteristic remains unknown, the knowledge is said to be indistinct. In such a case, due to the absence of cause, no further knowledge is produced in respect of the other object [i.e. the specific characteristic]. When, again, an object (*dharmin*) is apprehended as endowed with both the general as well as the specific characteristics, the knowledge is said to be distinct. If, however, the specific characteristic remains unknown and the general characteristic alone is apprehended, it would be indistinct knowledge. As an object of knowledge, the presence of general characteristic is different from the presence of specific characteristic, [for they are revealed by different pieces of knowledge having different causes for their production]. When one of them [viz. the specific characteristic] is not apprehended, it is [to be understood as] due to the absence of cause for its apprehension and not to the cognition's absence of durability. [That is, indistinctness of knowledge is due to the non-apprehension of the specific characteristic and not to its momentariness.]

Moreover, in regard to its own object, every knowledge is distinct, for each knowledge is restricted to [i.e. reveals] a specific object only. The knowledge having the general characteristic for its object is distinct in respect of its own object [i.e. the general characteristic] and the knowledge having the specific characteristic for its object also is distinct in respect of its own object [i.e. the specific characteristic], because each knowledge is restricted to a specific object only. [The opponent] has spoken of the absurdity of knowledge being always indistinct due to the momentariness of knowledge. But, then, what

would be the object [of the so-called indistinct knowledge ?] [That is, in respect of its own object, every knowledge is distinct; indistinct knowledge from the point of view of the object is an impossibility.]

[In fact, the characterisation of knowledge as distinct or indistinct] is explained by the presence or absence of the different cognitions revealing the different characteristics [i.e. the general as well as the specific ones] of an object. The characteristics of an object—i.e. of an entity which may be a locus of many characteristics—may be general as well as specific. They are each revealed by different pieces of knowledge which are restricted to their own specific objects only. If there are both the pieces of knowledge [revealing the two kinds of characteristics] in relation to an object, the knowledge is said to be distinct with regard to the object. If, however, there is only one piece of knowledge revealing the general characteristic alone, the knowledge is said to be indistinct [with regard to the object]. Thus, distinctness and indistinctness of knowledge can be possible only with reference to the object known. [That is momentariness of knowledge has nothing to do with its characterisation as distinct or indistinct, which really depends on how an object is apprehended—generally or specifically]

Besides, such indistinct knowledge cannot be explained as being due to the non-durability of either the object known or the knowledge itself. Such [indistinct knowledge, in fact, is]—

Sūtra 45

Not [justified] because, just like the distinct apprehension of each of the continuously appearing individual flames of a lamp, the knowledge of an object is always distinct. // iii. 2. 45 //

Bhāṣya

In spite of the non-durability of knowledge, the apprehensions of the different objects are to be admitted as distinct. How ? Just like the distinct apprehension of each of the continuously appearing individual flames of a lamp.

It is to be admitted that each apprehension revealing each individual flame of a lamp which appears continuously to form a series [so that the flame of a lamp is wrongly characterised to be one] is non-durable, and its object [viz. each individual flame] too is so, because every knowledge is restricted to a specific object only. [That is, each knowledge reveals only one particular flame and hence both of them are non-durable.] There are thus as many pieces of knowledge as there are flames of the lamp.

Even in such a case [where both the knowledge and the object of the knowledge are non-durable], the apprehensions of the flames of the lamp are observed to be quite distinct. [Hence indistinct knowledge being an impossibility, the objection raised in *sūtra* 43 above is not justified.]

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON KNOWLEDGE BEING MOMENTARY

(*buddhi-utpannāpavargitva-prakaraṇa*)

V. ON KNOWLEDGE AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE QUALITY OF THE BODY

Bhāṣya

[According to some], consciousness (*cetanā*) is a quality of the body, because if there is a body, there is consciousness, and if there is no body, there is no consciousness. [Refuting this, Gautama says]—

Sūtra 46

There is doubt [regarding the presence of consciousness in the body], because, in a substance, its own quality as well as a quality of something else are perceived. // iii. 2. 46 //

Bhāṣya

[The fact of] presence in presence [i.e. the fact that the quality of knowledge or consciousness is present only in the presence of the body] is only a cause of doubt, for, in water, its own quality, viz. fluidity, as well as the quality of a different substance [like fire], viz. the sensation of heat, are both perceived. Thus, there is a doubt in the form : 'Is this consciousness, perceived in the body, a quality of the body itself ? Or, is it a quality of some other substance ?'

Elucidation

In the present section, Gautama once again critically discusses the thesis that knowledge or consciousness is not a quality of the body. The argument of the opponent is stated by Vātsyāyana in the introduction.

In this connection, Uddyotakara says that the presence or absence of the qualities of conjunction and disjunction also follows the presence or absence of movement which is their cause. Still, it is never argued that conjunction or disjunction is a quality of movement. Similar is the case with the presence of knowledge in the presence of the body.

Bhāṣya

Consciousness is not a quality of the body. Why ?

Sūtra 47

Because the qualities of colour and the like are observed to be present as long as the substance [in which they inhere] exists. // iii. 2. 47 //

Bhāṣya

A body is never perceived to be without colour etc. However, a body is [sometimes] perceived to be without consciousness. Therefore, consciousness is not a quality of the body.

[Objection] If it be argued that [consciousness would be a quality of the body] in the same way as an impression? [Answer] No, because the cause [for the production of consciousness] is not destroyed [i e. remains as before]. It is not that an impression ceases to exist in the same substance [i.e. the same body] as was previously the locus of the impression, for the impression is completely destroyed only due to the disappearance of its cause from that substance. However, the absolute non-existence of consciousness is observed in the same body as was previously perceived to be the locus of consciousness. Therefore, the solution—[consciousness would be a quality of the body] in the same way as an impression—is not at all suited.

Moreover, none of the alternatives—(i) some entity [other than the body] but located in the body itself is the cause of the production of consciousness, (ii) some entity [other than the body] and located in a substance other than the body is the cause of the production of consciousness and (iii) some entity [other than the body] and located in both [viz. the body and a substance other than the body] is the cause of the production of consciousness—can be admitted, for there is no ground to justify a specific rule. [In the first alternative], there is no ground to justify a rule that an entity located in the body itself sometimes produces consciousness and sometimes does not. [In the second alternative], there is no ground to justify a rule that an entity located in a substance other than the body produces consciousness in the body alone and not in other objects like a piece of stone etc. [In the third alternative], there is no ground to justify a rule that, even though the cause [for the production of consciousness] be an entity located in both [the body and a substance other than the body], consciousness is produced only in the body, and never in any other substance identical in nature with the body.

Elucidation

Gautama argues that the qualities of the body are generally observed to characterise the body as long as it endures—a body is never perceived, for instance, without its colour. The quality of knowledge, however, may sometimes be absent from the body. Knowledge is thus dissimilar in nature to the accepted qualities of the body. Therefore, it is not a quality of the body.

It may be contended against the above that velocity (*vega*), one of the three varieties of impressions,[1] is accepted to be a quality of the body, even though the body is sometimes characterised by its absence. Similar would be the case of the quality of knowledge. In answer, Vātsyāyana says that velocity is produced in the body when its other causes besides the body—viz. movement etc—are present, and if the other causes are absent, velocity is not produced due to the absence of cause. Thus, the body as the locus of velocity is different from the body as the locus of the absence of velocity. All this, however, is not true of consciousness, for, as Vātsyāyana critically shows, no other entity besides the body can be supposed to be the cause of consciousness and hence, the absence of consciousness in spite of the presence of the body, cannot be explained, as in the case of velocity, to be due to the absence of some other cause.

Praśastapāda divides qualities into two classes: (i) *yāvaddravyabhāvin* or which is destroyed only when its substratum is destroyed—that is, lasts as long as the substratum endures, e.g. (ordinary) colour, smell, taste etc. and (ii) *a-yāvad-dravyabhāvin* or which is destroyed in spite of the presence of the substratum, e.g. conjunction, disjunction etc. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa says that the present *sūtra* implies Gautama's admission of the above classification.

Bhāṣya

[Objection] One may argue that the black colour etc [of an unbaked jar, put into fire, for instance] is destroyed even when the substance characterised by the black colour [i.e. the jar] endures. Similar would be the case of the [occasional] absence of consciousness [in the body]. [Refuting this, Gautama says]—

Sūtra 48

No [i.e. the substance is never absolutely without colour]; because a different quality [viz. red colour], 'produced by its conjunction with fire' (*pākaja*), appears in it. // iii. 2. 48 //

Bhāṣya

The colour of a substance is never absolutely destroyed. As the black colour disappears, there appears, due to the [substance's] conjunction with fire, a different quality, namely, the red colour. In the body, however, the absolute non-existence of consciousness is [sometimes] observed.

1. See page 46 fn.

Elucidation

When an object made of earth comes in contact with fire, its original colour changes into a new one, as for instance, a black and unbaked jar, when put into fire, turns red. The original colour is due to the colour of the constituent causes or the parts and the latter to a peculiar conjunction with fire. This latter colour is denoted by the term *pākaja*.

According to the Vaiśeṣika, the disappearance of the original colour and the appearance of the new one start in the very atoms of the jar which, being put into fire, disintegrates and the changed colour of the atoms is the cause of the changed colour of the jar. According to the Naiyāyika, however, the jar remains intact and the said disappearance and appearance of colours take place in the jar as a whole. The present *sūtra* indicates that Gautama is in favour of the latter view.

Bhāṣya

Moreover—

Sūtra 49

There can be no denial [of the above view], because it is logically established that there are qualities opposed to the qualities produced from conjunction with fire. // iii. 2. 49 //

Bhāṣya

The appearance of qualities produced from conjunction with fire is observed only in those substances in which the presence of qualities opposed to the previous ones is established, because the qualities produced from conjunction with fire are never observed to coexist with the previous qualities. However, in the body, even if the presence of a quality opposed to consciousness is assumed, no other quality incompatible [with consciousness] is really observed, on the basis of which it can be inferred that consciousness is opposed to the other quality. Therefore, why should not consciousness which is [admitted to be a quality of the body and which, as shown above, cannot be destroyed by any incompatible quality] be existing as long as the body endures? The fact, however, is that it does not so exist. As such, consciousness is not a quality of the body.

Elucidation

In the present *sūtra*, Gautama notes a further point of dissimilarity between

the qualities of colour etc. and consciousness. The qualities of colour etc. as located in the body may have qualities opposed to themselves, while consciousness is without any such quality. Thus, due to the absence of an opposed quality which may destroy consciousness in the body, there follows an absurdity that consciousness must be present as long as the body endures.

Bhāṣya

Consciousness is not a quality of the body, also because of the ground, namely—

Sūtra 50

Because [consciousness] pervades the [whole] body. // III. 2. 50 //

Bhāṣya

The body and all its component parts are pervaded by the presence of consciousness, and therefore, no part of the body is characterised by the absence of consciousness. Thus, the different component parts of the body, being as conscious as the body itself, there follows [the absurd position that a single body] is characterised by many conscious entities.

The probans for the inference of different selves in different bodies [of persons] is the specific rule regarding the [experience of] pleasure, pain and knowledge [viz. the pleasure etc of one can be experienced by one alone, and no one else]. [If there were many conscious entities in the same body], such a rule would have applied to the case of a single body also. It is, however, not so, [for pleasure or pain, registered in different parts of the body, is really experienced by one and the same knower]. Therefore, consciousness is not a quality of the body. [cf. *Bhāṣya* on *sūtra* 37 above]

It has been said that no component part of the body is characterised by the absence of consciousness. This is, however—

Sūtra 51

[Objection] Not correct, because consciousness is not observed in the hair and the nail. // III. 2. 51 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Consciousness is not produced in the hair and the nail. It is, therefore, illogical to claim that consciousness pervades the whole body.

Sūtra 52

[Answer] There is no possibility [of the production of consciousness] in the hair and the nail, because the body means only that portion which is covered by skin. // iii. 2. 52 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The body is defined to be a locus of the senses. The body which is the substratum of an individual self, the mind, pleasure, pain and sensation is completely covered by skin. As such, consciousness is not produced in the hair etc [which are not so covered and do not form an essential part of the body]. They are attached (*upanibaddha*) to the body only to serve some [specific] purposes.

Consciousness is not a quality of the body, also because of the ground, namely—

Sūtra 53

Because [consciousness] is dissimilar to the qualities of the body. // iii. 2. 53 //

Bhāṣya

The qualities of the body are of two kinds only—(i) imperceptible, e.g. heaviness and (ii) perceptible by the [external] senses, e.g. colour etc. Consciousness differs from both these kinds—it is not imperceptible, for it is internally apprehended and it is not perceptible by the external senses, for it is an object [known by] the mind only. Therefore, consciousness is a quality of some substance other [than the body].

Sūtra 54

[Objection] No [i.e. the ground mentioned in the previous *sūtra* is not valid], because [even the accepted qualities of the body like] colour, [taste, smell and touch] are dissimilar to one another. // iii. 2. 54 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Just as the qualities of colour and the like, though dissimilar to

one another, do not cease to be the qualities of the body, so also consciousness, though dissimilar to colour etc, would not cease to be a quality of the body.

Sūtra 55

[Answer] The refutation [given in the previous *sūtra*] is not proper, because [the qualities of colour etc.] are all perceived by the external senses. // iii. 2. 55 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] [A further ground rejecting the previous *sūtra* is possible, viz.] 'also because of the imperceptibility [of some qualities of the body]'.

The qualities of colour etc, though dissimilar to one another, do not form a class other than the two [as mentioned under *sūtra* 53 above]. In the same way, if consciousness were a quality of the body, it would not have formed a class other than the two in spite of its dissimilarity with colour etc. The fact, however, is that it forms [a distinct class]. Therefore, it is not a quality of the body.

[That consciousness is not a quality of the body is already] established by the refutation of [the view that] knowledge is a quality of the material elements, the senses and the mind. [cf. *Sūtra*-s 18ff above.] Still, the present discussion is made to explain some special points. A thesis is established more properly, when it is critically examined from various standpoints.

Elucidation

The implication of Gautama here is that the qualities of the body, though dissimilar among themselves, share a common property, namely, perceptibility through an external sense. They are thus not absolutely dissimilar. Consciousness, however, is absolutely dissimilar to the qualities of the body.

Vātsyāyana reads a further argument as implied in the *sūtra* and argues that consciousness is not a quality of the body, because it can be included in neither of the two classes of qualities located in the body.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON KNOWLEDGE AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE QUALITY OF THE BODY

(*śarīraguṇa-vyatireka-prakaraṇa*)

VI. ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE MIND

Bhāṣya

Knowledge has been critically examined. Now is the occasion for the critical examination of the mind. As regarding the dispute whether each body is related to [i.e. possess] one mind or many minds, [Gautama says]—

Sūtra 56

[Each body is characterised by] one mind only because of the non-simultaneity of cognitions. // iii. 2. 56 //

Bhāṣya

The non-simultaneity of cognitions in respect of each single sense-organ and its respective object is obvious, for an instrument [of knowledge] is capable of producing only one cognition [in the same moment]. And such non-simultaneity does not indicate that the mind is one only, [for, even if the mind were many, there would be no simultaneity of cognitions due to the instrument's incapability of producing many cognitions at the same moment].

However, there is also non-simultaneity of cognitions in respect of the different sense-organs and their different objects, and such non-simultaneity is the mark [indicating that the mind is one only]. Why? Had there been many minds [in the same body], simultaneity of conjunctions between the minds and the senses would have been possible and, as a result, there would have been simultaneity of cognitions. However, this never happens. Therefore, as the cognitions of the respective objects [through the respective sense-organs] occur only in succession, the mind must be one only.

Elucidation

The five forms of perceptual cognition produced by the five sense-organs like the olfactory and others presuppose a conjunction of the mind with each of the sense-organs. From this, a doubt follows whether the same mind is conjoined with each sense-organ or there are five separate minds that are so conjoined. In the present section, Gautama critically establishes that each body contains one mind only.

Sūtra 57

[Objection] No [i.e. the mind cannot be one only], because many [purposive] actions are

observed [in the same person] at the same moment. // iii. 2. 57 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] [It is observed that] the same preceptor reads, walks, holds on the gourd-vessel (*kamaṇḍalu*), looks at the path, hears sounds coming from the inhabitants of the forest [i.e. the animals], being afraid tries to determine the mark [and thereby the location] of the ferocious animals, and recollects his destination. All these actions, [it. is to be admitted], occur simultaneously, for succession in their occurrence is not observed. It follows thereform that [the same preceptor is characterised by] different minds [which lead to different simultaneous actions].

Sūtra 58

[Answer] The perception of simultaneity [in respect of different actions] is due to rapid movement [of the same mind which is atomic], as in the case of the perception of a 'circling firebrand' (*alāta cakra*). // iii. 2. 58 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] In a moving firebrand, the succession [of movements], though present, is not apprehended due to its rapid displacement. Due to the non-apprehension of succession it is apprehended as a connected [whole] and ultimately, [the firebrand is wrongly] ascertained [to be round] as a wheel In the same way, due to the quick production [and destruction] of the cognitions as well as the actions, succession [in their occurrence]—though present—is not apprehended. Thus, due to the non-apprehension of succession, it is wrongly ascertained that the actions take place simultaneously.

[Objection] Is it that the actions, [though non-simultaneous], are ascertained to be simultaneous because of the non-apprehension of succession? Or, is it that different actions are observed to be simultaneous only because they actually occur simultaneously? No ground for the specific determination [of any of these two alternatives] is mentioned here. [Answer] It has been already said that the cognitions of different objects through the different sense-organs are produced only in succession, and this [non-simultaneity of cognitions] cannot be denied, for it is proved by internal perception.

Moreover, [it is observed that] the cognitions of a person, while he thinks over the various objects seen and heard of, are produced in succession. On the

basis [of this instance], it is to be inferred that [in other cases too] cognitions do not occur simultaneously. [As for instance, in the case of one understanding the meaning of a sentence], succession in the cognitions of letters, words and the sentence as well as the cognitions of their meanings is not perceived due to their quick production [and destruction]. How? The different letters comprising [the words in] the sentence are uttered first. Then, each word is heard one after another. The letters so received by hearing are then determined, singly or together, as forming words. Next, one determines them to be the components [of the sentence]. After their determination as words, their meanings are obtained through recollection and then noting the different words in the proper order, one determines the whole sentence. Finally, one notes the different meanings as connected with one another and understands the meaning of the whole sentence. Due to quick production [and destruction] succession is not observed in these cognitions, though they actually occur in succession. On the basis of this fact, it is to be inferred that in other cases too cognitions and actions are wrongly ascertained to be simultaneous.

In fact, undoubted simultaneous occurrence of cognitions—which may be the basis for the inference of the multiplicity of mind in the same body—is not [proved in any instance].

Sūtra 59

Moreover, the mind is [proved to be] atomic in magnitude because of the ground already mentioned [viz. non-simultaneity of cognitions]. // iii. 2. 59 //

Bhāṣya

The mind is atomic as well as one—the two properties are collectively proved by the ground 'because of the non-simultaneity of cognitions.' If the mind were of intermediate magnitude, there would have been simultaneous cognitions of objects due to [the mind's] simultaneous conjunction with all the sense-organs.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE MIND

(*manaḥ-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

VII. ON BODY BEING PRODUCED BY 'DHARMA' AND 'ADHARMA'

Bhāṣya

The mind 'has the [capability of] performing functions' (*vṛtti-lābha*) only in a body endowed with senses, and not anywhere outside the body. Moreover, on the part of the knower, the body is the basis for all his cognition etc, enjoyment of the objects of senses, avoidance of what is not desirable and attainment of the desired ends. Thus, all the activities [of a living being] can proceed only on the basis of the body.

Due to contradictory notions, there is doubt regarding such a body: 'Is the creation of the body due to *adṛṣṭa* [=*karman* or the good and bad results of actions performed] of a person? Or, is its creation due to [a combination of] material elements only and is not dependent upon *adṛṣṭa*? Indeed, contradictory statements are heard in this regard.

The truth in this regard is as follows—

Sūtra 60

It [i.e. the body] is produced due to connection (*anubandha*) with the results of actions previously performed [i.e. *adṛṣṭa*=*dharma-adharma* =*karman*]. // iii. 2. 60 //

Bhāṣya

By 'action previously performed' is meant the activities—namely, exertions through speech, mind and body—as relating to the previous body. Its results are *dharma* and *adharma* produced by itself [i e. past action]. Connection with its results means their [i.e. of *dharma* and *adharma*] continued existence as inhering in the self. The body is produced from the material elements acted upon by it [i.e. *dharma-adharma*] and not from [the material elements] independent [of it].

The body is nothing but the locus—being located in which the self has the false notion 'I am [identical with] this [body]', to which the self becomes attached, through which the self, due to its craving for enjoyment, apprehends the objects [of senses] and thus makes *dharma* and *adharma* productive. These impressions—in the form of *dharma* and *adharma*—along with the material elements lead to the creation of a new body, when the previous body ceases to exist. In this newly created body exertions for the attainment of the human ends take place in the same way as in the previous body, and the activities of a person also are performed in the same way as in the previous body. All these can be justified only [on the admission that] the body is created from the material elements as depending upon *adṛṣṭa*.

It is observed that objects like the chariot etc—which are capable of fulfilling different human ends—are produced from material elements only when they are acted upon by the effort belonging to some person. From this instance, it is to be inferred that the body which has been produced as capable of fulfilling different human ends comes into being out of the material elements which are dependent upon a different quality [viz. *adṛṣṭa*] of the person concerned.

Elucidation

In the concluding portion of the *bhāṣya*, Vātsyāyana mentions an inferential ground to substantiate Gautama's view that the body is a product of the material elements as dependent upon the *adṛṣṭa* of the person concerned. Different material objects are produced from the material elements, not out of their own accord, but presuppose the effort of some persons. Similarly, the material elements form a particular body—not independently, but only when acted upon by *adṛṣṭa*.

Bhāṣya

To this [i.e. the above conclusion], the Nāstika says—

Sūtra 61

[Objection] The production of the body is [independent of *adṛṣṭa*] just like the production of [certain] 'composite objects' (*mūrti*) out of the material elements. // iii. 2. 61 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Just as the composite objects like sand, chips of stone, a piece of rock, minerals in the mountains, collyrium etc—produced to fulfil different human ends are taken [to appear] from material elements not dependent upon *adṛṣṭa*, so also the body produced for the purpose of fulfilling different human ends—is taken [to appear] from material elements not dependent upon *adṛṣṭa*.

Sūtra 62

[Answer] No [i.e. the above instance proves nothing], for it is similar to the probandum [i.e. the instance itself is yet to be logically established]. // iii. 2. 62 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The production of the body as independent of *adṛṣṭa* is yet to be logically established. In the same way, the creation—of sand, chips of stone, a piece of rock, minerals in the mountains, collyrium and the like—as independent of *adṛṣṭa*, is yet to be logically established, and thus, being similar to the probandum, it [i.e. the instance of sand etc] cannot be a proper logical ground. Indeed, the Nāstika has yet to prove [the validity of his instance, viz.] '[independent of *adṛṣṭa*], just like the production of [certain] composite objects out of material elements.'

Sūtra 63

No [i.e. the instance of sand etc does not hold in the case of the production of the body], for the mother and the father too are causes [for the production of the body]. // iii. 2. 63 //

Bhāṣya

Moreover, the instance [of sand etc] mentioned [by the Nāstika] is not at all suited. Why? [Because] all these composite objects [like sand etc] are produced without the seed [viz. the mixture of semen and female blood], while the production of the body is due to the seed. By the words 'mother' and 'father' are meant the female blood and semen which are the seeds of the body.

Thus, the specific form of *adṛṣṭa* of the living being which is the cause of its inhabitancy in the mother's womb, and also the two specific forms of *adṛṣṭa* of the parents which are the causes of their obtaining a son exert influence upon the production of the body out of the material elements, and as such, the reference to the seed [as an additional cause] becomes justified.

Sūtra 64

[The instance of sand etc does not hold in the case of the production of the body], also because the food [taken by the parents is the cause of the body]. // iii. 2. 64 //

Bhāṣya

The expression 'because of its being the cause of the production [of the body]' is to be added [from the previous *sūtra*] to the present one.

'Food' means both what is eaten and what is drunk. After the seed [i.e. the mixture of semen and female blood] occurs in the uterus, the quantity of the liquefied substance—[which is nothing but the essentials of the food] turned [into liquid] through the process of digestion and which undergoes transformation (*pāka*) in the same way as the seed—increases gradually in the body of the mother. The [quantity of the seed] also increases, little by little, until the accumulated [mixture of semen and female blood] becomes capable of producing the component parts [i e. the limbs and the organs of the child's body]. Thus being accumulated, [the seed] is transformed—into different composite parts [of the body], namely, *kalala* (the first formation after the mixture of semen and female blood), *arvuda* (the second formation after the said mixture), flesh, muscles, the longer nerves (*kaṇḍarā*), the skull, the arms etc as well as into the seats of the sense-organs. And after the formation [of the parts], the liquefied substance [i.e. the essentials of food taken by the mother] flows down [to it] through the 'uterine vein' (*garbhanāḍī*) and increases in quantity until it [i.e. the child] is fit for delivery. This [i.e. such transformation of the food taken] is, however, not observed in the case of food and drink lying in the earthen pot etc. For this reason, it is ascertained that *adṛṣṭa* also is a cause of the body.

Elucidation

As Vātsyāyana explains, the implication of Gautama here is that the food and drink taken by the mother alone—and not the same placed into some other container—undergo transformation, so that the body of a child is formed after the proper mixture of semen and female blood. This indicates that there is the need of an additional condition for the formation of the body—namely, *adṛṣṭa*.

Sūtra 65

[*Adṛṣṭa* is a cause of the body], also because there is no invariable rule that every union [of the husband with the wife would lead to conception]. // iii. 2. 65 //

Bhāṣya

The union of the husband with the wife is not observed to lead to conception in each and every case. The absence of an invariable rule [i.e. the absence of conception in spite of union] can be justified only on the admission that conception is not possible, when [the particular] *adṛṣṭa* is absent and conception is possible, when [the particular] *adṛṣṭa* is present. If only the

material elements—not dependent upon *adṛṣṭa*—[are admitted to be] the causes for the production of the body, let there be the invariable rule [that every union leads to conception], for in that case there is no absence of causes.

Moreover—

Sūtra 66

> *Adṛṣṭa* is also a cause for the production of the conjunction [between a particular self and a particular body] in the same way as it [i.e. *adṛṣṭa*] is a cause for the production of the body. //iii. 2. 66//

Bhāṣya

The body is constructed by a specific arrangement—which can only be performed with great difficulty—of [the different constituents of the body, viz.] the veins (*nāḍī*) through which breath (*prāṇa*) and the 'essential liquids' (*dhātu*) of the body flow, all the liquids ending with semen, the nerves, the skin, the bones, the sinews (*śiras*), the muscles, *kalala*, the longer nerves (*kaṇḍarā*), the head, the arms, the belly, the thighs, the three humours—the gaseous (*vāta*), the bilious (*pitta*) and the phlegmy (*kapha*)—located in the cavities (*koṣṭha*) of the body, the mouth, the neck, the heart, the stomach, the intestines and the rectum. [Such a highly complicated organism] cannot be produced simply by the elements of earth etc as independent of *adṛṣṭa* and hence it is ascertained that the production of the body is due also to *adṛṣṭa*.

In the same way, if there is no specific cause [i.e. a particular *adṛṣṭa*] in each individual self, the selves would have no distinguishing characteristic [and become exactly similar to one another]. Thus, each of the bodies—which are equally made of the elements of earth etc [and are thus exactly similar]—may belong [to any self], due to its connection with any one of such [identical selves]. There being also no property in the earth etc justifying a rule that [a particular self would have a particular body], the loci of all the selves for experiencing the sensations of pleasure and pain would be identical. But there is a specific rule that a particular self [is connected with a particular body only]. It is thus ascertained that *adṛṣṭa* which is the cause for the production of the body is also a cause for the [above] specific rule, for it is observed that the specific *adṛṣṭa* which is located in a particular self and has started yielding results constructs a body which would become the locus for the experience [of pleasure and pain] on the part of that self only in which it [i.e. the *adṛṣṭa*] is located, and thus makes the specific rule possible.

It follows, therefore, that *adṛṣṭa* is also a cause for the production of the conjunction [between a particular self and a particular body] in the same way as it is a cause for the production of the body [cf. *sūtra* 66 above]. By conjunction [of the self with the body] is meant the specific form of relation that subsists between each individual self and its particular body.

Elucidation

The implication of Gautama is that a particular self experiences the pleasure or pain produced only in that particular body with which it is connected. A specific rule regarding the relation of a particular self with a particular body can be explained only on the admission that the *adṛṣṭa* located in the particular self constructs a particular body for its experiences of pleasure and pain.

Sūtra 67

This [i.e. the previous *sūtra*] justifies the 'absence of rule' [*aniyama*, i.e. the fact that the indiviyidual selves have different bodies of their own, which are not exactly similar], // iii. 2. 67 //

Bhāṣya

It has been already objected against [the opponent] that if the production of the body [is admitted to be] due to [material elements], not depending upon *adṛṣṭa*, the absence of rule [cannot be explained]. This absence of rule, however, is justified by [the previous *sūtra*, viz.] '*adṛṣṭa* is also a cause for the production of the conjunction [between a particular self and a particular body] in the same way as it is a cause for the production of the body'.

What is [meant here by] 'rule' (*niyama*) ? [Rule] means the 'bodies of all the individual selves are exactly similar to the one possessed by any particular individual self'. 'Absence of rule' (*aniyama*) means 'each individual self has a different body [of its own], that is, [the bodies of the different individual selves] are different, non-identical or specifically distinguished [from one another]'.

Difference in the nature of [one's] birth [and the body] is indeed observed. Thus, [one is born] high or low, [and has a body] beautiful or ugly, afflicted with diseases or free from diseases, with limbs intact or impaired, suffering pain or enjoying pleasure, having the qualities befitting a man or the opposite, having signs auspicious or inauspicious, with sense-organs powerful or feeble. There are

also very minute differences which cannot be counted. Such difference of birth is possible only due to the difference of the *adṛṣṭa*-s located in each individual self. [Thus, it is to be admitted that a particular *adṛṣṭa* is the cause of a particular body related to an individual self.] [If the difference in the *adṛṣṭa*-s located in each of the individual selves] is not admitted, the selves would have no distinguishing characteristic [and become exactly similar]. There is also no property in the earth etc that may justify a rule [that a particular self has a particular body], for earth etc are of the same nature [in every case]. Thus, all the selves would have all the bodies [and there would be no specific rule]. The fact of birth, however, is not so [i.e. all the selves do not have exactly similar bodies]. Therefore, the production of the body [cannot be said to be] independent of *adṛṣṭa*.

Moreover, the separation [of the self from the body] can be justified, because the [gradual] diminution of *adṛṣṭa* can be justified. If the production of the body [is admitted to be] due to *adṛṣṭa*, it can be justified that the self, [at the time of liberation], is separated from the body. Why? Because it is justified that there is [gradual] diminution of *adṛṣṭa*. Indeed, the [gradual] diminution of *adṛṣṭa* can be justified [as follows]. When false knowledge has been removed by right knowledge, a person [i.e. his self] becomes free from attachment and does not perform again the actions—through body, speech and mind—which [i.e. the *adṛṣṭa* produced by those actions] would lead to its rebirth. Thus, no further *adṛṣṭa* is accumulated [in the self] and the *adṛṣṭa* already accumulated [by past actions] gradually diminishes through the enjoyment of its results. In this way, due to the absence of the cause [viz. *adṛṣṭa*], the production of a further body—after the present body has been destroyed—would not be possible and there would follow an [absolute] cessation of rebirth [i e. liberation]. If, on the other hand, the production of the body [is admitted to be due to material elements], not depending upon *adṛṣṭa*, the separation [of the self from its body] cannot be explained, because an [absolute] destruction of the material elements is not justified.

Elucidation

In the present context, the words *niyama* and *aniyama* signify respectively 'all the selves have exactly similar bodies' and 'a particular self has only a particular body'. Vātsyāyana explains that *aniyama* which is the only logical alternative can be justified only by admitting that *adṛṣṭa* too is a cause of the body—that a particular *adṛṣṭa* constructs a particular body for a particular self.

Vācaspati Miśra, however, explains the present *sūtra* to be a refutation of the view that the production of the body is not due to *adṛṣṭa*, but to the transformation of *prakṛti*—that *prakṛti* which is constituted by the three qualities of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* evolves itself, through different stages, into the body, independent of *adṛṣṭa*. [cf. *Yogadarśana*, *kaivalya-pāda*, *sūtra* 3 and *Vyāsabhāṣya* thereon]. According to him, the

words *niyama* and *aniyama* respectively mean pervasion (*vyāpti*) and non-pervasion (*avyāpti*). Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, does not seem to favour this interpretation.

Vātsyāyana lastly offers an independent argument to show that *adṛṣṭa* too is a cause for the body.

Sūtra 68

[Objection] If it be argued that the body is produced by non-perception [of the distinction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*] ? [Answer] There arises the possibility of the body [being produced] even after [the attainment of] liberation. // iii. 2. 68 //

Bhāṣya

The word *adṛṣṭa* [in the *sūtra*] means non-perception (*adarśana*) [of the distinction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*].

[Objection] The production of the body out of the material elements is due to non-perception [of the distinction]. So long as the body is not produced, the knower—without [being delimited by] a locus—never perceives what is perceptible (*dṛśya*). The perceptibles, again, may be of two kinds—(i) the objects [of enjoyment, viz. colour, taste, smell, touch and sound] and (ii) the distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. The body is created only to serve the purpose [of perceiving the perceptibles] When it [i.e. the purpose] is fulfilled, the material elements—having their purpose served—do not produce a [further] body and thus the separation [of the self] from a body, [which is the state of liberation], can be justified.

[Answer] If you [i.e. the opponent] argue in the above manner, there is a possibility of body even after liberation—i.e. there follows the absurdity of the body being produced once again [even after liberation]. There is in fact no difference between the two cases of non-perception—(i) the non-perception admitted to be nothing but the 'absence of perception because the body is not yet produced' and (ii) the non-perception admitted to be nothing but the 'absence of perception, because the body is destroyed in liberation'. As such, the non-perception [of the distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*] does not cease to exist even after liberation and there follows the absurdity of the body being produced once again.

[Objection] If it be said that fulfilment of purpose is the point of difference ? [That is, it may be argued that the above two non-perceptions

differ, because, in the former case, the purpose of the material elements constituting the body is not fulfilled, while, in the latter case, it is fulfilled.] [Answer] No, because the production [of the body] is observed both in the presence and the absence of the act [of apprehension]. [Objection explained] The material elements have their purpose fulfilled, for their perception [i.e. the experience of the objects] has been completed and as such, they do not start producing a further body [at the time of liberation]. This may be said to be the point of difference [between the two non-perceptions]. [Answer explained] No, because the production [of the body] is observed both in the presence and the absence of the act [of apprehension]. It is observed that [so long as one does not attain liberation] the body is produced again and again by the material elements, even if their purpose is fulfilled, when they perform the act of apprehending the objects and it is also observed that the body is produced again and again, though without any purpose, when [the material elements] do not perform the act of the apprehension of the distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*.

Thus, if the creation of the elements [is admitted to be] independent of *adṛṣṭa*, the production of the body for the purpose of the perception [of objects] cannot be justified. On the other hand, if the creation [of the elements is admitted to be] dependent upon *adṛṣṭa*, the production of the body for the purpose of the perception of objects can be justified. 'Perception of objects' means experiencing the results of actions.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana has said, under the previous *sūtra*, that liberation or an absolute cessation of the self's connection with the body is not possible, unless *adṛṣṭa* is admitted to be a cause of the body. To this, the followers of Sāṃkhya may answer that the body is produced so long as the distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* is not ascertained due to ignorance. When one ultimately ascertains the distinction between the two, there is no question of any further production of a body and one attains liberation. Liberation may thus be explained even without admitting that *adṛṣṭa* is a cause of the body. In answer, Vātsyāyana says that non-perception of the distinction, the alleged cause of the body, is present even in liberation, for, in that state, there is an absolute non-existence of knowledge in general due to the absence of the body. Thus, even in liberation, a body should be produced—which is, however, absurd.

As against this answer, it may be contended that there is difference between non-perception *before* the creation of the body and non-perception *after* the destruction of the body in liberation. In the former, the purpose of the body or the material elements constituting it—viz. the perception of the perceptibles—is yet to be fulfilled, while, in the latter, the purpose is already fulfilled. Thus, in liberation, the material

elements do not construct a further body because of the fulfilment of their purpose. Vātsyāyana rejects this argument by saying that there is no rule that the material elements do not construct a further body after the fulfilment of their purpose, for, until liberation, they are observed to produce different bodies (in different births), even though their purpose had been fulfilled already in the previous bodies. Nor can it be maintained that the purpose of the material elements is not fulfilled until there is a perception of the distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, for, in that case, the production of the different bodies until the attainment of liberation becomes simply purposeless.

Bhāṣya

[Objection] If it be argued that the body is produced by *adṛṣṭa* [as being a quality of the atoms]? [Objection explained] In the system of some [philosophers], *adṛṣṭa* is only a quality of the atoms [as well as the mind] and produces movement [in them]. Being moved by it, the atoms get conjoined with one another and produce the body. The mind, being moved by the *adṛṣṭa* which is its own quality [i.e. which is located in it], gets into such a body and the knower has the cognitions in a body as endowed with the mind. [Answer] In the [view of this] system also, there is a possibility of the body [being produced] even after liberation due to the absence of destruction of the quality [of *adṛṣṭa*]. [If *adṛṣṭa* be a cause of the body as a quality of the atoms], the body may be produced even after liberation, for *adṛṣṭa* being a quality of the atoms, cannot be destroyed.

Elucidation

After refuting the objection raised from the Sāṃkhya standpoint, Vātsyāyana critically examines another view which admits *adṛṣṭa* to be a cause of the body, though as a quality of the atoms and the mind. He points out that, in this view, *adṛṣṭa* can never be destroyed. Its destruction cannot be due to the destruction of the substratum, for both the atoms and the mind are eternal. Nor can it be destroyed through the enjoyment of its results, for the results are enjoyed only by the self and not by the atoms or the mind. It is never admissible that the *adṛṣṭa* of one is destroyed through the enjoyment of its results by someone else.

According to Vācaspati Miśra, the view refuted here was held by the Jaina philosophers. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, notes that it cannot be a Jaina view, for the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattva-āloka-alaṃkāra*, an authoritative work on the Jaina system, clearly states that *adṛṣṭa* is a quality of the self.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa also notes incidentally the Jaina classification of categories (*padārtha*). The categories are first divided into two classes, *jīva* and *ajīva*. An entity

possessing consciousness is *jīva* and those without consciousness are *ajīva*. A *jīva* 'having wordly existence' (*saṃsārin*) is of two kinds, characterised by a mind (*samanaska* or *saṃjñin*) and without a mind (*amanaska*). The *ajīva* is of five kinds—*pudgala*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa* and *kāla*. Entities that are characterised by touch, taste, smell and colour—viz. earth, water, fire and air—are called *pudgala*. It is of two kinds, atomic (*aṇu*) and composite (*skandha*). The mind also is of two kinds, positive (*bhāva*) and substance (*dravya*). Both the kinds are related to *pudgala*.

Sūtra 69

> Moreover, [if the conjunction of the mind with the body] be due to the *adṛṣṭa* located in the mind, the conjunction can never be destroyed // iii. 2. 69 //

Bhāṣya

If it is admitted that the mind gets conjoined with [the body] because of [being moved by] the *adṛṣṭa* which is [located as] a quality in the mind itself, the said conjunction can never be destroyed. In their view [i.e. the view mentioned last in the *bhāṣya* on the previous *sūtra*], what would be the cause of the mind's movement out of the body [at the time of death]? [If, on the other hand, *adṛṣṭa* is admitted to be a quality of the self], it can be explained [by saying] that when some particular *adṛṣṭa* is destroyed [through the enjoyment of its result], the mind is made to move out of the body by some other particular *adṛṣṭa* which has started yielding its result.

[Objection] If it be said that [the mind] moves out of [the body] because of its own *adṛṣṭa*? That is, let the same *adṛṣṭa* as is the cause of the mind's moving into the body be also the cause of its moving out of the body. [Answer] No, because the same *adṛṣṭa* cannot be the cause of both life and death. To explain, if it be so [i.e. if the opponent's claim is accepted], it would follow that the same *adṛṣṭa* is the cause of both life [when the mind moves into the body] as well as death [when the mind moves out of the body]. This, however, cannot be logically justified.

Sūtra 70

> Further, there would be the absurdity of the body being eternal, for death cannot be explained. // iii. 2. 70 //

Bhāṣya

Death results when, due to the [gradual] diminution of *adṛṣṭa* through the enjoyment of its result, the body falls, and there is rebirth due to some other

adṛṣṭa. If the production of the body [is admitted to be] due to only the material elements, not depending upon *adṛṣṭa*, what entity would there be the [gradual] diminution of which [may be said to be the cause of] the falling of the body and death? Thus, death, being logically unjustified, we would be led to the absurd conclusion that [the body is] eternal. If death is [admitted to be] merely accidental, the different kinds [of death] cannot be justified. [That is, each person dies under some specific condition. Someone dies young, someone in the mother's womb, someone in the ripe old age and so on. This shows that death too has some specific cause and is not merely accidental.]

With a view to explaining away the objection [raised by] 'there arises the possibility of the body even after liberation', [the opponent] says—

Sūtra 71

[Objection] It would be just like the uncaused (*nitya*) black colour of an atom. // iii. 2. 71 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Just as the uncaused black colour of an atom, when destroyed by conjunction with fire, is never produced again, so also the body which is produced by *adṛṣṭa* [as located in the atoms and the mind] is not produced once again [after its destruction] in liberation.

Elucidation

Uddyotakara explains the implication of the opponent as follows. The black colour of an atom of earth, though uncaused, is destroyed by a conjunction with fire. Similarly, the *adṛṣṭa* located as a quality in the atoms and the mind, though uncaused, is destroyed by 'right knowledge' (*tattva-jñāna*). As such, due to the complete destruction of the *adṛṣṭa*, no further body is produced after liberation.

Sūtra 72

[Answer] No [i.e. the instance of the previous *sūtra* does not stand logically], because there follows the absurdity of 'acquiring the result of an action not performed' (*akṛta-abhyāgama*). // iii. 2. 72 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] This [i.e. the uncaused-ness of the black colour of an atom] is not a proper instance. Why? Because of the absurdity of 'accepting what is not proved' (*akṛta-abhyāgama*). The word '*akṛta*' means what is not justified by any *pramāṇa*, and the word *abhyāgama* means admitting it, i.e. accepting it as true. Thus, one adhering [to the instance of the previous *sūtra*] has to admit what is not established by any *pramāṇa*. It [i e the uncaused-ness of the black colour of an atom] cannot, therefore, be a proper instance. Neither perception nor inference [establishing that the black colour of an atom is uncaused] has been cited. Hence the instance is stated here only as similar to the probandum [of an inference]. [That is, the black colour is actually produced by some specific cause. As such, its uncaused-ness, which is unduly accepted by the opponent, is not yet proved and cannot be cited as an instance.]

Or, [the opponent's view cannot be accepted], because of the absurdity of acquiring the result of an action not performed. One who tries to explain the production of the body as independent of *adṛṣṭa* with the instance of the black colour of the atom would have to face the absurdity of acquiring the result of an action not performed. That is, there arises the absurdity that the self has to feel pleasure and pain even without performing the actions which are the causes of [those particular] pleasure and pain. [The view of] one who answers in the affirmative [i.e. may even accept the above possibility] is contradicted by perception, inference and verbal testimony.

Contradiction with perception [is as follows]. The different kinds of pleasure and pain of all the living beings are known perceptually, for they are internally congised by each self. Wherein does their [i e. of pleasure and pain] difference lie? [They may be] intense, mild, lasting, shortlived, of manifold types, of only one type and so on, and [these are] the points of difference. But [in the opponent's view] there is no specific cause for pleasure and pain [viz. *adṛṣṭa*] as located in each individual self and a specific effect is not observed [to be produced] unless there is a specific cause. If, on the other hand, the sensations of pleasure and pain are [admitted to be] due to *adṛṣṭa*, the difference in the various forms of pleasure and pain can be explained to be due to the presence of intensity or mildness in the *adṛṣṭa*-s, virtuousness or viciousness [of the actions leading to] the collections of *adṛṣṭa*-s, and manifoldness or the sameness of *adṛṣṭa*-s. Thus, [in the opponent's view] the difference in the various forms of pleasure and pain—which is an observed fact—cannot be explained due to the absence of the cause and this is nothing but contradication with perception.

Next [is explained] contradiction with inference. The restriction of pleasure and pain is due to the restriction of the quality [viz. internal effort] in [the self of] a person. [That is, only a person whose self is characterised by an internal efiort for pleasure or pain experiences pleasure and pain.] Only a

conscious person who becomes aware that pleasure is to be produced by [some particular] means and being desirous of attaining [the pleasure] strives to get the means for it can have the sensation of pleasure, and not one who is the opposite [i.e. who does not act in the above manner]. Again, one who becomes aware that pain is to be produced by [some particular] means and being desirous of avoiding [the pain], strives to avoid the means for it does not have the sensation of pain, and not one who is the opposite. But it is a fact that sometimes pleasure and pain are restricted to [i.e. produced] the different conscious persons even without such internal effort, [when the cause of pleasure or pain appears suddenly and there is no scope for the person's deliberation]. It is thus inferred that [the sudden pleasure or pain which is not due to internal effort] must be due to the restriction [i.e. presence] of some other quality [viz. *adṛṣṭa*] of the conscious self. If the sensations of pleasue and pain are [admitted to be] independent of *adṛṣṭa*, the [above] inference becomes contradicted. The other quality [of the self, established by the above inference] is called *adṛṣṭa* [lit. unseen] because it is imperceptible. It is also not restricted [to a particular point of time], because no specific point of time for the production of its result [can be cited beforehand and as such, it can be the cause of sudden pleasure and pain]. Besides, [the other qualities of the self like] knowledge, [internal effort] etc are destroyed [in the third moment after production]. [Thus, they cannot be the cause of sudden pleasure and pain at a later period]

Next [is explained] contradiction with verbal testimony. There are [*śāstra*-s embodying] the various precepts of the *ṛṣi*-s concerning the performance or avoidance of different acts. The results of these precepts are the different persons' being engaged to [the pious acts]—i.e. performing [them], according to the persons' caste (*varṇa*) and 'stage of life' (*āśrama*) as well as their being prevented from [the harmful acts]—i.e. avoiding [them]. These two [forms of activity, viz. being engaged to and being prevented from ceremonies, prescribed by *śāstra*-s] are in contradiction with the view that there is neither virtue nor vice and the sensations of pleasure and pain of the persons are not due to *adṛṣṭa*. [That is, if there is neither virtue nor vice, nobody would either perform the pious acts or refrain from the harmful ones.]

Therefore, the views that the production of the body is not dependent upon *adṛṣṭa* and that the sensations of pleasure and pain are not due to *adṛṣṭa* are only some false notions of the most sinful onse.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON BODY BEING PRODUCED BY 'DHARMA' AND 'ADHARMA'

(*śarīra-adṛṣṭaniṣpādyatva-prakaraṇa*)

SECOND ĀHNIKA OF THE THIRD CHAPTER ENDS

LIST OF SŪTRA-S

Abbreviations

ASS	:	NS, Nbh & NVr ed. Ānandāśrama Saṃskṛta Series.
B	:	Ballentyne, *The Aphorisms of the Nyāya Philosophy of Gautama*, Allahabad 1850.
Bibl. Ind.	:	NS & Nbh ed, Bibliotheca Indica.
ChSS	:	*Nyāyadarśana* and the *Bhāṣya* with *Khadyota* by Ganganath Jha and the *Bhāṣyacandra* by Raghūttama (on NS i. 1. 1—iii. 2. 17). Ed. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series.
Nbh	:	*Nyāya-bhāṣya*
NM	:	*Nyāyamañjarī* by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, ed. Vizianagram Sanskrit Series.
NS	:	*Nyāya-sūtra*
NSN	:	*Nyāya-sūcī-nibandha.*
NV	:	*Nyāyavārttika*, ed. Bibliotheca Indica.
NVi	:	*Nyāya-vivaraṇa*, ed. Paṇḍit.
NVr	:	*Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti*. See ASS.
nvr	:	*Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti*, ed. 1828.
NVTT	:	*Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā*, ed. Vizianagram Sanskrit Series.
R	:	NS with NVr, ed. Paṇḍit (by Ramabhavana Sarma). This does not agree with the edition of the Bibl. Ind. or the ed. nvr.
V	:	Vidyabhusana's translation of NS.
VSS	:	NS with Nbh, ed. Gangadhara Sastrin, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series.

Adhyāya III *Āhnika I*

iii. 1. 1 / darśana-sparśanābhyām ekārtha-grahaṇāt.
iii. 1. 2 / na, viṣaya-vyavasthānāt.
iii. 1. 3 / tad-vyavasthānād eva ātma-sadbhāvād apratiṣedhaḥ.
iii. 1. 4 / śarīra-dāhe pātakābhāvāt.
iii. 1. 5 / tad-abhāvaḥ sātmaka[1]-pradāhe api tan-nityatvāt.

1. R : *sātma-*

iii. 1. 6 / na, kāryāśraya-kartṛ-vadhāt.[2]

2. NVi : *bādhāt.* NVr : *bodhāt.* Bibl. Ind., nvr, B : *badhāt.*

iii. 1. 7 / savya[3]-dṛṣṭasya itareṇa pratyabhijñānāt.

3. B, nvr : *savyena.*

iii. 1. 8 / na, ekasmin nāsāsthi-vyavahite dvitvābhimānāt.
iii. 1. 9 / eka-vināśe[4] dvitīyāvināśān na ekatvam.

4. R, B, nvr : *nāśe.*

iii. 1. 10 / avayava-nāśe api avayavi-upalabdher ahetuḥ.
iii. 1. 11 / dṛṣṭānta-virodhād apratiṣedhaḥ.
iii. 1. 12 / indriyāntara-vikārāt.
iii. 1. 13 / na, smṛteḥ smartavya-viṣayatvāt.
iii. 1. 14 / tadātma-guṇatva[5]-sadbhāvād apratiṣedhaḥ.

5. Though others read *guṇa*, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa's reading agrees with NSN, R, B, nvr and NVi.

iii. 1. 15 / na, ātma-pratipatti-hetūnāṃ manasi sambhavāt.
iii. 1. 16 / jñātur jñāna-sādhana-upapatteḥ saṃjñā-bheda-mātram.
iii. 1. 17 / niyamaś ca niranumānaḥ.
iii. 1. 18 / pūrvābhyasta-smṛtyanubandhāj jātasya harṣa-bhaya-śoka-sampratipatteḥ.
iii. 1. 19 / padmādiṣu prabodha-sammīlana[6]-vikāravat tad[7]-vikāraḥ[8].

6. R : *mīlanavat tad-*

7. ASS omits *tad.*

8. NVi : *tad-upapatteḥ*

iii. 1. 20 / na, uṣṇa-śīta-varṣā[9]-kāla-nimittatvāt pañcātmaka-vikārāṇām.

9. Others read *varṣa.* The present reading agrees with ChSS, ASS, Bibl. Ind., R, B, nvr and NVi.

iii. 1. 21 / pretyāhārābhyāsa-kṛtāt stanyābhilāṣāt.
iii. 1. 22 / ayasaḥ ayaskāntābhigamanavat tadupasarpaṇam.
iii. 1. 23 / na, anyatra pravṛttyabhāvāt
iii. 1. 24 / vītarāga-janmādarśanāt.
iii. 1. 25 / saguṇa-dravyotpattivat tadutpattiḥ.
iii. 1. 26 / na, saṃkalpa-nimittatvād rāgādīnām.
iii. 1. 27 / pārthivaṃ guṇāntara[10]-upalabdheḥ

10. Śaṅkara Miśra (on *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* 4. 2. 4) reads *tad-viśeṣaguṇa.*

iii. 1. 28 / pārthiva-āpya-taijasaṃ tad-guṇa-upalabdheḥ.[11]

11. Some do not read the present and the following two as *sūtra*-s. They are, however, included as *sūtra*-s in NSN, ASS, ChSS, NVr, B, R, and NVi.

iii. 1. 29 / niḥśvāsa-ucchvāsa-upalabdheś cāturbhautikam.
iii. 1. 30 / gandha-kleda-pāka-vyūha-avakāśadānebhyaḥ pāñcabhautikam.
iii. 1. 31 / śruti-prāmaṇyāc ca.
iii. 1. 32 / kṛṣṇasāre sati upalambhād vyatiricya ca upalambhāt saṃśayaḥ.
iii. 1. 33 / mahad-aṇu-grahaṇāt.[12]

12. R : *mahad-agrahaṇāt.* NVi : *anugrahaṇāt.*

iii. 1. 34 / raśmyartha-sannikarṣaviśeṣāt[13] tad-grahaṇam.

13. B and nvr : *sannikarṣāt tad.*

iii. 1. 35 / tad-anupalabdher ahetuḥ.
iii. 1. 36 / na anumīyamānasya pratyakṣataḥ anupalabdhir abhāva-hetuḥ.
iii. 1. 37 / dravya-guṇa-dharma-bhedāc ca upalabdhi-niyamaḥ.[14]

14. NVi and ChSS : *aniyamaḥ.*

iii. 1. 38 / aneka-dravya-samavāyād rūpa-viśeṣāc ca rūpa-upalabdhiḥ.[15]

15. cf. *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* 4. 1. 8.

iii. 1. 39 / karmakāritaś ca indriyāṇāṃ vyūhaḥ puruṣārtha-tantraḥ.
iii. 1. 40 / madhyandina-ulkā-prakāśa-anupalabdhivat tad-anupalabdhiḥ,
iii. 1. 41 / na, rātrau api anupalabdheḥ.
iii. 1. 42 / vāhya-prakāśa-anugrahād viṣaya-upalabdher anabhivyaktitaḥ anupalabdhiḥ.
iii. 1. 43 / abhivyaktau ca abhibhavāt.
iii. 1. 44 / naktañcara-nayana[16]-raśmi-darśanāc ca.

16. B and nvr omit *nayana*.

iii. 1. 45 / aprāpya-grahaṇaṃ kāca-abhrapaṭala-sphaṭikāntarita-upalabdheḥ.
iii. 1. 46 / kuḍyāntarita-anupalabdher apratiṣedhaḥ.
iii. 1. 47 / apratighātāt sannikarṣa-upapattiḥ.[17]

17. R, B and nvr : *utpattiḥ*.

iii. 1. 48 / ādityaraśmeḥ sphaṭikāntare[18] api dāhye avighātāt.[19]

18. Others read *sphaṭikāntarite*. The present reading agrees with ASS, VSS, Bibl. Ind. and R.

19. NVi : *abhighātāt*.

iii. 1. 49 / na, itaretara-dharma-prasaṅgāt.
iii. 1. 50 / ādarśa-udakayoḥ prasāda-svābhāvyād rūpa-upalabdhivat tadupalabdhiḥ.
iii. 1. 51 / dṛṣṭānumitānāṃ hi niyoga-pratiṣedhānupapattiḥ.[20]

20. NM adds, in the end, the expression *pramāṇasya tattva-viṣayatvāt* which occurs in Nbh and NV.

iii. 1. 52 / sthānānyatve sati nānātvād[21] avayavi-nānāsthānatvāc ca saṃśayaḥ.

21. V, Bibl. Ind. and VSS add *avayavi-nānātvād*.

iii. 1. 53 / tvag avyatirekāt.

Note. In Bibl. Ind. and V, the following three expressions (which occur in Nbh) are read as *sūtra*-s after the present one : (i) *na, indriyāntara-artha-anupalabdheḥ* ; (ii) *tvag-avayava-viśeṣeṇa dhūma-upalabdhivat tad-upalabdhiḥ* ; (iii) *vyāhatatvād ahetuḥ*.

iii. 1. 54 / na, yugapad[22] artha-anupalabdheḥ.

22. VSS : *ayugapad*.

iii. 1. 55 / vipratiṣedhāc ca na tvag ekā.
iii. 1. 56 / indriya-artha-pañcatvāt.
iii. 1. 57 / na, tad-artha-vahutvāt.
iii. 1. 58 / gandhatvādi-avyatirekād gandhādīnām apratiṣedhaḥ
iii. 1. 59 / viṣayatva-avyatirekād ekatvam.
iii. 1. 60 / na, buddhilakṣaṇa-adhiṣṭhāna-gati-ākṛti-jāti-pañcatvebhyaḥ.
iii. 1. 61 / bhūta-guṇaviśeṣa-upalabdhes tādātmyam.
iii. 1. 62 / gandha-rasa-rūpa-sparśa-śabdānāṃ sparśa-paryantāḥ pṛthivyāḥ.

iii. 1. 63 / ap-tejo-vāyūnāṃ pūrvaṃ pūrvam apohya ākāśasya uttaraḥ.

iii. 1. 64 / na, sarvaguṇa-anupalabdheḥ.

iii. 1. 65 / ekaikaśyena[23] uttara-uttara-guṇa-sadbhāvād uttara-uttarāṇāṃ tadanupalabdhiḥ[24]

23. Ass, Bibl. Ind., R, B, nvr and V : *ekaikasya eva*. The present reading agrees with NV and NSN.

24. ASS and R : *upalabdhiḥ*.

iii. 1. 66 / viṣṭaṃ hi aparaṃ pareṇa.

Note. Accordiug to some, the present *sūtra* is preceded by the *sūtra* : *saṃsargācca aneka-guṇa-grahaṇam*. Phaṇibhuṣaṇa, following NSN, does not read it as a *sūtra* (and includes it in the *bhāṣya* on iii. 1. 65). He, however, comments that it seems to be a separate *sūtra* from the remarks of Vātsyāyana.

iii. 1. 67 / na, pārthiva-āpyayoḥ pratyakṣatvāt.

iii. 1. 68 / pūrvaṃ pūrvaṃ guṇa-utkarṣāt tat-tat-pradhānam.

iii. 1. 69 / tad-vyavasthānaṃ tu bhūyastvāt.

iii. 1. 70 / saguṇānām indriya-bhāvāt.

iii. 1. 71 / tena eva tasya agrahaṇāc ca.

iii. 1. 72 / na, śabdaguṇa-upalabdheḥ.

iii. 1. 73 / tad-upalabdhir itaretara-dravya-guṇa-vaidharmyāt.

Adhyāya III *Āhnika II*

iii. 2. 1 / karma-ākāśa-sādharmyāt saṃśayaḥ.
iii. 2. 2 / viṣaya-pratyabhijñānāt.
iii. 2. 3 / sādhyasamatvād ahetuḥ.
iii. 2. 4 / na, yugapad-agrahaṇāt.
iii. 2. 5 / apratyabhijñāne ca vināśa-prasaṅgaḥ.
iii. 2. 6 / kramavṛttitvād ayugapad-grahaṇam.
iii. 2. 7 / apratyabhijñānaṃ ca viṣayāntara-vyāsaṅgāt.
iii. 2. 8 / na gati-abhāvāt.
iii. 2. 9 / sphaṭika-anyatva-abhimānavat tadanyatva-abhimānaḥ.

Note : See under *Elucidation.*

iii. 2. 10 / sphaṭike api apara-apara-utpatteḥ kṣaṇikatvād vyaktīnām ahetuḥ.[25]

25. NVi omits *ahetuḥ.*

iii. 2. 11 / niyama[26]-hetu-abhāvād yathādarśanam abhyanujñā.

26. Nvi : *laya-*

iii. 2. 12 / na, utpatti-vināśa-kāraṇa-upalabdheḥ.
iii. 2. 13 / kṣīra-vināśe[27] kāraṇa-anupalabdhivad[28] dadhi-utpattivac ca tad-upapattiḥ.[29]

27. NVi : *vināśa*

28. B, nvr : *anupalabdhika.*

29. VSS, ASS and NVi : *utpattiḥ.*

iii. 2. 14 / liṅgato grahaṇān na anupalabdhiḥ.
iii. 2. 15 / na, payasaḥ pariṇāma-guṇāntaraprādurbhāvāt.
iii. 2. 16 / vyūhāntarād dravyāntara-utpattidarśanaṃ[30] pūrvadravya-nivṛtter anumānam.

30. NVi omits *darśana.*

iii. 2. 17 / kvacid vināśakāraṇa-anupalabdheḥ kvacic ca upalabdher anekāntaḥ.
iii. 2. 18 / na indriya-arthayoḥ, tad-vināśe api jñāna-avasthānāt.
iii. 2. 19 / yugapaj jñeya[31]-anupalabdheś ca[32] na[33] manasaḥ.

31. NVi : *jñāna-*

32. NSN and NV omit *ca.*

33. NVi omits *na.*

iii 2. 20 / tad ātmaguṇatve api tulyam.
iii. 2. 21 / indriyair manasaḥ[34] sannikarṣa-abhāvāt tad-anutpattiḥ.

34. R, nvr, B and NVi omit the first two words.

iii. 2. 22 / na, utpattikāraṇa-anapadeśāt.[35]

35. NVi : *anupadeśāt.*

iii. 2. 23 / vināśakāraṇa-anupalabdheś ca avasthāne tan-nityatva-prasaṅgaḥ.

iii. 2. 24 / anityatva-grahaṇād[36] buddher buddyantarād vināśaḥ[37] śabdavat.

36. NV, NSN, NVi, B and nvr : *grahaṇād.*

37. ASS : *hi nāśaḥ.*

iii. 2. 25 / jñānasamaveta-ātmapradeśa-sannikarṣān manasaḥ smṛtyutpatter na yugapad utpattiḥ.

iii. 2. 26 / na, antaḥśarīra-vṛttitvān manasaḥ.

iii. 2. 27 / sādhyatvād ahetuḥ.

iii. 2. 28 / smarataḥ śarīra-dhāraṇa-upapatter apratiṣedhaḥ.[38]

38. R : *aniṣedhaḥ.*

iii. 2. 29 / na tat, āśugatitvān manasaḥ.

iii. 2. 30 / na,[39] smaraṇakāla-aniyamat.

39. R omits *na.*

iii. 2. 31 / ātmapreraṇa-yadṛcchā-jñatābhiś ca na saṃyoga-viśeṣaḥ.

iii. 2. 32 / vyāsakta-manasaḥ pāda-vyathanena saṃyoga-viśeṣeṇa samānam.[40]

40. R : *samānaḥ.*

iii. 2. 33 / praṇidhāna-liṅgādijñānānām ayugapadbhāvād yugapad-asmaraṇam.[41]

41. NV, NSN, NVi, B, nvr and Bibl. Ind. : *yugapad asmaraṇam.* The following expression (which occurs in the *bhāṣya*) is read as a separate *sūtra* after the present one : *prātibhavat tu praṇidhānādi-anapekṣe smārte yaugapadya-prasaṅgaḥ.*

iii. 2. 34 / jñasya icchā-dveṣa-nimittatvād ārambha-nivṛttyoḥ.

iii. 2. 35 / tal-liṅgatvād icchā-dveṣayoḥ pārthivādyeṣu apratiṣedhaḥ.

iii. 2. 36 / paraśvādiṣu ārambha-nivṛtti-darśanāt.

iii. 2. 37 / niyama-aniyamau tu tad-viśeṣakau.

iii. 2. 38 / yathoktahetutvāt pāratantryād akṛtābhyāgamāc[42] ca.

42. NVi, R, nvr and B ; *svakṛtābhyāgamāt.*

iii. 2. 39 / pariśeṣād yathoktahetu-upapatteś ca.

iii. 2. 40 / smaraṇaṃ tu ātmano jña-svābhāvyāt.

iii. 2. 41 / praṇidhāna-nibandha-abhyāsa-liṅga-lakṣaṇa-sādṛśya-parigraha-āśraya āśrita-sambandha-ānantarya-viyoga-ekakārya- virodha-atiśaya- prāpti- vyavadhāna-sukha- duḥkha- icchā-dveṣa- bhaya- arthitva- kriya- rāga- dharma- adharma-nimittebhyaḥ.

iii. 2. 42 / karma-anavasthāyi-grahaṇāt.

iii. 2. 43 / avyakta-grahaṇam anavasthāyi-tvād, vidyut-sampāte[43] rūpa-avyakta-grahaṇavat.

43. B and nvr : *saṃghāte.*

iii. 2. 44 / hetu-upādānāt pratiṣeddhavya-abhyanujñā,

iii. 2. 45 / na,[44] pradīpa-arciḥ[45]-santati-abhivyakta-grahaṇavat tad-grahaṇam.[46]

44. The *na* is retained by Phaṇibhūṣaṇa on the authority of NV, NVr and NSN.

45. NV and NSN : *arciṣaḥ*.

46. R, B and nvr add from Nbh : *anavasthāyitve api*.

iii. 2. 46 / dravye svaguṇa-paraguṇa-upalabdheḥ saṃśayaḥ.

iii. 2. 47 / yāvad-dravya[47]-bhāvitvād rūpādīnām.

47. Others read *śarīra*. The present reading agrees with NV and NSN (not in ChSS).

iii. 2. 48 / na, pākaja-guṇāntara-utpatteḥ.

iii. 2. 49 / pratidvandvi-siddheḥ pākajānām[48] apratiṣedhaḥ.

48. R : *pākajātānām*

iii. 2. 50 / śarīra-vyāpitvāt.

iii. 2. 51 / na, keśa-nakhādiṣu anupalabdheḥ

iii. 2. 52 / tvak-paryantatvāt śarīrasya keśa-nakhādiṣu aprasaṅgaḥ.

iii. 2. 53 / śarīra-guṇa-vaidharmyāt.

iii. 2. 54 / na rūpādīnām itara-itara-vaidharmyāt.

iii. 2. 55 / aindriyakatvād rūpādīnām apratiṣedhaḥ.

iii. 2. 56 / jñāna-ayaugapadyād ekam manaḥ.

iii. 2. 57 / na, yugapad aneka-kriyā-upalabdheḥ.

iii. 2. 58 / alāta[49]-cakra-darśanavat tadupalabdhir āśusañcārāt.

49. NV : *ālāta*.

iii. 2. 59 / yathokta-h tutvāc ca aṇu.[50]

50. B and nvr : *aṇuḥ*.

iii 2. 60 / pūrvakṛta-phala-anubandhāt tad-utpattiḥ

iii. 2. 61 / bhūtebhyo mūrti-upādānavat tad-upādānam.

iii. 2. 62 / na, sādhyasamatvāt.

iii. 2. 63 / na, utpattinimittatvān mātā-pitroḥ.

iii. 2. 64 / tathā āhārasya.

iii. 2. 65 / prāptau ca[51] aniyamāt.

51. R : *vā*.

iii. 2. 66 / śarīra-utpatti-nimittavat saṃyoga-utpatti-nimittam karma[52]

52. VSS : *nimitte karmāśaye*.

iii. 2. 67 / etena aniyamaḥ pratyuktaḥ.

iii. 2. 68 / tad adṛṣṭa-kāritam iti cet ?[53] punas tat-prasaṅgaḥ apavarge.

53. B, nvr and NVi omit the expression from *tad* to *cet*.

iii. 2. 69 / manaḥkarma-nimittatvāc ca saṃyoga-vyucchedaḥ

iii. 2. 70 / nityatva-prasaṅgaś ca prāyaṇa-anupapatteḥ.

iii. 2. 71 / aṇuśyāmatā-nityatvavad etat syāt.

iii. 2. 72 / na, akṛtābhyāgama-prasaṅgāt.